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Introduction
Environmental pollution is one of the biggest problems we face today. While some forms of environ-
mental pollution mainly have negative impacts at a local level, others cross borders through path-
ways like water and air and affect entire regions or the whole planet making them a transnational or
world-wide problem. In other words, environmental pollution may have a spatial component. For
example, the release of green house gases into the atmosphere is the main driver of man-made global
climate change, itself responsible for the rise of sea levels, heat waves, melting of glaciers, droughts,
and floods worldwide. Furthermore, industrial and agricultural activities have led to soil contami-
nation, destroying fertile soil and water ecosystems locally, but also depleting natural resources such
as rainforests affecting the climate worldwide. Moreover, the discharge of commercial and industrial
waste into rivers has drastically deteriorated their water quality, affecting the entire biosphere along
their course. Further forms of pollution, such as artificial light and noise pollution, drown out natural
landscapes locally, disturbing wildlife in their natural habitat.
In my thesis, I consider environmental pollution that is spatially distributed. Countries, regions or
cities, represented by agents, may thus not only pollute their direct environment but their pollution
may spread and accumulate across agents. Hence, whether and by howmuch the agents are affected
by the pollution of the others depends on their location, their distance to the polluting sources and
the accumulative nature of the pollution considered. The agents and the pollution emitted build
a network, in which the agents represent the nodes and are arranged according to a geographical
structure and in which the pollution flows represent the edges that connect the agents. The pollution
emitted exerts a negative externality on the agents in the network. Since the others mostly bear the
negative consequences of the pollution produced and these external costs are not taken into account
by the polluters themselves, the polluters have little incentive to incur the costs to reduce pollution.
Consequently, they choose to pollute more as if they were required to pay all associated costs. Thus,
in general, unregulated markets in goods with externalities generate prices that do not reflect the full
social cost of their transactions and therefore allocate the resources inefficiently. As a consequence,
an intervention by an external authority or a voluntary agreement among the agents seems necessary
to correct for the externalities and to improve on the inefficient status-quo.
There is a broad range of policy instruments available for the mitigation of pollution by an exter-
nal authority, including the establishment of property rights, command-and-control regulation and
market-based approaches. However, these approaches may be far from efficient or impractical to im-
plement if, for example, heterogeneously distributed pollution or asymmetric information is present.
In addition, pollution is rarely confined within territorial boundaries with the consequence that reg-
ulations cannot be instated in other jurisdictions and the polluters cannot be held liable for the pollu-
tion damage they cause in these jurisdictions. Thus, if no authority to enforce any regulation exists,
voluntary cooperation among the polluters and their victims is the only way to improve on the in-
efficient outcome. In this thesis, I analyse if and to what extent the efficient levels of pollution can
be implemented by voluntary agreements or regulatory instruments when pollution is spatially dis-
tributed and when many polluters share a network.
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In the first chapter, co-authored with Ralph Winkler, we address the problem of efficient emission
abatement in a multi-polluter network, where the polluters are sovereign states with no supra-
national authority to enforce any action. In this chapter, we consider a specific network in which
the polluters are hierarchically ordered along a graph from upstream to downstream. In this setting,
the emissions released upstream accumulate while moving downstream so that the pollution emitted
upriver induces negative externalities on all downstream agents. An example for this structure is an
international river being polluted by the riparians along its course. The polluters may abate some
of their pollution by incurring abatement costs to reduce the damages caused to their downstream
agents. As the agents do not take into account the externalities on the other agents when deciding on
their actions, they decide to abate inefficiently little. Coase (1960) argued that the problem of having
inefficiently low levels of pollution could be solved by establishing property rights. Given property
rights, agents have an incentive to find a way to make mutually beneficial deals that lead them to
take the externalities into account. However, concerning environmental problems, it is often unclear
how these property rights should be defined. As an example, reconsider river pollution. There is
an absence of clearly defined property rights over the river as all riparians sharing the river usually
claim property rights over it or at least the part of the river flowing through their territory. As a con-
sequence, none of the riparians is willing to reduce its pollution or pay compensations to the others
suffering from it. Thus, one of the reasons for the inefficiently low amount of pollution abatement is
the absence of well-defined property rights or/and the lack of an authority to assign such property
rights. Hence, the only way to tackle pollution crossing borders is voluntary cooperation among the
agents. In order for all externalities to be internalized, the grand coalition needs to form. Thus, all
agents need to cooperate to attain the efficient solution.
An obvious difficulty of any cooperation is the tendency for agents to seek a free ride. This is be-
cause the formation of a coalition, in which agents act cooperatively and therefore reduce pollution,
exerts a positive externality on potential non-members. Thus, the incentive to deviate from the grand
coalition hinges on how much these deviating agents can achieve by themselves. Clearly, this value
depends on how the remaining agents will behave once one or many agents have left the grand
coalition. These remaining agents could either fully cooperate, form partial coalitions or, as is often
assumed, they may behave fully non-cooperatively and break into singletons. Thus, for an agent not
to deviate from the grand coalition, an agent should be at least as well off if he is part of the grand
coalition as if he were on his own or cooperating with some others.
To achieve the grand coalition and the consequent reduction of pollution to efficient levels may
involve some agents making losses relative to the status-quo. This is especially true for spatially
distributed pollution as well as non-uniform damages and mitigation costs, where moving towards
an efficient solution without having the victims pay compensations to the polluters for incurring
the mitigation costs inevitably violates individual rationality. As a consequence, financial transfers
between the agents have been advocated. But how should these transfers look like? While the abate-
ment allocation determines the total welfare, these compensation transfers determine how this total
welfare is shared among the agents. Clearly, there are infinitely many possibilities how this welfare
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can be split. One requirement for the transfer scheme to be accepted is to ensure that any polluter
or coalition of polluters is compensated at least for what they would be able to achieve themselves if
they were operating individually. Another requirement addresses the issue of fairness, in the sense
that any transfer scheme should be perceived as fair. One possible way to define fairness is to demand
that no agent or coalition of agents should bemade better off than they were if the non-members fully
mitigated the effects of the negative externality caused in their territories. The abatement allocation
implemented together with the chosen transfer scheme is often called an agreement.
In the first chapter of this thesis, we therefore search for an efficient agreement that is sufficiently
appealing to all agents involved for them to agree to it. Thus, it must fulfil the following conditions:
First, all agents must participate and the efficient pollution levels need to be implemented. Second,
it must satisfy the so-called participation constraints for all possible coalitions while assuming that
non-coalition members behave non-cooperatively. This means that all agents or possible coalitions
are made better off by the agreement than they were if they acted alone. Third, is must fulfil a fair-
ness criterion in the sense that no agent and no coalition is made better off by the agreement than
it were being alone in the network with no other polluters than themselves. We find that there ex-
ists only one agreement that fulfils all participation constraints and fairness constraints at the same
time. This agreement, called theDownstream Incremental Distribution, assigns each agent his marginal
contribution to the coalition composed of its predecessors. It favours downstream agents, as the co-
operation gain goes to the agent most downstream while the agent most upstream is set indifferent
to the status-quo.
Even if we do not have the problem of a missing authority to enforce any joint action, there are
other reasons why an inefficient abatement allocation prevails, for example asymmetric information.
In this case, one agent may have more information than another agent, for example more than the
government. This divergence in knowledge may lead to a misallocation of resources because the
better informed agent has a comparative advantage. Thus, an additional difficulty in forging an
agreement among the agents or implementing a regulatory instrument is that each participant may
retain private information on his mitigation costs or damages. In particular, polluters may have an
incentive to exaggerate their privately known abatement costs in order to reduce the abatement level
they have to supply with the consequence that most of the burden of abatement is left to the others.
Due to this discrepancy in information, it may even be beneficial for an external authority to delegate
its power to enforce actions to one of the agents in the network.
In the second chapter, I address this problem of asymmetric information in multi-polluter networks.
For this, I extend the linear hierarchical setting with downstream oriented externalities introduced
in the first chapter to include asymmetric information and a federalist governance structure. The
lower tiers, representing the agents along the graph, are assumed to have private information about
their abatement costs. An example for this structure is the Aare, a river which flows through several
cantons of Switzerland. I propose that one of the lower tiers is nominated by the federal government
to offer a set of mitigation contracts to the remaining agents. These contracts specify an abatement
level and a compensation payment for the abatement effort. The selected principal can either pro-
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pose the contracts in a centralized manner, where he simultaneously offers contracts to all agents or
he contracts only with his direct up- and downstream neighbours and delegates to those two agents
the authority to contract with their direct up- respectively downriver neighbours and so on till all
agents received a contract. I establish that given full information, both models implement the first-
best optimal allocation and the choice of the principal only determines which agent attains the full
cooperation gain.
In the presence of asymmetric information, an agreement must not only satisfy the participation
constraints of all agents, but also the so-called incentive compatibility constraints. When fulfilled,
these incentive compatibility constraints guarantee that agents do not lie about their true costs. The
abatement allocation attained may thus not be efficient as information rents in return for disclosing
information have to be paid. Given asymmetric information, I demonstrate that even though the
delegated principal agent model is prone to a control loss, the abatement allocation implemented in
the centralized principal agent model can be replicated in the delegated principal agent model while
matching the expected costs of the principal. However, to counteract and to avoid the tendency of the
intermediate agents to bias the abatement allocation in their favour, the nominated principal must be
able to monitor the abatement levels as well as the reports of the intermediate agents and it must be
ensured that the set of contracts is executed after all intermediate agents have accepted their subcon-
tracts.
As all potential principals implement a different abatement allocation, the choice of the prime prin-
cipal matters for the total expected costs occurring in the river basin. I show that the tier located the
most downriver, which is subject to the same informational constraints as the federal government, is
never the best choice to nominate as a principal. In case of linear damages, I establish that choosing
the agent at the source of the river will implement the abatement allocation leading to least expected
total costs for the river basin. For other functional forms of damage and abatement costs, the nomi-
nation of the best principal depends not only on the position of the potential principal along the river
but also on the damage cost parameters as well as the exogenously given pollution levels.
Even if we have full information on all relevant parameters and there exists an authority to en-
force regulatory instruments, inefficient abatement allocations may still prevail in case of spatially
distributed pollution. This is because the regulatory instruments are inefficient or impractical to im-
plement. For example, command-and-control regulation, which includes policies to prescribe how
much pollution a source is allowed to emit or what types of control equipment it must use to meet
such requirements, have often been criticised. First of all, they offer no incentive to abate pollu-
tion beyond the standard set by the authority or to rethink their production methods. Second, they
are inflexible. It is a "one-size-fits-all" approach that does not consider varying performance of pol-
luters. Third, selecting the appropriate standards demands a high level of information, which may
be missing or misrepresented. Thus, command-and-control regulation is unlikely to achieve a least-
cost reduction in pollution and often leads to inefficient pollution levels. In contrast, market-based
approaches seek to address the market failure caused by the externalities by incorporating the ex-
ternal cost created through taxes and charges or by creating property rights and facilitating the es-
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tablishment of a proxy market for the use of environmental services. In other words, market-based
approaches create markets where they did not previously exists to give polluters incentives to re-
duce pollution. These policies can either be quantity-based or price-based. Quantity-based policies
include cap-and-trade systems where the total quantity of pollution is set at the optimal level of
pollution, pollution allowances in this amount are distributed to the polluters and a market is estab-
lished in which the allowances may be traded. Price-based policies are often a tax, where polluters
have to pay a fixed price per unit of emissions. In theory, marked-based policies are often favoured
over command-and-control regulation because they tend to be least costly, place a lower information
burden on the authority and provide incentives for technological advances. However, with heteroge-
neously dispersed pollution, such as river pollution, the social welfare optimum can only be achieved
by source-dependent taxes or prices of the tradable pollution rights in cap-and-trade systems, which
makes their implementation questionable. Being restricted to one price or tax, the question arises,
whether the enforcing authority could set a cap or a tax other than the efficient total pollution level
to reduce overall costs.
In the third chapter of this thesis, I address this issue and propose a second best optimal solution
to the problem of emission abatement in multi-polluter models. I extend the multi-polluter model
introduced in the previous chapters to a general multi-polluter network with heterogeneously dis-
persed pollution, where there exists an external authority enforcing a cap-and-trade system to control
pollution with one price for tradable pollution permits. While with regulating uniformly distributed
pollution the first-best optimal solution can be implemented, controlling heterogeneously dispersed
pollution in multi-polluter networks is more complex. This is because with heterogeneously dis-
persed pollution, the emissions released at the sources and the damage-inducing ambient pollution
levels accumulated at the receptors may not coincide. Because emissions from different sources in-
duce different damage costs for the receptors and as the marginal damage costs may vary across
receptors, the first-best optimal abatement allocation can only be implemented by source-dependent
taxes or prices of the tradable pollution rights in cap-and-trade systems. Hence, setting only one
price for the tradable pollution permits will result in inefficiency.
To improve on this situation, I propose a second-best optimal solution. Instead of taking an ex-
ogenously given and predetermined pollution cap in a cap-and-trade system, the pollution cap is
endogenized so that it is determined by the total cost-minimizing equilibrium of a cap-and-trade
system. I show that with quadratic abatement costs and linear damage costs, the first-best optimal
pollution cap implements the second-best cost-minimizing equilibrium of the cap-and-trade system
for any network. However, the second-best optimal abatement allocation differs from the first-best
optimal abatement allocation, implying higher second-best optimal total costs than first-best optimal.
In particular, second-best optimal total abatement costs fall short of first-best total abatement costs,
while second-best optimal total damage costs exceed first-best optimal damage costs. For other func-
tional forms of damage and abatement cost functions, first-best pollution caps are not second-best
optimal. The second-best optimal pollution caps may either exceed or deceed the first-best optimal
pollution caps and have to be determined for each specific network. These findings hold for two
different cap-and-trade systems, the emission permit market and the ambient pollution market.
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To sum up, in this thesis, I studied if and to what extent the efficient solution can be implemented
in multi-polluter networks with spatially distributed externalities. For this, I analysed three different
circumstances: First, when there is transboundary pollution with no supranational authority to en-
force any regulation, implying that a self-enforcing agreement among all agents is required to reach
efficiency. We show that for a specific network there exists such a voluntary and efficient agreement
that is both stable to deviations and perceived as fair. Second, when there is asymmetric information
in regard to the mitigation costs, implying that acceptable agreements among all agents have to be
found that lead to the revelation of the true costs with the smallest welfare loss possible. We show
that for a specific network with a federalist setting the government should elect one of the lower
tiers as a principal to offer contracts to the remaining agents. The elected principal is then indiffer-
ent between offering contracts simultaneously or delegating its power to his neighbours starting a
sequential contracting process. And third, when there is a market-based approach instated in which
only one price of a tradable pollution permit can be set, implying that a second-best optimal market-
based approach has to be designed which implements the maximal welfare possible given the one
price restriction. We propose a second-best optimal solution for this problem in which the pollution
cap is endogenized in such a way that the social costs are minimized given the one-price-only restric-
tion.
Evidently, regulating spatially distributed pollution poses a big challenge. This is because the stan-
dard regulating instruments such as cap-and-trade or command-and-control systems that usually
implement an efficient allocation do not work in case of spatially distributed pollution or an author-
ity to enforce them is missing. The problem of optimal pollution control is further aggravated by the
presence of asymmetric information as many governments face limitations in monitoring the mitiga-
tion costs or the pollution flows. As illustrated, there is no one-size-fits-it-all solution to the problem
of spatially distributed pollution, so that each situation needs to be analysed separately. Particularly,
the design of second-best optimal mechanisms for pollution control in case of spatially distributed
pollution together with multi-dimensional asymmetric information suggests an interesting avenue
for future research. Also, the design of voluntary and fair agreements that are stable over time given
uncertainties in the future pollution flows might yield interesting insights.
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Chapter 1
Sharing A River With Downstream Externalities
Abstract
We consider the problem of efficient emission abatement in a multi-polluter setting, where
agents are located along a river in which net emissions accumulate and induce negative external-
ities to downstream riparians. Assuming a cooperative transferable utility game, we seek welfare
distributions that are in the non-cooperative core and satisfy a specific fairness constraint. Mean-
ing, we search for welfare distributions that satisfy all agents’ participation constraints, in that
each coalition is at least as well off as it were if acting on its own and that is perceived to be fair,
in that no coalition is better off than it were if all non-members of the coalition do not pollute the
river at all. We show that the downstream incremental distribution, as introduced by Ambec and
Sprumont (2002), is the only welfare distribution satisfying both constraints. In addition, we show
that this result holds true for numerous extensions of our model.
1 Introduction
Industries and cities all around the world have historically been concentrated along rivers, since
rivers provide means of transportation, food production, energy generation and drinking water. Be-
cause of this intensive utilization, many rivers and streams have been and still are being heavily
polluted. Excessive pollution worsens water quality, which reduces economic profits and negatively
impacts wildlife and human health. One specific characteristic of rivers is that pollutants discharged
into the river are carried downriver. As a consequence, it is the downstream riparians rather than
the polluter himself who bears the negative consequences of the emissions discharged into the river.
Moreover, if upstream polluters and downstream riparians belong to different jurisdictions, polluters
may have little incentive to abate their emissions, because they cannot be held liable for the pollution
damage caused in other jurisdictions.
In this chapter, we consider the problem of efficient emission abatement among agents located along
a river, where upstream emissions cause negative externalities to all downstream agents. This set-
ting can be characterized as a cooperative transferable utility game with two sources of externalities.
First, upstream emissions impose negative externalities on downstream agents. Second, cooperative
behaviour among a subset of agents (a so-called coalition) imposes positive externalities upon agents
located in between different connected subsets of this coalition. Due to this second kind of externali-
ties, the core is, in general, empty. As a consequence, we restrict our attention to the non-cooperative
core, i.e. the set of partitions which consists of one coalition and only singletons otherwise. The
non-cooperative core imposes cost upper bounds for any coalition, which can be interpreted as a
participation constraint that has to be satisfied by any cost distribution to be acceptable to all agents.
In addition, we impose cost lower bounds, which are inspired by the aspiration welfare principle, i.e.
no coalition of agents should have lower costs than it can secure for itself if all non-members of the
coalition would not pollute the river at all. We show that the downstream incremental distribution,
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as introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002), is the only distribution simultaneously satisfying the
non-cooperative core upper cost bounds and the aspiration lower cost bounds.
The existing literature on transboundary pollution in river basins mainly focuses on the case of two
jurisdictions. Notable exceptions include Ni and Wang (2007) and Gengenbach et al. (2010). Ni and
Wang (2007) derive cooperative sharing rules for the costs of cleaning a river from two principles of
international water law: Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (ATS) claims that every jurisdiction has ex-
clusive rights to use the water on its territory, while Unlimited Territorial Integrity UTI expands these
exclusive use rights to all water originating within and upstream of a respective jurisdiction. They
adapt these principles to the case of pollution responsibility and derive axioms characterizing the
two resulting cost sharing principles. They also show that these cost-sharing principles correspond
to the Shapley value solutions of the corresponding cost-sharing games. However, Ni and Wang
(2007) assume exogenously given costs for cleaning the river. Thus, they are only concerned with the
distribution of these costs. In contrast, pollution levels in our model are endogenously determined
by the actions of the agents. Thus, we are concerned about finding cost sharing distributions that are
acceptable to all agents and, at the same time, give incentives to choose efficient emission abatement
levels in the first place. In line with the literature on international environmental agreements, Gen-
genbach et al. (2010) model river pollution as a two-stage-cartel-formation game. In the first stage,
agents decide whether to join a coalition, while pollution abatement levels are chosen in the second
stage. In the absence of a supranational authority, abatement levels are in general inefficiently low,
as all agents have an incentive to free ride on the abatement efforts of their upstream neighbours.
Analysing the formation of stable coalitions they find that the location of agents has no impact on
coalition stability but rather impacts on environmental outcomes. In contrast to Gengenbach et al.
(2010), we employ a cooperative game setting.
In fact, our research is most closely related to Ambec and Sprumont (2002) and Ambec and Ehlers
(2008), who apply an axiomatic cooperative game theoretic approach to the efficient sharing of wa-
ter along a river basin. In Ambec and Sprumont (2002), agents derive strictly increasing benefits
from water consumption, while Ambec and Ehlers (2008) generalize the results to agents which may
exhibit satiation in water consumption. Ambec and Ehlers (2008) show that the downstream incre-
mental distribution is the only welfare distribution satisfying the non-cooperative core lower bounds
and the aspiration welfare upper bounds. Several other papers propose alternative sharing rules
to the downstream incremental distribution in settings similar to the one proposed by Ambec and
Sprumont (2002). Interpreting the river sharing problem as a line-graph game, Van den Brink et al.
(2007) derive four different efficient solutions including the downstream incremental distribution by
imposing various properties with respect to deleting edges of the line-graph. However, they do not
address fairness issues and consider non-satiable agents. Allowing for multiple springs and satiable
agents with respect to water consumption, Van den Brink et al. (2012) propose a class of weighted
hierarchical welfare distributions based on the Territorial Integration of all Basin States (TIBS) princi-
ple, which includes the downstream incremental distribution as a special case. Ansink and Weikard
(2012) concentrate on reallocations of the resource itself instead of the reallocation of welfare by an
appropriate transfer scheme. In case of water scarcity, the agents’ overlapping claims to river water
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render it a contested resource similar to a bankruptcy problem. They propose a class of sequential
sharing rules based on bankruptcy theory and compare them to other sharing rules, including the
downstream incremental distribution. Demange (2004) considers hierarchies without externalities
and shows that the hierarchical outcome satisfies the core bounds for all connected coalitions for all
super-additive cooperative games. However, the hierarchical outcome may violate core bounds for
non-connected coalitions. If the hierarchy is a river, then the hierarchical outcome corresponds to the
counterpart of the downstream incremental distribution.
Our research can be interpreted as a generalization of the results of Ambec and Ehlers (2008) to com-
modities with public good properties. While water consumption is a purely private good, emission
abatement exhibits public good characteristics, as it imposes negative externalities on all downstream
agents. These additional externalities impose non-trivial complications for proving that the down-
stream incremental distribution satisfies the non-cooperative cost upper bounds and the aspiration
cost lower bounds in the formulation of our river pollution model.
2 A River Sharing Model with Downstream Pollution Externalities
Consider a set of agents N = {1, ...., n}, which are located along a river. Without loss of generality,
agents are numbered from upstream to downstream, i.e. i < j indicates that agent j is located down-
river of agent i. We follow Ambec and Sprumont (2002) and Ambec and Ehlers (2008) in defining
the set of agents preceding agent i by Pi = {1, ..., i}, with the strict predecessors of agent i indicated
as Pi\i = {1, ..., i − 1}. Analogously, the set of agents following agent i is defined by Fi = {i, ..., n},
where Fi\i = {i+ 1, ..., n} denotes the set of agents strictly located downriver of agent i.
Each agent i along the river produces gross emissions in exogenously given amount ei. An agent
i may choose to abate the amount xi with 0 ≤ xi ≤ ei, the costs of which are given by the strictly
increasing, twice differentiable and strictly convex abatement cost function ci(xi). Without loss of
generality, we assume that abating nothing induces no abatement costs, i.e. ci(0) = 0. Net emissions
ei − xi are passed into the river where they accumulate and are carried along its course. Assuming
that net emissions of agent i are discharged into the river after agent i’s but before agent i+ 1’s loca-
tion, and that there is no pollution at the rivers’ source, the ambient pollution level qi at the location
of agent i is given by the sum of net emissions of all strict predecessors of agent i:
qi = ∑
j∈Pi\i
γji(ej − xj) , ∀ i ∈ N
with 0 < γji ≤ 1. γji represents the assimilative capacity of the river, i.e. what fraction of the
net emissions released by agent j actually reach agent i. As the vector of abatement efforts x =
(x1, . . . , xn), together with the vector of exogenously given emissions e = (e1, . . . , en), fully determine
the vector of ambient pollution levels, we shall often write the ambient pollution levels as a function
of the vector x:
q(x) =
(
q1(x), . . . , qn(x)
)
.
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The ambient pollution level qi causes damage costs to agent i, the amount of which is given by the in-
creasing, twice differentiable and convex damage cost function di(qi). Thus, the net emissions ei − xi
released by agent i induce negative externalities for all downriver agents j > i, but not for agent i
himself or all upstream agents j < i.
The total costs ki agent i faces are the sum of abatement and damage costs:
ki(xi, qi) = di(qi) + ci(xi) .
A river sharing problem is characterized by (N, e, c, d), where c = (c1, . . . , cn) and d = (d1, . . . , dn)
denote the vectors of abatement and damage cost functions. Given a river sharing problem, the
distribution of total costs ki among all agents i is determined by the emission abatement allocation x.
Our assumptions about the accumulation of emissions along the river, as described in the previous
paragraph, imply the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (No abatement is dominant strategy). Given a river sharing problem (N, e, c, d) and for
given emission abatement levels of all agents j ∈ N\i it is a dominant strategy for agent i not to abate at all,
i.e. xi = 0.
Proof. The damage costs of agent i only depend on qi which are not influenced by xi. As costs ci
are strictly increasing in the amount of emission abatement xi, given qi, total costs are minimized by
setting xi = 0.
Proposition 1 states that agents who only consider their own total costs will never abate. In par-
ticular, this implies that if the river sharing problem (N, e, c, d) is considered to be a non-cooperative
game among the agents i ∈ N, the unique Nash equilibrium is given by xˆi = 0 for all i ∈ N (nomatter
whether agents are considered to decide sequentially or simultaneously). However, this outcome is,
in general, inefficient. In particular, if we assume that money transfers between agents are possible
and agents have unbounded resources for such transfers, the efficient emission abatement allocation
x⋆ minimizes the sum of total costs ki among all agents. The following proposition establishes that
such an allocation exists and is also unique.
Proposition 2 (Existence and uniqueness of efficient allocation). Given a river sharing problem (N, e, c, d)
there exists a unique vector x⋆ which is the solution to the following constrained minimization problem:
min
{xi}
n
i=1
n
∑
i=1
ki
(
xi, qi(x)
)
subject to
qi(x) = ∑
j∈Pi\i
γji(ej − xj) , ∀ i ∈ N ,
0 ≤ xi ≤ ei , ∀ i ∈ N.
Proof. Existence and uniqueness follow directly from the strict convexity of the total costs functions
ki(xi, qi).
Let ti denote the money payments. We impose ∑
n
i=1 ti = 0 and define agent i’s after transfer costs
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zi as:
zi = ki(xi, qi) + ti .
Obviously, any vector z = (z1, . . . , zn) with ∑
n
i=1 zi = ∑
n
i=1 ki
(
x⋆i , qi(x
⋆)
)
is an efficient cost distribu-
tion, as it implies a unique vector of transfer payments ti = zi − ki
(
x⋆i , qi(x
⋆)
)
with ∑Ni=1 ti = 0 (no
waste of money) and achieves the cost minimum ∑Ni=1 ki
(
x⋆i , qi(x
⋆)
)
. In the following, we call any
efficient cost distribution a river sharing agreement. The main problem will be which one to choose
among this infinite set.
3 Coalitions and Cost Upper Bounds
A non-empty subset of agents S ⊂ N is called a coalition if the agents of S choose their emission
abatements such as to minimize the sum of total costs among all coalition members. Denoting by
minS and maxS the most upstream, respectively the most downstream member of coalition S, the
coalition S is connected or consecutive if all agents j with minS < j < maxS are also members of the
coalition S.
We define the secure costs v(S) of a coalition S as the minimum value of the sum of the total costs ki
over all members of the coalition:
v(S) = ∑
i∈S
ki
(
xvi (S), qi(x
v
i (S))
)
,
where xv(S) =
(
xv1(S), . . . , x
v
n(S)
)
denotes the solution to
min
{xi}i∈S
∑
i∈S
ki
(
xi(S), qi(x(S))
)
subject to (3.1)
qi(x) = ∑
j∈Pi\i
γji(ej − xj) , ∀ i ∈ N (3.2)
0 ≤ xi ≤ ei , ∀ i ∈ S , (3.3)
xj given , ∀ j /∈ S . (3.4)
It is obvious from the above definition that both the allocation of abatement efforts xv(S) and the
secure costs v(S) of the coalition S depend, in general, on the behaviour of the agents not belonging
to the coalition S. As an example, consider the coalition S = {k, . . . , n}. In particular the pollution
level qk (but also the pollution levels qi with i > k) depends on the amount of emission abatement
undertaken by the agents iwith i < k. According to Proposition 1, if these agents i < k only minimize
their own sum of abatement and damage costs, they would not abate at all, implying a pollution level
of qk = ∑j∈Pk\k γjkej. If however, the agents 1 to k− 1 form a coalition T and minimize their joint total
costs, they will, in general, choose xj > 0 for at least some j ∈ 1, . . . , k− 1. This implies a pollution
level of qk < ∑j∈Pk\k γjkej which reduces the minimal costs v(S) coalition S can secure for itself. Thus,
analogously to Ambec and Ehlers (2008), cooperation exerts a positive externality on the coalition S.
In the following, we restrict our attention to the non-cooperative core, i.e. we assume that all non-
members of a coalition S behave non-cooperatively, which according to Proposition 1 implies that
they do not abate at all. Then, condition (3.4) is replaced by xj = 0 for all j /∈ S, and the secure
costs v(S) of a coalition S are well defined and unique (as the resulting optimization problem is a
sub-problem of the one analysed in Proposition 2). The reason is like in Ambec and Ehlers (2008): the
structure of the river sharing problem (N, e, c, d), as described in detail in Section 2, is such that only
the non-cooperative core is guaranteed to be non-empty.
Like Ambec and Ehlers (2008), we impose the secure costs as the participation constraint of any
coalition S. A coalition S will only agree to a river sharing agreement if it is not worse off than with-
out the agreement. Thus, a river sharing agreement should at most assign the secure costs v(S) to
any coalition S as otherwise the coalition would block the agreement knowing that it can achieve
at least v(S) on its own. Hence, v(S) defines cost upper bounds for any coalition S a river sharing
agreement must satisfy in order not to be blocked.
4 Cost Lower Bounds
Ambec and Ehlers (2008) also impose welfare upper bounds that are inspired by the unlimited terri-
torial integrity (UTI) doctrine. In case of water consumption, UTI claims that all agents are entitled
to consume the full stream of water originating upstream from their location and, thus, have a legiti-
mate claim to the corresponding welfare level such a consumption generates. As such claims are, in
general, incompatible if water is scarce, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) and Ambec and Ehlers (2008)
interpret them as welfare upper bounds agents may legitimately aspire to.
The straightforward translation of these aspiration welfare upper bounds to the case of our river
pollution model is to define the minimal costs a coalition S can ensure if all non-members of the
coalition would abate all their emissions, and thus, not pollute the river at all. Formally, these cost
lower bounds a(S) are given by:
a(S) = ∑
i∈S
ki
(
xai (S), qi(x
a
i (S))
)
,
where xa(S) =
(
xa1(S), . . . , x
a
n(S)
)
denotes the solution to
min
{xi}i∈S
∑
i∈S
ki(xi(S), qi(x(S))) subject to
qi(x) = ∑
j∈Pi\i
γji(ej − xj) , ∀ i ∈ N ,
0 ≤ xi ≤ ei , ∀ i ∈ S ,
xj = ej , ∀ j /∈ S .
The cost lower bounds a(S) can be interpreted as a fairness condition: no coalition S should enjoy
lower costs than the costs it were to secure itself if all non-members of the coalition did not pollute
the river at all.
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5 The Downstream Incremental Distribution
As in Ambec and Sprumont (2002) and Ambec and Ehlers (2008), there is a connection between the
non-cooperative core upper bounds v(S) and the cost lower bounds a(S): For the coalition of all
predecessors of agent i they coincide, i.e. v(Pi) = a(Pi). Thus, for any coalition of predecessors Pi it
is clear that the only river sharing agreement satisfying both the cost upper and cost lower bounds is
the so called downstream incremental distribution (DID) defined by
z⋆i = v(Pi)− v(Pi\i) , ∀ i ∈ N .
The DID assigns every agent his marginal contribution to the coalition composed of his predecessors
along the river. As a consequence, the DID is the only candidate for a river sharing agreement that
at the same time satisfies the non-cooperative core upper bounds v(S) and the cost lower bounds
a(S) for any coalition S. The following theorem establishes that the DID, in fact, satisfies the non-
cooperative core upper bounds v(S) and the cost lower bounds a(S) for any coalition S.
Theorem 1 (OnlyDID satisfies cost upper and lower bounds). The downstream incremental distribution
(DID) z⋆ is the only river sharing agreement satisfying the non-cooperative core upper bounds v(S) and the
cost lower bounds a(S) for any coalition S.
Proof. The proof is split into three parts. In the first part, we show that the DID satisfies the non-
cooperative core upper bounds for any coalition S. In part two, we prove that the DID also satisfies
the cost lower bounds for any coalition S and, finally, in the third part, we show that any river shar-
ing agreement that satisfies the cost upper and lower bounds for an arbitrary coalition S is identical
to the DID.
We prove that the DID satisfies the non-cooperative core upper bounds for any coalition S by in-
duction. The idea is that any coalition S can be created from the grand coalition N by consecutively
deleting all non-members mj ∈ {m1, . . . ,mz} of S starting with the most downstream agent mz. This
procedure creates a sequence of intermediate coalitions N = Sz, Sz−1, . . . , S1, S. We show that the
DID satisfies the core upper bounds for any intermediate coalition Sj, j ∈ 1, . . . , z and also for S.
For the first part of the proof we need the following proposition, the proof of which is given in
the Appendix.
Proposition 3. For any T ⊂ N with minT > j and any j ∈ N the following inequality holds:
v(Pmj ∪ T)− v(Pmj\mj ∪ T) ≤ v(Pmj)− v(Pmj\mj) . (5.1)
For the grand coalition N = Sz, the non-cooperative core upper bounds are satisfied. Now,
suppose the DID satisfies the non-cooperative core upper bounds for some intermediate coalition Sj,
i.e.
∑
i∈Sj
z⋆i ≤ v(Sj) . (5.2)
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We generate the intermediate coalition Sj−1 by deleting the non-member mj from the intermediate
coalition Sj. By construction the intermediate coalition Sj−1 consists of all strict predecessors of agent
mj and all agents i > mj who belong to the coalition S. Rearranging inequality (5.2) and applying the
definition of the DID implies
∑
i∈Sj−1
z⋆i ≤ v(Sj)− z
⋆
mj
= v(Sj)− v(Pmj) + v(Pmj\mj) .
We have to show that the DID satisfies the non-cooperative core upper bounds for the intermediate
coalition Sj−1, i.e.
∑
i∈Sj−1
z⋆i ≤ v(Sj)− v(Pmj) + v(Pmj\mj) ≤ v(Sj−1) .
Rearranging this inequality yields
v(Sj)− v(Sj−1) ≤ v(Pmj)− v(Pmj\mj) . (5.3)
If the coalition S does not have any members i > mj, then the inequality is trivially satisfied as then
Sj = Pmj and Sj−1 = Pmj\mj. Otherwise, define the set T consisting of all members i of the coalition
S with i > mj. Then, Sj = Pmj ∪ T and Sj−1 = Pmj\mj ∪ T and by virtue of Proposition 3, inequality
(5.3) holds.
For the second part of the proof, the following proposition is needed
Proposition 4. For any S ⊂ T ⊂ N and i /∈ S, T the following inequality holds:
a(S ∪ i)− a(S) ≤ a(T ∪ i)− a(T). (5.4)
The proof of Proposition 4 is given in the Appendix.
To show that the DID satisfies the cost lower bounds for any coalition S, we employ v(Pi) = a(Pi) to
rewrite the definition of the DID:
z⋆i = v(Pi)− v(Pi\i) = a(Pi)− a(Pi\i) .
Summing up over all agents i ∈ S and employing Proposition 4 yields
∑
i∈S
z⋆i = ∑
i∈S
a(Pi)− a(Pi\i) ≥ ∑
i∈S
a(Pi ∩ S)− a(Pi\i ∩ S) .
The right hand side of the inequality simplifies to
∑
i∈S
a(Pi ∩ S)− a(Pi\i ∩ S) = a(PminS) + a({PminS, PminS + 1})− a({PminS}) + ...
+ a({PminS, ..., PmaxS})− a({PminS, ..., PmaxS − 1})
= a({PminS, ..., PmaxS}) = a(S) .
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Thus, we obtain
∑
i∈S
z⋆i = a(Pi)− a(Pi\i) ≥ ∑
i∈S
a(Pi ∩ S)− a(Pi\i ∩ S) = a(S) ,
which proves that the DID satisfies the cost lower bounds for any coalition S:
∑
i∈S
z⋆i ≥ a(S) .
Finally, we prove that the DID is the only river sharing agreement that simultaneously satisfies
the cost upper and lower bounds for any coalition S. Therefore, we have to show that whenever a
river sharing agreement z satisfies both the cost upper and lower bounds, then for each agent i it
holds that zi = z
⋆
i . Again, the proof is by induction.
Similar to Ambec and Ehlers (2008), for agent 1, any river sharing agreement z fulfilling both con-
straints satisfies v({1}) ≥ z1 ≥ a({1}). As v({1}) = a({1}) this implies z1 = z
⋆
1 . Now, suppose that
zi = z
⋆
i holds for all agents i upstream of some agent j, i.e. i ≤ j < n. Summing up over all i ∈ Pj, we
obtain
∑
i∈Pj
zi = ∑
i∈Pj
z⋆i = v(Pj) .
As v(Pj+1) = a(Pj+1) and because any river sharing agreement z satisfies both the cost upper and
lower bounds, ∑i∈Pj+1 zi = v(Pj+1) = a(Pj+1) has to hold. Hence,
zj+1 = ∑
i∈Pj+1
zi − ∑
i∈Pj
zi = v(Pj+1)− v(Pj) = z
⋆
j+1.
Therefore, the cost distribution z is identical to the DID. 
Theorem 1 is the exact counterpart to Theorem 1 of Ambec and Ehlers (2008). However, it is
neither obvious nor straightforward to prove that the DID is the only distribution satisfying the cost
upper and lower bounds in case of our river pollution model. The main challenge in Ambec and
Ehlers (2008) arose from the fact that cooperation among agents impose positive externalities on any
coalition S. As a consequence, the welfare level a coalition could secure for itself crucially depends
on the partition of all non-members. The same is true for our river pollution model. Cooperative
behaviour among non-members of a coalition S induces, in general, positive abatement levels, which
benefits the members of the coalition.
In contrast to Ambec and Sprumont (2002) and Ambec and Ehlers (2008), however, the decision
variable in our model is emission abatement not water consumption. While water consumption only
benefits the consumer and, thus, is a purely private commodity, emission abatement is not. In fact, in
our model emission abatement does not benefit the abating agent but only all downstream agents, as
it reduces the river’s downstream pollution level. Thus, emission abatement imposes positive down-
stream externalities, i.e. pollution abatement is a commodity with public good properties. This is
also reflected in the agents’ welfare: agents’ welfare in the water consumption models of Ambec and
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Sprumont (2002) and Ambec and Ehlers (2008) is simply given by some benefit function bi(xi)which
depends on the water consumption xi of agent i. In our model, the costs agent i faces consist of two
parts: first, the abatement costs ci(xi), which only depend on the emission abatement of agent i and,
second, the damage cost function di(qi) depending on the pollution level qi, which itself is a function
of the emission abatement levels of all upstream agents.
6 Discussion and Extensions
The model detailed in Section 2 relies on a number of assumptions which can be relaxed without
impairing the statement of Theorem 1. First, we assumed that there is no initial pollution at the
source of the river and that the net emissions of agent i do not harm agent i himself but only all
downstream agents. As a consequence, agent 1 does not face any pollution and the specification
of agent 1’s damage function d1 is optional. The first assumption simplified the specification of the
pollution level qi, while the latter assumption implied that in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium
no agent would abate at all. However, the proof of Theorem 1 does not draw on these assumptions
and would still be valid if the pollution level agent i faces would be defined as
qi = q0 + ∑
j∈Pi
γji(ej − xj) ,
where q0 denotes an initial pollution level at the source of the river.
Second, we framed the model as a pollution abatement model. Obviously, emissions and the cor-
responding pollution levels are prime examples for downstream externalities, yet there are many
other contexts to which our model is applicable. As an example, think of the case of flooding. Then,
ei corresponds to the water discharges from the territory of agent i into the river and xi denotes the
amount of water agent i withdraws from the stream (e.g. by the controlled flooding of designated
flooding areas) and qi is the amount of excess water at agent i’s location. In this interpretation it
would also be reasonable to assume that the water withdrawn xi is not limited by the discharge ei
but could sum up to the total amount of excess water in the river basin, i.e.
0 ≤ xi ≤ qi .
These modifications also would not impact the validity of Theorem 1.
Third, particularly in case of flood protection, agents may have different means of protection. While
the withdrawal of water induces costs to agent i and benefits all his downstream agents, there are
other protection techniques which are purely private goods. As an example, consider that agent i
could build a levee that protects his own territory from flooding, but does not induce any positive
externalities to the downstream agents. Then, the damage to agent i does not only depend on the
total amount of water qi but also on the agent’s investment into private damage protection mi, i.e.
di = di(qi,mi). Assuming that an interior solution is optimal, i.e. m
⋆
i > 0, the optimal level of private
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protection m⋆i (qi) is given by the solution of the first order condition
∂di(qi,mi)
∂mi
= 0 .
Thus, we can re-write di(qi,mi) as di
(
qi,m
⋆
i (qi)
)
. Whenever these newly specified damage functions
di
(
qi,m
⋆
i (qi)
)
are increasing, twice differentiable and convex in qi, we are back at the model specifi-
cation introduced in Section 2.
7 Conclusion
We showed that the main result of Ambec and Ehlers (2008) that the downstream incremental distri-
bution is the only welfare distribution that satisfied the non-cooperative core bounds and the aspira-
tion welfare bounds simultaneously, can be generalized to the case of commodities with public good
characteristics. Like their water consumption model, our river pollution problem is a cooperative
game with externalities, since cooperation among non-members imposes a positive externality to the
members of any coalition S. However, our model comprises an additional source of externalities be-
cause the emissions discharged into the river induce negative externalities on all downstream agents.
In addition, our results are robust with various extensions of our baseline model.
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Appendix
Proof. of proposition 3
Set Sj = Pmj ∪ T and Sj−1 = Pmj\mj ∪ T. Let us parametrize the damage functions for agents j > mj
with a parameter α ∈ [0,∞). Due to this parametrization, the secure costs v(Sj−1, α) of the interme-
diate coalitions Sj−1 now depend on the parameter α and amount to
v(Sj−1, α) = ∑
i∈Pmj\mj
ki(x
v(Sj−1, α)) + ∑
i∈Fmj\mj∩S
ci(x
v(Sj−1, α))+
α · ∑
i∈Fmj\mj∩S
di(qi(x
v(Sj−1, α))).
Furthermore, inequality (5.1) changes to
v(Sj, α)− v(Sj−1, α) ≤ v(Pmj)− v(Pmj\mj) ∀α ∈ [0,∞). (7.1)
By showing that (7.1) holds for all α ∈ [0,∞], then it holds, in particular, for α = 1 and inequality
(5.1) is satisfied.
Thus, in a next step, we show that inequality (7.1) holds for all α ∈ [0,∞]. For α = 0, we have
v(Sj, 0) = v(Pmj) and v(Sj−1, 0) = v(Pmj\mj), therefore inequality (7.1) holds with equality. For all
other α, we differentiate inequality (7.1) with respect to α, i.e.
∂v(Sj, α)
∂α
−
∂v(Sj−1, α)
∂α
≤ 0. (7.2)
Hence, we partially differentiate v(Sj, α) with respect to α and apply the envelope theorem, i.e.
∂v(Sj, α)
∂α
=
∂v(xv(Sj, α), α)
∂α
+
∂v(xv(Sj, α), α)
∂x(Sj, α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
∂x(Sj, α)
∂α
=
∂v(xv(Sj, α), α)
∂α
= ∑
i∈Fmj\mj∩Sj
di(qi(x
v(Sj, α)))
(7.3)
and analogously,
∂v(Sj−1, α)
∂α
=
∂v(xv(Sj−1, α), α)
∂α
= ∑
i∈Fmj\mj∩Sj−1
di(qi(x
v(Sj−1, α))).
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Hence, inequality (7.2) can be rewritten to
∑
i∈Fmj\mj∩Sj
di(qi(x
v(Sj), α)) ≤ ∑
i∈Fmj\mj∩Sj−1
di(qi(x
v(Sj−1, α))).
Clearly, this inequality is satisfied whenever
∑
l∈Pk
xvl (Sj−1, α) ≤ ∑
l∈Pk
xvl (Sj, α), ∀k ∈ Sj−1, Sj,
which is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For any agent k ∈ S, T the following inequality is satisfied
∑
l∈Pk
xvl (Sj−1, α) ≤ ∑
l∈Pk
xvl (Sj, α), ∀k ∈ Sj−1, Sj. (7.4)
Proof. of Lemma 1
Consider two coalitions S and T = S ∪ m and an agent m /∈ S. Given this notation, inequality (7.4)
changes to
∑
j∈Pk∩S
xvj (S, α) ≤ ∑
j∈Pk∩T
xvj (T, α), ∀k ∈ S, T.
Let us prove Lemma 1 by contradiction, i.e. assume that
∑
j∈Pk∩T
xvl (T, α) < ∑
j∈Pk∩S
xvl (S, α). (7.5)
According to the parametrized minimization problem, the following first order conditions have to be
satisfied
c′i(xi) ≤ ∑
j∈Fi\i∩T∩Pm
d′j(qj(xj)) + α ∑
j∈Fm\m∩T
d′j(qj(xj))
≤ ∑
j∈Fi\i∩T∩Pm
d′j

 ∑
k∈Pj\j
γkjek − ∑
k∈Pj\j∩T
γkjxk


+ α · ∑
j∈Fm\m∩T
d′j

 ∑
k∈Pj\j
γkjek − ∑
k∈Pj\j∩T
γkjxk

 , ∀i ∈ T,
(7.6)
and
c′i(xi) ≤ ∑
j∈Fi\i∩S∩Pm\m
d′j(qj(xj)) + α ∑
j∈Fm\m∩S
d′j(qj(xj))
≤ ∑
j∈Fi\i∩S∩Pm\m
d′j

 ∑
k∈Pj\j
γkjek − ∑
k∈Pj\j∩S
γkjxk


+ α ∑
j∈Fm\m∩S
d′j

 ∑
k∈Pj\j
γkjek − ∑
k∈Pj\j∩S
γkjxk

 , ∀i ∈ S
(7.7)
Due to assumption (7.5), the right hand side of (7.6) for i ∈ T is higher than the right hand side of (7.7)
for i ∈ S. This implies c′i(xi(T)) ≥ c
′
i(xi(S)) for all agents i ∈ S, T and thus, due to the characteristics
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of the cost function ci(.), x
v
i (T) ≥ x
v
i (S), ∀i. This, however, implies
∑
j∈Pk∩T
xj(T) > ∑
j∈Pk∩S
xj(S).
Therefore, by contradiction, inequality ∑j∈Pk∩S xj(S) > ∑j∈Pk∩S xj(T) cannot hold.
Hence, given Lemma 1, inequality (7.1) is satisfied for all α ∈ [0,∞], thus also for α = 1 implying
that inequality (5.1) holds for the coalition Sj−1. By induction, inequality (5.1) holds for all intermedi-
ate coalitions Sj, j = 1, ..., z with S1 = S, therefore the DID is stable for all non-consecutive coalitions
S.
Proof. of proposition 4
For the proof of Proposition 4 the following lemma is required.
Lemma 2. For any two coalitions S, T, the following relationships among the abatement levels of an
agent j ∈ T, S hold
xaj (T ∪ i) ≥ x
a
j (S ∪ i) ≥ x
a
j (S) and x
a
j (T ∪ i) ≥ x
a
j (T).
Proof. of Lemma 2
It suffices to show that these inequalities hold for two coalitions S, T, with T = S ∪ t, t ∈ N\S. Let
us first establish that xaj (G ∪ i) ≥ x
a
j (G) for all coalitions G = T, S. The first order conditions for an
agent j ∈ G respectively j ∈ G ∪ i read
c′j(xj) ≤ ∑
k∈Fj\j∩G∪i
d′k( ∑
m∈Pk\k∩G∪i
γmk(em − xm)) (7.8)
respectively
c′j(xj) ≤ ∑
k∈Fj\j∩G
d′k( ∑
m∈Pk\k∩G
γmk(em − xm)). (7.9)
The right hand side of the first order condition in (7.8) is either larger than the right hand side of
(7.9), if j ≤ i, or equal to it, if j > i. Thus, xaj (G ∪ i) ≥ x
a
j (G), ∀j ∈ G,G ∪ i and G = T, S. Due to
T ∪ i = S ∪ i ∪ t, it follows that xaj (T ∪ i) ≥ x
a
j (S ∪ i). Thus, lemma 2 holds.
Recall inequality (5.4) in Proposition 4. We restate the two differences in the inequality in the
following way
a(T ∪ i)− a(T) = ki(x
a
i (T ∪ i)) + ∑
j∈T
k j(x
a
j (T ∪ i))− k j(x
a
j (T))
= ki(x
a
i (T ∪ i)) + ∑
j∈T\S
k j(x
a
j (T ∪ i))− k j(x
a
j (T)) +
∑
j∈S
k j(x
a
j (T ∪ i))− k j(x
a
j (T))
and
a(S ∪ i)− a(S) = ki(x
a
i (S ∪ i)) + ∑
j∈S
k j(x
a
j (S ∪ i))− k j(x
a
j (S)).
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Thus, by rearranging and using the above expressions, inequality (5.4) can expressed as
ki(x
a
i (T ∪ i))− ki(x
a
i (S ∪ i)) + ∑
j∈T\S
k j(x
a
j (T ∪ i))− k j(x
a
j (T))+
∑
j∈S
k j(x
a
j (T ∪ i))− k j(x
a
j (T)) + ∑
j∈S
k j(x
a
j (S))− k j(x
a
j (S ∪ i)) ≥ 0.
(7.10)
To prove that inequality (7.10) is satisfied, we divide the terms into three groups I, I I, I I I as repre-
sented in the following
∑
j∈S
k j(x
a
j (T ∪ i))− k j(x
a
j (T)) + ∑
j∈S
k j(x
a
j (S))− k j(x
a
j (S ∪ i))︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
+
∑
j∈T\S
k j(x
a
j (T ∪ i))− k j(x
a
j (T))︸ ︷︷ ︸
I I
+ ki(x
a
i (T ∪ i))− ki(x
a
i (S ∪ i))︸ ︷︷ ︸
I I I
≥ 0.
(7.11)
In the three lemmas presented below, wewill show that for all subgroups I, I I, I I Iwe have I, I I, I I I ≥
0. As a result, we conclude that inequality (7.10) holds.
Lemma 3. Given the terms in subgroup I of (7.11), it holds that I ≥ 0, i.e.
∑
j∈S
k j(x
a
j (T ∪ i))− k j(x
a
j (T)) + ∑
j∈S
k j(x
a
j (S))− k j(x
a
j (S ∪ i)) ≥ 0. (7.12)
Proof. of Lemma 3
Let us rewrite inequality (7.12) by splitting it into cost and damage functions, i.e.
∑
j∈S
cj(x
a
j (T ∪ i))− cj(x
a
j (T)) + cj(x
a
j (S))− cj(x
a
j (S ∪ i))
+ ∑
j∈S
dj(qj(x
a
j (T ∪ i)))− dj(qj(x
a
j (T))) + dj(qj(x
a
j (S)))− dj(qj(x
a
j (S ∪ i))) ≥ 0.
We prove the inequality above graphically. Due to the convexity of both the damage and cost
functions of each agent j ∈ S and due to the relationships xaj (T ∪ i) ≥ x
a
j (S ∪ i) ≥ x
a
j (S) and
xaj (T ∪ i) ≥ x
a
j (T) established in Lemma 2, for each agent j it holds that
cj(x
a
j (T ∪ i))− cj(x
a
j (S ∪ i)) = m,m ≥ 0
cj(x
a
j (S))− cj(x
a
j (T)) = n, n ≤ 0,
with |m| ≥ |n| as depicted1 in Figure 1. Similarly,
dj(qj(x
a
j (T ∪ i)))− dj(qj(x
a
j (S ∪ i))) = m,m ≤ 0
dj(qj(x
a
j (S)))− dj(qj(x
a
j (T))) = n, n ≥ 0, ∀j
with |n| ≥ |m| as depicted in Figure 2. Thus, we conclude that inequality (7.12) holds.
1As no general relationship can be established for xaj (T) and x
a(S ∪ i), both cases are depicted in the Figures 1 and 2.
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Figure 1: Cost functions
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Figure 2: Damage cost functions
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Lemma 4. Given the terms in subgroup II of (7.11), it holds that I I ≥ 0, i.e.
∑
j∈T\S
k j(x
a
j (T ∪ i))− k j(x
a
j (T)) ≥ 0. (7.13)
Proof. of Lemma 4
The following first order conditions have to be satisfied
c′j(xj(T)) ≤ ∑
k∈Fj\j∩T
d′k
(
∑
t∈Pk\k∩T
γtk(et − xt(T))
)
, ∀j ∈ T, (7.14)
and
c′j(xj(T ∪ i)) ≤ ∑
k∈Fj\j∩T∪i
d′k
(
∑
t∈Pk\k∩T
γtket + γikei − γtkxt(T)− ∑
t∈Pk\k∩T∪i
γtk∆xt
)
, ∀j ∈ T ∪ i, (7.15)
with ∑t∈Pk\k∩T∪i γtk∆xt = ∑t∈Pk\k∩T∪i γtkx
a
j (T ∪ i)−∑t∈Pk\k∩T γtkx
a
t (T).
As xaj (T ∪ i) ≥ x
a
j (T) derived in Lemma 2, the right hand side of inequality (7.15) has to be larger
than the right hand side of (7.14). In order for this to be satisfied, the following needs to hold
γikei ≥ ∑
t∈Pk\k∩T∪i
γtk∆xt = ∑
t∈Pk\k∩T∪i
γtkx
a
j (T ∪ i)− ∑
t∈Pk\k∩T
γtkx
a
t (T).
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Consequently,
dj

 ∑
k∈Pj\j∩(T∪i)
γkj(ej − x
a
j (T ∪ i))

 ≥ dj

 ∑
k∈Pj\j∩T
γkj(ej − x
a
j (T))

 , ∀j ∈ T. (7.16)
In addition, due to xaj (T ∪ i) ≥ x
a
j (T) and ci(xi) increasing and convex, we have cj(x
a
j (T ∪ i)) ≥
cj(x
a
j (T)). Combining this with (7.16) implies k j(x
a
j (T∪ i)) ≥ k j(x
a
j (T)). Summing up over all j ∈ T\S
yields the desired inequality (7.13).
Lemma 5. Given the terms in subgroup III of (7.11), it holds that I I I ≥ 0, i.e.
ki(x
a
i (T ∪ i))− ki(x
a
i (S ∪ i)) ≥ 0.
Proof. of Lemma 5
Recall that for each j ∈ S ∪ i, the following first order condition must hold
c′j(xj(S ∪ i)) ≤ ∑
k∈Fj\j∩S∪i
d′k
(
∑
t∈Pk\k∩S∪i
γtk(et − xt(S ∪ i))
)
. (7.17)
Similarly, for each j ∈ T ∪ i it must hold that
c′j(xj(T ∪ i)) ≤ ∑
k∈Fj\j∩T∪i
d′k( ∑
t∈Pk\k∩S∪i
γtket + ∑
t∈Pk\k∩T\S
γtket
− ∑
t∈Pk\k∩S∪i
γtkxt(S ∪ i)− ∑
t∈Pk\k∩T∪i
γtk∆xt).
(7.18)
Given that xaj (T ∪ i) ≥ x
a
j (S ∪ i) derived in Lemma 2, the left hand side of inequality (7.18) is larger
than the left hand side of inequality (7.17). Consequently, it has to hold that
∑
t∈Pk\k∩T\S
γtket ≥ ∑
t∈Pk\k∩T∪i
γtk∆xt = ∑
t∈Pk\k∩T∪i
γtkx
a
t (T ∪ i)− ∑
t∈Pk\k∩S∪i
γtkx
a
t (S ∪ i).
The agents j ∈ T ∪ i do not abate more than the additional pollution flow passing through their
region compared to what they would optimally abate if they belonged to the smaller coalition S ∪ i.
As a result,
di

 ∑
j∈Pi\i∩T∪i
γji(ej − x
a
j (T ∪ i))

 ≥ di

 ∑
j∈Pi\i∩S∪i
γji(ej − x
a
j (S ∪ i))

 . (7.19)
In addition, as xaj (T ∪ i) ≥ x
a
j (S ∪ i) ∀j derived in Lemma 2 and ci(xi) is increasing and convex, we
have
ci(x
a
i (T ∪ i)) ≥ ci(x
a
i (S ∪ i)). (7.20)
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Combining (7.19) with (7.20) implies
ki(xi(T ∪ i)) ≥ ki(xi(S ∪ i)).
Proposition 4 then follows from combining Lemmas 3, 4 and 5.
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Chapter 2
Sharing a River with Asymmetric Information
Abstract
In this chapter, we analyse the contractual mitigation of a global public bad along a river in
the presence of a federalist governance structure, where the lower tiers have private information
about their abatement costs. We propose that the federal government nominates one of the lower
tiers to be the principal, who is authorized to offer mitigation contracts to the other tiers sharing
the river. The elected principal can do so either in a centralized manner, i.e. he offers contracts
simultaneously to all other tiers, or in a delegated manner, i.e. he starts an upstream and down-
stream sequential contracting process by contracting with his up- and downriver neighbouring
tiers, to which he then gives the authority to subcontract with their respective neighbouring tiers
till all tiers received a contract. We show that under certain conditions, a nominated principal
can achieve the same abatement allocation with the delegated as with the centralized contract-
ing method while matching his expected costs. As all potential principals implement a different
abatement allocation, the choice of the prime principal matters for the total expected costs occur-
ring in the river basin. We show that the tier located most downriver, which is subject to the same
informational constraints as the federal government, is never the best choice to be nominated as
the principal.
1 Introduction
One negative aspect of sharing a river with others is water pollution. Water pollution not only neg-
atively impacts wildlife and human health but may also deteriorate economic profits. A special
characteristic of rivers is their unidirectional flow and, as a consequence, they carry the pollution
downriver where it accumulates. In addition, the polluters may not bear the negative consequences
of their emissions themselves and may thus have little incentive to reduce their emissions. Moreover,
rivers may flow through several countries, cantons and numerous municipalities so that upstream
polluters and downstream riparians may belong to different jurisdictions. As a consequence, pol-
luters may have little motivation to abate their emissions, because they cannot be held liable for the
pollution damage caused in other jurisdictions.
In this chapter, we analyse contractual mitigation of a global public bad along a river in the pres-
ence of a federalist governance structure, where the lower tiers have private information about their
abatement costs. In countries with a strong federalist structure like Switzerland, the US or Canada
levels directly below the Federal government (States, Provinces or Cantons) as well as the lowest tiers
of government (communities) have considerable authority in terms of the allocation and distribution
of a public bad. Thus, mitigation contracts that have to be accepted by all tiers in the river basin may
be proposed by two sources; either by the federal government, which acts as a social planner or by
one of the lower tiers. Even though the lower tiers follow their self-interest, it might be beneficial for
the federal government to let one of the lower tiers propose mitigation contracts because the lower
tiers are expected to know the preferences of their constituents better than the higher level and thus
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are subject to fewer informational constraints. Yet, as all lower tiers would try to seize the opportu-
nity to propose contracts to the other tiers and each of them would implement a different allocation
of the public bad, the federal government should nominate the tier that instates the allocation leading
to the lowest expected total costs for the federalist state. However, as is well known, the contractual
mitigation of a global public bad in adverse selection models with voluntary participation encoun-
ters several difficulties. First, all tiers have to voluntarily agree to a set of contracts offered by the
principal. Second, tiers may have an incentive to exaggerate their privately known abatement costs
in order to reduce the abatement level they have to supply with the consequence that most of the
burden of abatement is left to the other riparians. Thus, the proposed set of contracts has to ensure
that all tiers are not worse off than in the status quo without any contracts and that it is in their best
interest to reveal their true abatement costs.
Only a few papers consider asymmetric information in the costs and benefits of reducing pollution
and even fewer address environmental agreements taking a mechanism design perspective. One of
the first to consider environmental agreements in a mechanism design setting was Dasgupta et al.
(1980). In their paper, they focus on optimal pollution control with imperfect information about the
abatement costs of the agents. The polluting agents communicate with the regulator but not with
one another and there is only one victim of pollution, the society. In particular, they look at incen-
tive compatible direct revelation schemes and propose a simple adaptation of the Groves scheme,
while neglecting the issue of voluntary participation. Caparros et al. (2004) consider a bargaining
model in which northern countries suffer from emissions of southern countries and negotiate the
transfer necessary to reduce these emissions. Thus, they consider one-sided asymmetric information
and bargaining between one polluter and one victim. Baliga and Maskin (2003) are the first to con-
sider environmental agreements between countries that are at the same time victims and polluters
as a mechanism design problem under asymmetric information. However, they do not consider par-
ticipation constraints and thus find that first best agreements are possible. Helm and Wirl (2011)
consider a two-country model, where bargaining power is asymmetrically distributed and an un-
informed country designs a mechanism controlling collective emissions. They show that the unin-
formed party must jointly use subsidies and its own emissions to incentivize the informed party and
ensure its participation. Martimort and Sand-Zantman (2013) analyse international environmental
agreements and highlight the trade-off between the free riding problem due to asymmetric infor-
mation and voluntary participation. They concentrate on second best mechanisms and show that
the optimal mechanism admits a simple approximation by menus. We contribute to this strand of
literature by adding directed externalities between the affected agents, by studying environmental
agreements in a federalist setting and by analysing the choice of the principal offering contracts.
The design of incentive schemes for implementing optimal plans in organizations where informa-
tion differs across agents has been much studied in recent years. In adverse selection environments,
Myerson (1982) has shown that, in general, any non-cooperative equilibrium outcome of an arbitrary
decentralized organization can be mimicked by a centralized one, where agents communicate their
private information directly to the principal without any interactions among them. Our research is
closest related to Melumad et al. (1995), who show in a three agent model, that both organizational
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structures are equivalent when, in the decentralized structure, the principal can make the payment
to the intermediate agent contingent on the contract set up between this agent and his partner. When
this is not so, the centralized structure is strictly superior. We generalize their model to n agents,
extend it by adding directed externalities among the intermediate agents and set it in a federalist
structure with the option of having different principals.
In particular, we consider two forms of contracting, a centralized and a delegated principal agent
model. In the centralized contracting model, the lower tier chosen by the federal government to be
the principal contracts directly and simultaneously with all other tiers. For the delegated contract-
ing model, upstream and downstream delegated contracting seem appropriate due to the nature of
the river. Hence, the nominated principal contracts with two tiers, his upriver and downriver direct
neighbours, to which he then gives the authority to sub-contract with their up respectively downriver
neighbouring tier and so on till all riparians have accepted their contracts. The elected principals are
allowed to choose among the two contracting methods. Delegated contracting may have the advan-
tage that it reduces the communication requirements between the principal and the other tiers. A
possible disadvantage of delegation is that it may exacerbate incentive problems. Intermediate tiers
who have been given authority over certain decision may pursue their own self-interest rather than
that of the principal.
We show that given full information about the abatement costs, the first best optimal solution, i.e.
the abatement allocation minimizing the sum of all abatement and damage costs in the river, can
be implemented in both the centralized and the delegated principal agent models independent on
who proposes the set of contracts. The total cooperation gain goes to the chosen principal, whereas
all other tiers are equally well off as in the status quo without any mitigation. Thus, the choice of
the principal is only a matter of who attains the cooperation gain and does not affect the abatement
allocation. In the case of privately known abatement costs, the first best optimal abatement allocation
cannot be attained in either contracting model. The abatement levels are distorted due to the infor-
mation rents that have to be paid with the result that they fall short of the first best optimal abatement
levels. In line with the literature, we show that, under certain conditions, a principal can achieve the
same abatement allocation in the delegated contractingmodel as in the centralized contractingmodel
while matching his expected costs. For this result to hold, we assume that the contracts, generally
consisting of an assigned abatement level and compensation payment from the benefactors of the
abatement done to the tiers doing the abatement, are realized after all riparians have accepted them
and that all intermediate principals are able to monitor the abatement levels and reported types. In
addition, we show that the selection of the prime principal plays an important role for the total costs
occurring in the river in the presence of asymmetric information. We establish that the riparian most
downriver, who faces the same informational constraints as the federal government, offers contracts
that lead to the highest expected costs in the river basin. Thus, the federal government should del-
egate its power to any other riparian as total expected costs for the river basin amount to less with
any of them acting as the prime principal. Intuitively, the reason for this is that by electing any other
tier to be the principal, one uncertainty drops as this principal knows his own type and thus one less
information rent has to be paid. If damage costs are linear, the tier most upriver is the best choice.
30
However, if damage costs take any other functional form, the choice of the best principal depends on
the exogenously given pollution levels, the position of the principal along the river and the damage
parameters as illustrated by an example.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
characterizes the centralized and delegated principal agent model and presents the optimal contracts
in case of full and in case of asymmetric information in regard to the abatement costs. In Section 4,
we investigate which riparian should be chosen by the federal government as a principal.
2 The River Sharing Model with Asymmetric Information
We analyse contractual mitigation of a global public bad in a federalist structure where the abate-
ment costs are private information. Specifically, consider a country with a federalist government
G with n lower tiers sharing a river. The federal government aims to minimize the expected total
costs incurred due to the public bad in the river basin. Let the lower tiers be represented by agents
i = 1, ..., n. The agents are numbered from upstream to downstream, with i < j indicating that agent
i is upriver of agent j. Agents may pollute the river by discharging pollutants in exogenously given
amount ei > 0. Agents have the possibility to abate pollution in the amount of xi ≤ ei by facing
abatement costs Ci(xi, θi) = θici(xi). Assume, ci(.) is increasing and strictly convex in the abatement
efforts xi. The abatement costs depend on an agent-specific abatement cost parameter θi ∈ [θ, θ],
which is observable only by agent i and not by the other agents j 6= i. Thus, the parameter θi repre-
sents the agent’s private information, i.e. his type. The cost parameters θi are drawn independently
from a commonly known prior distribution F(θi) with a positive density function f (θi). Denote by
x = (x1, ..., xn−1) the vector of abatement levels and by θ = (θ1, ..., θn) the vector of abatement cost
parameters. Furthermore, let θ−i = θ\θi. The net emissions released by the agents accumulate while
moving downriver, so that the ambient pollution level at agent i’s location amounts to
qi(x) =
i−1
∑
j=1
ej − xj.
The ambient pollution level qi(x) causes damage costs Di(qi(x)) that are increasing and convex in
qi(x) and are known to all agents.
Summing up, we face a pollution abatement problem S in a federalist setting with asymmetric in-
formation characterized by (N, e, c, d, θ), where N = n is the number of agents sharing the river,
e = (e1, ..., en) is the vector of gross emissions and C = (C1, ...,Cn) and D = (D1, ...,Dn) denote the
vectors of abatement and damage cost functions.
Furthermore, note that
∂2Ci(xi, θi)
∂xi∂θi
= c′i(xi) ≥ 0, and
∂3Ci(xi, θi)
∂xi∂2θi
= 0.
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The term on the left hand side represents the single crossing property saying that an agent i’s marginal
costs from increasing xi is increasing in his type θi. This implies that higher types will be asked to
abate less, since the marginal costs of abating xi increases everywhere as θi increases. Let us make
the following standard assumption in adverse selection models.
Assumption 1.
F(θi)
f (θi)
is increasing in θi.
Note that we assume pollution to be a directed externality in that agents only suffer from the net
emissions released by agents located upriver. As a consequence, if the pollution abatement problem
is considered to be a non-cooperative game among the agents, then agents have no incentive to
abate, as this would only increase individual costs. Thus, in order to do abatement, agents have to be
compensated for the costs they bear by transfer payments made by the other agents who benefit from
this abatement. Hence, an incentive mechanism or a set of contracts has to be designed that gives
the agents incentives to voluntarily abate pollution. Formally, a set of contracts consists of abatement
levels x(.) = {x1(.), ..., xn−1(.)} and compensation transfers t(.) = {t1(.), ..., tn(.)} so that given such
a set of contracts, an agent i’s costs amount to
ki(.) = Ci(xi, θi) + Di(qi(x))− ti(x),
where ti(x) can either be positive or negative. This set of contracts may be proposed by two sources,
either the federal government, which acts as a social planner or one of the agents is elected by the
federal government to be the principal who subcontracts with all the other agents. In the first con-
cept, the social planner faces the problem of aggregating the (announced) costs of the agents into
a collective decision and has to design an appropriate compensation scheme. In the later concept,
the principal minimizes his expected costs given the announced costs of the other agents and adopts
an appropriate compensation scheme. According to the constrained efficiency theorem (Mas-Colell
et al. (1995)), the federal government is not able to improve upon a decentralized outcome (even if
that outcome is inefficient), if it is limited by the same informational constraints. Thus, the federal
government cannot achieve a better outcome than agent n by designing a set of contracts for all n
agents, as agent n and the social planner face the same informational constraints. However, it might
be beneficial for the federal government to elect one of the other agents to design contracts because
these agents havemore informationwith regard to their abatement costs than the federal government
and thus are limited by fewer informational constraints. The nomination of a specific principal itself
is relevant due to two reasons. First, all agents have an incentive to act as a principal and second,
each potential principal will implement a different abatement allocation. Furthermore, the elected
principal can offer these contracts in two different ways, either in a centralized or a delegated man-
ner.
We first discuss centralized contracting models, where the elected principal offers contracts to all
other agents simultaneously. Second, we consider delegated contracting models, in which one agent
is chosen to be the prime principal, who offers contracts to his direct downstream and upstream
neighbour and gives them the authority to sequentially subcontract with their direct neighbours. In
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either model, the principal faces two problems: first, all agents need to have an incentive to accept a
proposed contract, i.e. they must be at least as well off as in the status quo and second, abatement
costs are privately known, i.e. agents may have an incentive to overstate their true abatement costs.
Thus, a principal has to design a set of contracts for which all agents may find it in their best inter-
est to reveal their abatement costs truthfully and in which all agents are made better off as in the
non-cooperative outcome. In other words, a set of contracts must fulfil all incentive compatibility
constraints as well as all individual rationality constraints.
According to the revelation principle (Gibbard (1973)), we can restrict our attention to incentive com-
patible direct revelation contracts which satisfy the individual rationality of all agents. In such con-
tracts, agents are asked to announce their type, denoted by θˆi, and in return receive a transfer ti(θˆi)
and an abatement level xi(θˆi). Furthermore, we assume that the principal observes all reported types
as well as the abatement levels chosen. In addition, contracts are realised, i.e. abatement levels and
payments are executed, after all agents have accepted their contracts.
Let us have a closer look at the individual rationality constraints. We assume that if one agent does
not accept the contract, no other contracts will be established among the remaining agents. Thus, a
contract fulfils the individual rationality constraints, if no agent can do better on his own given the
assumption that the other agents behave non-cooperatively and do not mitigate. Formally, a contract
satisfies the individual rationality constraints as long as
ki(.) ≤ Di
(
i−1
∑
j=1
ej
)
:= ki.
Next, let us consider the incentive compatibility constraints. Let θi denote the true type of agent i
and θˆi the reported type. Given any contract, let ki(θˆi, θi) be the total costs of agent i if he is of type θi
and reports θˆi while the other agents report truthfully, i.e.
ki(θˆi, θi) = Ci(xi(θˆi), θi) + Di(qi(x(θ−i)))− ti(θˆi).
Then, incentive compatibility requires
ki(θˆi, θi) ≥ ki(θi, θi), ∀θi,
where ki(θi, θi) is the cost level of agent i of type θi if he announces his true type. Fortunately, Mirrlees
(1971) introduced a way to reduce the number of incentive constraints by replacing them with the
corresponding first order conditions. The trick is as follows: If we think of an agent i’s problem as
choosing an announcement θˆi, then his minimization problem can be written as
minθˆki(θˆi, θi).
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Thus, the incentive constraint can be stated as follows
θi ∈ argminθˆiki(θˆi, θi).
Therefore, for all θi ∈ [θ, θ] at which the objective function is differentiable, which it is by assumption,
the following first order condition must hold
0 =
∂
∂θˆ
ki(θˆi, θi)|θˆi=θi .
That is, truth-telling implies that the first order condition of ki(θˆi, θi) is satisfied when θˆi = θi.
Let θˆi(θi) ∈ argmin Ci(xi(θˆi), θi) − ti(θˆi) and let ki(θi, θˆi) = Ci(xi(θˆi(θi)), θi) − t(θˆi(θi)) be the
equilibrium cost level of agent i. Note that this cost level depends on θi in two ways: on the agent’s
true type and on his announcement. Thus, differentiating ki(θi, θˆi) with respect to θi, yields
dki(θˆi, θi)
dθi
=
∂Ci(xi(θˆi(θi)), θi)
∂θi
+
∂Ci(xi(θˆi(θi)), θi)
∂xi(θˆi(θi))
∂xi(θˆi(θi))
∂θˆi(θi)
∂θˆi(θi)
∂θi
−
∂ti(θˆi(θi))
∂θˆi(θi)
∂θˆi(θi)
∂θi
Applying the envelope theorem yields
dki(θˆi, θi)
dθi
=
∂Ci(xi(θˆi(θi)), θi)
∂θi
.
Thus, in case of incentive compatibility, i.e. where θˆi(θi) = θi, we receive
dki(θˆi, θi)
dθi
=
∂Ci(xi(θi), θi)
∂θi
. (2.1)
This condition ensures local incentive compatibility. Meaning that an agent i does not gain by mis-
representing θi around the neighbourhood of θi. By itself, it does not ensure that agent i does not
want to misrepresent θi by a large amount. Hence, reporting θi might be a local minimum, but not
a global one. However, global incentive compatibility is guaranteed if in addition to condition (2.1),
monotonicity of x(.) holds.
Proposition 1. (Myerson’s Characterization Theorem) A contract {x(.), t(.)} is globally incentive compatible
iff
1. xi(θi, θ−i) is decreasing in θi (monotonicity)
2. ki(θi, θi) = ki(θi, θi)−
∫ θi
θi
∂Ci(xi(s),s)
∂θi
ds
The proof of proposition 1 may be found in the appendix. As a consequence, when proposition 1
holds, it is ensured that truth-telling is a global minimum.
3 Optimal Contracts in Principal Agent Models in a River
Assume the federal government nominates one of the agents to design a set of contracts for all other
agents. The agent chosen has two possibilities to offer contracts. Either he simultaneously and di-
rectly contracts with the remaining agents in a centralizedmanner or he starts a delegated contracting
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process in which he subcontracts with his two direct neighbours who are given the authority to sub-
contract with their direct neighbour and so on till all agents received and accepted a contract.
One advantage of the delegated structure is that the intermediate agents can design their subcontracts
while having full knowledge about their own costs. On the other hand, a potential drawback of dele-
gated contracting is that the prime principal may experience a control loss, owing to the monopsony
power granted to the other agents. Melumad et al. (1995) consider an upwards-oriented sequential
contracting model with three agents. They show that the principal, in their case agent 3, can alle-
viate the control loss completely by constructing a sustainable transfer for the outsourcing to agent
2 so that the allocation is the same as in the centralized model. To calibrate the transfer correctly,
however, the principal has to know agent 2’s true costs θ2 as this determines the magnitude of the
monopsony distortion. To elicit this information, the principal offers agent 2 a contract with a con-
tinuum of contingencies, corresponding to different possible true values of θ2. Similarly, we find that
the prime principal can achieve the same abatement allocation in the delegated as in the centralized
model while he is indifferent ex-ante between the centralized and delegated model.
3.1 The Centralized Principal Agent Model
Let us first have a look at the centralized principal agent model. Let Pi denote the structure in which
agent i, i = 1, ..., n, is the principal elected by the federal government. Assume that agent i has to
compensate all agents j < i for their abatement efforts, and is paid by all agents j > i for his abate-
ment effort.
Full Information
Suppose that agent i has full information about the abatement costs of the other agents. Agent i’s
minimization problem can be written as follows
minx1,...,xn−1,t1(.),...,tn(.)Ci(xi, θi) + Di(qi(x)) +
i−1
∑
j=1
tj(x)−
n
∑
j=i+1
tj(x),
subject to the binding individual rationality constraints of the agents j 6= i, i.e.
Cj(xj, θj) + Dj(qj(x))− tj(x) = kj, for j < i
Cj(xj, θj) + Dj(qj(x)) + tj(x) = kj, for j > i,
with kj being the cost level an agent j incurs in the status quo. The individual rationality constraints
must bind, because if they would not, the principal could lower his costs by decreasing tj(.), ∀j < i,
or by increasing tj(.), ∀j > i, while still satisfying the individual rationality constraints. From the
binding individual rationality constraints, the following transfer payments can be attained
tj(x) = Cj(xj, θj) + Dj(qj(x))− kj, for j < i
tj(x) = kj − Cj(xj, θj)− Dj(qj(x)), for j > i.
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Substituting these tj(.) into the minimization problem of agent i yields
minx1,...,xn−1
n−1
∑
j=1
Cj(xj, θj) +
n
∑
i=2
Dj(qj(x))−
n
∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj.
The solution to this minimization problem is the first best abatement allocation xFB = (xFB1 , ..., x
FB
n−1),
with xFBn = 0.
Asymmetric Information
Let us now assume that the agents have no knowledge about the abatement costs of the other agents.
Finding the optimal direct-revelation set of contracts for the principal in case of asymmetric informa-
tion demands minimizing the principal’s expected total costs over the set of mechanisms that induce
truthful revelation of the agents’ types and full participation. Thus, the principal’s problem of de-
signing the optimal contract can be stated equivalently as minimizing the principal’s expected total
costs subject to the local incentive compatibility constraints, the individual rationality constraints and
the monotonicity constraints. Hence, the principal’s minimization problem can be expressed as
minx1,...,xn,t1(.),...,ti−1,ti+1,...,tn(.)Eθ−i [Ci(xi, θi) + Di(qi(x)) +
i−1
∑
j=1
tj(x)−
n
∑
j=i+1
tj(x)] (3.1)
subject to the individual rationality constraints, i.e.
Cj(xj, θj) + Dj(qj(x))− tj(x) ≤ kj, for j < i
Cj(xj, θj) + Dj(qj(x)) + tj(x) ≤ kj, for j > i,
Dn(qn(x)) + tn(x) = kn,
the incentive compatibility constraints, i.e.
Cj(xj(θj), θj) + Dj(qj(x(θj)))− tj(θj) ≤ Cj(xj(θˆj), θj) + Dj(qj(x(θˆj)))− tj(θˆj), for j < i
Cj(xj(θj), θj) + Dj(qj(x(θj))) + tj(θj) ≤ Cj(xj(θˆj), θj) + Dj(qj(x(θˆj))) + tj(θˆj), for j > i, j 6= n
and the feasibility constraints
j
∑
k=1
xk ≤
j
∑
k=1
ek, ∀k.
The optimal set of contracts is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The optimal abatement levels xPi1 , ..., x
Pi
n−1 in the centralized model with agent i as the principal
satisfy
xPi1 , ..., x
Pi
n−1 ∈ argminx1,...,xn−1Ci(xi, θi) + Di(qi(x)) +
i−1
∑
j=1
tj(x)−
n
∑
j=i+1
tj(x),
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whereby
tj(x, θj) = Cj(xj, θj) +
∂Cj(xj, θj)
∂θj
F(θj)
f (θj)
+ Dj(qj(x))− kj, ∀j < i
tj(x, θj) = −Cj(xj, θj)−
∂Cj(xj, θj)
∂θj
F(θj)
f (θj)
− Dj(qj(x)) + kj, ∀j > i
tn(x) = Dn(
n−1
∑
j=1
ej)− kn.
We refer to these transfers as the standard principal agent transfers. They reflect the relevant costs
for the principal that have to be paid to the agents. In expectation, the cost level each agent i 6= n
incurs by accepting his contract falls short of the non-cooperative status quo by an amount equal to
the agent’s informational rent r :=
∂Cj(xj,θj)
∂θj
F(θj)
f (θj)
. The proof of proposition 2 is in the appendix.
3.2 The Delegated Principal Agent Model
Let us now introduce the delegated principal agent model. Due to the nature of the river, we con-
sider upstream-oriented and downstream-oriented sequential contracting. Assume agent i has been
selected as the prime principal. Suppose, he first subcontracts with his direct upriver neighbour
agent i − 1, who in turn subcontracts with his direct upriver neighbour agent i − 2 and so on, till
agent 1 is reached. After all upriver agents j < i have accepted their contract, agent i offers agent
i + 1 a contract, who in turn is given the authority to subcontract with agent i + 2 and so on till all
agents j > i have accepted the contract proposed by their upriver neighbour2. Similarly to the cen-
tralized model, we assume that an agent j has to compensate his direct upriver neighbour j+ 1 for
his abatement effort whereas he is paid by his direct downriver neighbour i + 1 for his abatement
effort.
Full Information
Assume first, that types are common knowledge. By backwards induction, agent i, knows that all
other agents j 6= i will set their direct up or downriver contracting partner indifferent between ac-
cepting their contracts of the non-cooperative outcome. In addition, to maximize his cooperation
gain, agent i is confronted with the following minimization problem
minx1,...,xn
n
∑
j=1
Cj(xj) + Dj(qj(x))−
n
∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj.
The abatement allocation minimizing agent i’s costs corresponds to the first best optimal abatement
allocation xFB. However, in contrast to the centralized model, agent i cannot choose all abatement
levels simultaneously to fully incorporate the externalities. Thus, agent i has to construct the two
contracts to his direct upriver neighbour i − 1 and direct downriver neighbour i + 1 in such a way
that the first best allocation is sequentially implemented by all agents. We claim that agent i is able to
skim off the maximal cooperation gain by inducing the following contracting process: He first offers
2Note that delegating downriver first and upriver afterwards will lead to the same results.
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agent i − 1 a transfer ti−1 contingent on the abatement levels of the upriver agents and lets agent
i− 1 decide on the abatement level xn−1. After accepting the transfer payment, agent i− 1 will offer
a transfer to agent i− 2 and so on. We claim that if agent i offers agent i− 1 a transfer of
ti−1(x) =
n−1
∑
i=1
Ci(x
FB
i , θi) +
n
∑
i=1
Di(qi(x
FB))−
n
∑
j=i
Dj(qj(x1, ..., xi, x
FB
i+1, ..., x
FB
n−1))
−
n−1
∑
j=i
Cj(x
FB
j , θj)−
i−1
∑
j=1
kj, ∀i
all upriver agents j < i will sequentially choose first best optimal abatement levels. After all upriver
agents j < i have accepted their contracts, agent i offers a contract consisting of xFBi and ti to agent
i+ 1. We claim that if agent i offers agent i+ 1 a transfer of
ti(x) =
n
∑
j=i+1
kj −
n−1
∑
j=i+1
Cj(x
FB
j , θj)−
n
∑
j=i+1
Dj(qj(x
FB)),
all downriver agents j > i will subsequently choose the first best optimal abatement levels xFBj . In
the end, all agents j 6= i will end up with their reservation costs kj whereas the full cooperation gain
goes to agent i.
Proposition 3. Given full information, agent i offers agent i− 1 a contract consisting of the transfer
ti−1(x) =
n−1
∑
i=1
Ci(x
FB
i , θi) +
n
∑
i=1
Di(qi(x
FB))−
n
∑
j=i
Dj(qj(x1, ..., xi, x
FB
i+1, ..., x
FB
n−1))
−
n−1
∑
j=i
Cj(x
FB
j , θj)−
i−1
∑
j=1
kj, ∀i (3.2)
and offers agent i+ 1 a contract consisting of an abatement level of xFBi and a transfer of
ti(x) =
n
∑
j=i+1
kj −
n−1
∑
j=i+1
Cj(x
FB
j , θj)−
n
∑
j=i+1
Dj(qj(x
FB)). (3.3)
These transfers together with the first best optimal abatement allocation xFB constitute a Nash-equilibrium of
the delegated contracting model.
The proof of proposition 3 may be found in the appendix.
Clearly, the nominated principal can achieve the same abatement allocation in the centralized and
delegated principal agentmodel. The transfers to be paid, however, differ in the twomodels. Nonethe-
less, the principal is equally well off in both models in that he attains the maximal cooperation gain
possible.
Proposition 4. Agent i, the principal, is indifferent between the delegated and centralized model.
This proposition follows by construction.
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Asymmetric Information
Suppose now, that the agents cannot observe the types of the other agents. Suppose the contract-
ing goes as follows: the principal, agent i, first offers agent i − 1 a contract consisting of a transfer
ti−1(x1, ..., xi−1, θˆi−1) contingent on the abatement levels of all upriver agents j < i which agent i− 1
accepts by reporting θˆi−1. Agent i− 1 then chooses xi−1 and offers a contract to agent i− 2, who in
turn reports θˆi−2 and selects xi−2 optimally. This contracting process is continued till agent 1 reports
his type θˆ1 to agent 2 in exchange for a transfer t1(x1, θˆ1) and finally chooses to abate x1. Then, agent
i proposes a contract consisting of an abatement level xi(θˆi+1) and transfer ti(θˆi+1) to agent i + 1,
who accepts by reporting θˆi+1, followed by agent i+ 1 proposing an abatement level xi+1(θˆi+2) and
a transfer ti+1(θˆi+2) to agent i+ 2, who in turn reports θˆi+2. This contracting process is continued till
agent n accepts the contract.
The resulting sequential optimization problem can be represented as follows. Let us first consider
the upstream-oriented contracting part of the game. In the last step of the upstream contracting,
agent 1 receives t1(x1, θˆ1) and chooses x1. In the second last step, agent 2 subcontracts with agent 1,
given the transfer t2(x1, x2, θˆ1, θˆ2) and his report θˆ2. Agent 2 then faces the following minimization
problem
minx1,x2,t1Eθ1 [C2(x2, θ2) + D2(q2(x)) + t1(x1, θ1)− t2(x1, x2, θˆ1, θˆ2)] := minx1,x2M2(x, θˆ2, θ2)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint of agent 1
θ1 ∈ argminθˆ1C1(x1(θˆ1), θ1)− t1(x1, θˆ1)
and the individual rationality constraint of agent 1
C1(x1(θ1), θ1)− t1(x1, θ1) ≤ k1.
In the previous step, agent 3 subcontracts with agent 2, given the transfer t3(x1, x2, x3, θˆ1, θˆ2, θˆ3) and
solves
minx1,x2,x3,t2Eθ1,θ2 [C3(x3, θ3) + D3(q3(x)) + t2(x1, x2, θˆ1, θˆ2)− t3(x1, x2, x3, θˆ1, θˆ2, θˆ3)]
:= minx1,x2,x3M3(x, θˆ3, θ3),
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint of agent 2
θ2 ∈ argminθˆ2M2(x, θˆ2, θ2),
the individual rationality constraint of agent 2
J2(x, θˆ2, θ2) ≤ k2
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and subject to
x1, x2 ∈ argminx1,x2M2(x, θˆ2, θ2).
This process is continued till agent i is reached. Next, consider the downstream-oriented contracting
part of the game. Let x˜j = ∑
j−1
k=1 xk, i.e. the joint abatement effort chosen by the agents k < j. Consider
the second last step of the contracting, in which agent n− 2 subcontracts with agent n− 1, given all
upriver agents j’s reports θˆj, the transfer tn−2(x˜n−2, θˆn−1) and the abatement levels selected upriver.
Agent n− 1 will offer agent n a contract composed of an abatement level xn−1 satisfying
minxn−1Cn−1(xn−1, θn−1) + Dn−1(qn−1(x˜n−1)) + tn−2(x˜n−2, θˆn−1)− kn + Dn(qn(x˜n−1, xn−1))
:= minxn−1Mn−1(x, θˆn−1, θn−1)
and a transfer setting him indifferent between accepting and not. Moving one step upriver, agent
n− 2 subcontracts with agent n− 1, given the transfer tn−3(x˜n−3, θˆn−2) as well as all upriver agents
i’s reports θˆi, i = 1, ..., n − 2 and the abatement levels selected upriver. Agent n − 2 thus faces the
following minimization problem
minxn−1,xn−2,tn−2Eθn−1 [Cn−2(xn−2, θn−2) + Dn−2(qn−2(x˜n−2)) + tn−3(x˜n−3, θˆn−2)− tn−2(x)]
:= minxn−2,xn−1Mn−2(x, θˆn−2, θn−2),
so that agent n− 1 reports truthfully, i.e.
θn−1 ∈ argminθˆn−1Cn−1(xn−1(θˆn−1), θn−1) + Dn−1(qn−1(x˜n−1(θˆn−1)))
+ tn−2(x˜n−2(θˆn−1))− tn−1(x˜n−1(θˆn−1)),
the individual rationality constraint of agent n− 1 is fulfilled, i.e.
Cn−1(xn−1, θn−1) + Dn−1(qn(x˜)) + tn−2(x˜n−2)− tn−1(x˜n−1) ≤ kn−1
and
xn−1 ∈ argminMn−1(x, θˆn−1, θn−1).
Continue this process till agent i is reached. This implies the following minimization problem for
agent i
minx1,...,xn−1,ti−1,tiEθ−i [Ci(xi, θi) + Di(qi(x)) + ti−1(x, θˆ1, ..., θˆi−1)− ti(x, θˆi+1, ..., θˆn−1)]
:= minx1,...,xn−1Mi(x)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint of both agents i− 1, i+ 1, i.e.
θj ∈ argminθˆjMj(x, θˆj, θj), j = i+ 1, i− 1,
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the individual rationality constraint of both agents i− 1,i+ 1, i.e.
Mj(x, θˆj, θj) ≤ kj, j = i+ 1, i− 1
and subject to
x1, ..., xi−1 ∈ argminx1,...,xi−1Mi−1(x, θˆi−1, θi−1), (3.4)
xi+1, ..., xn−1 ∈ argminxi+1,...,xn−1Mi+1(x, θˆi+1, θi+1). (3.5)
The last two constraints (3.4),(3.5) reflect that the desired abatement levels must coincide with those
that agent i+ 1 respectively agent i− 1 will choose when they subcontract with their corresponding
contracting partners i+ 2 respectively i− 2.
For the class of contracts we consider, the revelation principle implies that a centralized arrange-
ment weakly dominates all other arrangements. The relevant question is thus whether the principal
can design a set of contracts that match his expected costs in the centralized model. We will show
that by choosing appropriate transfers, agent i can achieve the same abatement allocation as in the
centralized principal agent model and this is the best he can do.
Proposition 5. Agent i, the principal, can achieve the same abatement allocation xPi in the delegated model as
in the centralized model.
The proof of proposition 5 is in the appendix and is based on the following idea. To achieve
the same outcome in the delegated model as in the centralized principal agent model, agent i has to
counteract the tendency of the other agents j 6= i to bias the abatement levels in their favour. Thus,
the prime principal i has to shift the preferences of both agent i − 1 and i + 1 in such a way that
they fully internalize the prime principals objective. We claim that he achieves this by adopting the
following incentive scheme: He first offers agent agent i− 1 a transfer of
ti−1(x) =ω(θˆi−1)−
n
∑
j=i
Dj(qj(x1, ..., xi, x
Pi
i+1, ..., x
Pi
n−1))−
n−1
∑
j=i
Cj(x
Pi
j , θˆj)
−
n−1
∑
j=i
∂Cj(x
Pi
j , θˆj)
∂θˆj
F(θˆj)
f (θˆj)
−
∂Ci−1(xi−1, θˆi−1)
∂θˆi−1
F(θˆi−1)
f (θˆi−1)
with
ω(θˆi−1) =
n−1
∑
k=1
Ck(x
Pi
k , θk) +
n
∑
k=2
Dk(qk(x
Pi)) +
n−1
∑
k=i−1
∂Ck(x
Pi
k , θˆk)
∂θˆk
F(θˆk)
f (θˆk)
−
i−1
∑
l=1
kl
+
i−1
∑
k=1
∫ θk
θˆk
∂Ck(xk(θ−k, s, s, ), s)
∂θˆk
ds.
After all upriver agents have accepted their respective offer, agent i offers agent i+ 1 an abatement
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level of xPii and a transfer of
ti(x) =
i−1
∑
j=1
∂Cj(x
Pi
j , θˆj)
∂θˆj
F(θˆj)
f (θˆj)
+
∂Ci+1(xi+1, θˆi+1)
∂θˆi+1
F(θˆi+1)
f (θˆi+1)
− ϕ(θˆi+1).
with
ϕ(θˆi+1) =
n−1
∑
k=i+1
Ck(x
Pi
k , θk) +
n
∑
k=i+1
Dk(qk(x
Pi)) +
i+1
∑
k=1,k 6=i
∂Ck(x
Pi
k , θˆk)
∂θˆk
F(θˆk)
f (θˆk)
+
n−1
∑
k=i+1
∫ θk
θˆk
∂Ck(xk(θm, s, s), s)
∂θˆk
ds−
n
∑
l=i+1
kl .
The functions ϕ(.),ω(.) in the transfers above are chosen so as to ensure full participation and truth-
ful type revelation of all agents j 6= i. Since under any incentive-compatible scheme, the expected
payments to either agent i− 2 and i+ 2 must equal their standard principal agent transfers, the trans-
fers ti−1(x), ti(x) given above ensure, that both agents i+ 1, i− 1 internalize the principal’s objective.
In the proof of proposition 5, we show that with the functions ω(.), ϕ(.) given above each agent jwill
indeed report truthfully at each stage and his expected profit will be equal to his reservation costs at
θj = θ j, in other words his individual rationality constraint will be binding for the highest type. The
claim then follows from the revenue equivalence theorem.
As established, a nominated principal can achieve the same abatement allocation in the delegated
as in the centralized model. However, the transfer scheme offered differs in the two models and
thus, total costs incurred by the nominated principal may vary in the two models. We show that the
expected total costs of the nominated principal fall together in both models and thus, ex-ante, the
principal is indifferent between choosing the delegated or centralized contracting method.
Proposition 6. Agent i is indifferent ex-ante between the delegated and centralized model.
The proof of proposition 6 may be found in the appendix.
4 Choice of the Principal
As a last point, we address the question which agent the federal government should nominate as a
principal. In case of full information, all potential principals implement the first best optimal alloca-
tion. Thus, the source at which the contracts originate just determines who gets the cooperation gain.
Instead of nominating one of the agents to propose contracts, the federal government could for ex-
ample propose a set of contracts according to the downstream incremental cost distribution as proposed
by Winkler and Steinmann (2015). This cost distribution is in the core and additionally satisfied a
specific fairness criterion. In case of asymmetric information, the federal government may benefit
from letting one of the agents propose a set of contracts. Even though the elected principal has a
different objective than the federal government, nominating one of the agents to be the principal
might still be beneficial for the government because this principal has full knowledge about his own
abatement costs. In other words, the nominated principal has one less informational constraint to
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consider while offering contracts. Furthermore, as established in proposition 5, a nominated prin-
cipal implements the same abatement allocation whether he chooses a centralized or a delegated
principal agent model. As evident from the minimization problem of the principal (3.1), however,
the abatement allocation implemented differs across the prime principals. Thus, clearly, the govern-
ment should nominate the agent who implements the abatement allocation leading to least costs for
the river basin. But who is the best principal?
First and not surprisingly, all potential principals will lead to higher total costs for the river basin than
first best optimal as all abatement allocations chosen have in common that there is less individual and
thus less total abatement done than first best optimal.
Proposition 7. The abatement levels under asymmetric information are weakly smaller than under full infor-
mation
xFBj ≥ x
Pi
j , ∀i, j.
The proof of proposition 7 is in the appendix. There is efficiency at the top, i.e. the highest type
agents abate pollution in the first best optimal amount. This is because for θi = θi, each principal’s
problem in the asymmetric information case is equivalent to full information case. For all other types,
the principals will distort the abatement levels to reduce the information rents.
Second, we find that agent n should never be the one proposing contracts for the agents along the
river as his best set of contracts leads to higher total expected costs in the river basin as with any agent
i 6= n acting as a principal. Intuitively, by electing any agent i 6= n as a principal, one uncertainty
drops as agent i knows his own type and only n− 2 information rents have to be paid, whereas with
agent n proposing contracts, there are still n− 1 unknown types and information rents. To show this
formally, let us establish the condition under which an agent i is a better prime principal than an
agent k.
Proposition 8. Let E[KPi ] be total expected costs in the river basin with agent i being the principal, i = 1, ..., n.
Then, for any two principals i,k
E[KPi ] ≤ E[KPk ], ∀i, k, i 6= k
if
Eθ [
∂Ck(x
Pi
k , θk)
∂θk
−
∂Ci(x
Pk
i , θi)
∂θi
] ≤ Eθ [
∂2Ci(x
Pk
i , θi)
∂θi∂xi
(xPii − x
Pk
i )].
The proof of proposition 8 may be found in the appendix. From proposition 8, we deduct, that
choosing any agent i, i 6= n as principal leads to lower total expected costs than selecting agent n and
there is less total abatement in the river basin with agent n being the principal.
Corollary 1. Let E[KPi ] be total expected costs in the river basin with agent i being the principal,
i = 1, ..., n. It holds that
E[KPi ] ≤ E[KPn ], ∀i, i 6= n.
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and
Eθ [
n−1
∑
j=1
xPij ] ≥ Eθ [
n−1
∑
j=1
xPnj ], ∀i, i 6= n
The proof of corollary 1 may be found in the appendix. According to the constrained efficiency
theorem, the federal government is not able to achieve a better outcome for the river basin as agent
n because it is subject to the same informational constraints.
According to proposition 8, the position of a potential principal along the river as well as the exoge-
nously given pollution levels and the damage cost parameters play an important role in the abate-
ment allocation chosen and thus in determining who of the principals is the best one. We establish,
that with linear damages, it is best to assign the power to the agent at the source of the river.
Proposition 9. Assume, the damage functions are of the form Di(qi) = αi + βiqi. Then, the federal govern-
ment should nominate agent 1 to be the principal.
The proof of proposition 9 may be found in the appendix. With linear damages, the abatement
levels chosen are a function of the constant marginal damage costs. Because of this and due to his
position, agent 1’s expected abatement level is the highest, no information rent has to be paid for it
and it has the most influence as it benefits all and not just a subgroup of agents. Thus, intuitively,
total expected costs are smallest with agent 1 as the principal.
For any other functional form of the damage costs, there is no clear cut answer to who should be
nominated as principal. This is illustrated by an example of a river shared by three agents with
quadratic damage and abatement costs.
Example 1. Consider a river shared by three agents. Assume, the abatement costs are of the form
Ci(xi) =
1
2θix
2
i , i = 1, 2 and the damage costs of the form Di(qi(x)) = 1/2βiqi(x)
2,i = 2, 3. As
established in proposition 1, the agent most downriver, agent 3, should not be chosen to be the
principal. Let us thus consider agents 1,2 as principals in dependence of the pollution levels e1, e2.
Furthermore, set e1 = αe2. As shown in the appendix, there exist values of α for which either agent 1
or agent 2 is the better principal.
Lemma 1. There exist α ∈ (0, αid) with αid < 1 for which
E[KP1(α)] > E[KP2(α)],
and for all α > αid,
E[KP1(α)] < E[KP2(α)].
5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analyse contractual mitigation of a global public bad along a river in the pres-
ence of a federalist governance structure, where the lower tiers have private information about their
abatement costs. In our model, one of the lower tiers is nominated by the federal government to offer
a set of mitigation contracts to the remaining agents. The selected principal either proposes contracts
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in a centralized manner, where he simultaneously offers contracts to all agents, or he contracts only
with his direct up- and downstream neighbour and delegates to those two agents the authority to
contract with their direct up- respectively downriver neighbours, and so on, until all agents received
a contract. We establish that given full information, both models implement the first best optimal al-
location and the choice of the principal only determines which agent attains the full cooperation gain.
In case of asymmetric information, we demonstrate that even though the delegated principal agent
model is prone to a control loss, the abatement allocation implemented in the centralized principal
agent model can be replicated in the delegated principal agent model while matching the expected
costs of the principal. However, to counteract and to avoid the tendency of the intermediate agents
to bias the abatement allocation in their favour, the nominated principal must be able to monitor the
abatement levels as well as the reports of the intermediate agents and it must be ensured that the set
of contracts is executed after all intermediate agents have accepted their subcontracts. As all potential
principals implement a different abatement allocation, the choice of the prime principal matters for
the total expected costs occurring in the river basin. We show, that the tier located most downriver,
which is subject to the same informational constraints as the federal government, is never the best
choice to nominate as a principal. In case of linear damages, we establish that choosing the agent at
the source of the river will implement the abatement allocation leading to least expected total costs
for the river basin. For other functional forms of damage and abatement costs, the nomination of the
best principal depends not only on the position of the potential principal along the river but also on
the damage cost parameters as well as the exogenously given pollution levels.
This chapter can be extended in a number of directions, for example, to flood protection. In this
case, the exogenously given pollution levels correspond to the water discharges from one tier to an-
other, the abatement levels match the amount of water a tier withdraws from the stream by controlled
flooding of designated flooding areas and the pollution flow is the amount of excess water in a tier’s
area. These modifications would not impact on the validity of any propositions made in this chapter.
A more challenging extension of our work would be to allow for the formation of sub-coalitions,
meaning that agents may propose a set of contracts to a sub-group of agents. By incorporating this
cooperative behaviour among the agents, more complex reservation costs respectively participation
constraints would have to be considered. This would also be the approach to follow if sovereign
countries were considered, where there is no federal government giving the power to offer contracts
to one particular agent with the threat that the status quo were to prevail if one agent refuses the
contract.
Our work suggests several other avenues for future research. Our model relies on perfect monitoring
of both the communication among the agents as well as the abatement levels chosen by each agent.
A realistic limitation in monitoring could be that an intermediate agent is confined to observing only
the joint abatement effort of his upriver agents rather than each individual abatement level or/and
may not be able to monitor the communication in regard to the type reports between the other agents.
Thus, analysing the consequences of such reductions in the amount of monitoring between the agents
might yield interesting insights. Additionally, making the exogenously given pollution levels private
information, the adverse selection problem would be enriched by a moral hazard component. In this
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case, an intermediate agent can only observe the pollution flow at his location but cannot deduct the
abatement effort done by the upriver agent. Finally, considering a setting where the asymmetric in-
formation involves two dimensions, the abatement costs and the damage costs, would allow to study
the problems of multidimensional incentive design with type dependent reservation costs. This may
induce countervailing incentives in the sense that an agent may want to overstate its abatement and
damage costs to obtain a higher compensation and at the same time to understate his type to pretend
a better outside option.
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Appendix
Proof. of proposition 1
Assume, a contract is incentive compatible. Let us show (i) and (ii).
Suppose, θˆi > θi and θ−i constant. From incentive compatibility, we have
ki(θˆi, θi) ≥ ki(θi, θi).
By definition
θici(x(θˆi))− ti(θˆi) ≥ θici(x(θi))− ti(θi).
Rearranging implies
ki(θˆi, θˆi)− ki(θi, θi) ≥ (θˆi − θi)ci(xi(θˆi, θ−i)). (5.1)
The same must hold for θˆi, i.e. from
ki(θi, θˆi) ≥ ki(θˆi, θˆi),
we attain
θˆici(x(θi))− ti(θi) ≥ θˆici(x(θˆi))− ti(θˆi)
and thus
ki(θi, θi)− ki(θˆi, θˆi) ≥ (θi − θˆi)ci(xi(θi)). (5.2)
Combining inequalities (5.1) and (5.2) yields
(θˆi − θi)ci(xi(θˆi)) ≤ ki(θˆi, θˆi)− ki(θi, θi) ≤ (θˆi − θi)ci(xi(θi)).
The above inequality can be rewritten to
∫ θˆi
θi
∂Ci(xi(θˆi), s)
∂θi
ds ≤ ki(θˆi, θˆi)− ki(θi, θi) ≤
∫ θˆi
θi
∂Ci(xi(θi), s)
∂θi
ds. (5.3)
Ignoring the middle term, this implies that
∫ θˆi
θi
∂Ci(xi(θi), s)
∂θi
ds−
∫ θˆi
θi
∂Ci(xi(θˆi), s)
∂θi
ds ≥ 0,
which is identical to
∫ θˆi
θi
∫ xi(θi)
xi(θˆi)
∂2Ci(z, s)
∂xi∂θi
dzds ≥ 0.
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By assumption ∂
2Ci(xi ,θi)
∂xi∂θi
≥ 0, making the integrand positive. For the integral itself to be positive, we
need
(θˆi − θi)(xi(θi)− xi(θˆi)) ≥ 0.
By assumption θˆi > θi, thus the above inequality is satisfied whenever xi(θi) ≥ xi(θˆi). Thus, for
incentive compatibility to hold, it is required that xi(θi) is non-increasing in θi. Note that this implies
that x(.) is continuous almost everywhere. Moreover, by fixing one end point in (5.3) and letting
the other converge towards it, we see that k(θi, θi) must be continuous and thus almost everywhere
differentiable. The derivative of k(θi, θi) amounts to
k′i(θi, θi) =
∂Ci(xi, θi)
∂θi
.
Consequently, we attain (ii). The proof is similar for θˆi < θi.
Next, we assume (i),(ii) and show incentive compatibility. Suppose θˆi > θi. For incentive com-
patibility to hold, we need
ki(θˆi, θˆi) ≤ θˆici(xi(θi))− ti(θi) = ki(θi, θi) + (θˆi − θi)ci(xi(θi)).
Thus, we need to check whether
ki(θˆi, θˆi)− ki(θi, θi) =
∫ θˆi
θi
Ci(xi(s), s)
∂θi
ds ≤ (θˆi − θi)ci(xi(θi)).
The right hand side of the above inequality can be rewritten to
(θˆi − θi)ci(xi(θi)) =
∫ θˆi
θi
∂Ci(xi(θi), s)
∂θi
ds.
Hence, the inequality we have to check is equivalent to
∫ θˆi
θi
∂Ci(xi(s), s)
∂θi
−
∂Ci(xi(θi), s)
∂θi
ds ≤ 0.
Given our functional forms, this is equivalent to
θˆici(xi(θˆi))− θˆici(xi(θi)) ≤ 0.
This holds true as we assumed θˆi > θi and xi(θi) decreasing in θi.
Next, let us prove that we have global incentive compatibility. As Ci(xi, θi) satisfies the single cross-
ing property and is continuously differentiable, Ci(xi, θi) satisfies increasing differences. Increasing
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differences imply, that if xˆ > x and θˆ > θ,
θˆici(xˆi)− t(θˆi)− (θˆici(xi)− t(θˆi)) ≥ θici(xˆi)− t(θi)− (θici(xi)− t(θi))
ci(xˆi) ≥ ci(xi).
Say that we have local incentive compatibility and monotonicity. Let θˆi > θi, then by
∂Ci(xi ,θi)
∂xi
≥ 0 and
∂Ci(xi ,θi)
∂θi
≥ 0, we have
∂Ci(xi(θˆi), θi)
∂xi(θˆi)
≤
∂Ci(xi(θˆi), θˆi)
∂xi(θˆi)
.
Then from
∂
∂θˆi
ki(θˆi, θi) =
∂Ci(xi(θˆi), θi)
∂xi(θˆi)
·
∂xi(θˆi)
∂θˆi
−
∂ti(θˆi)
∂θˆi
,
we get
∂
∂θˆi
ki(θˆi, θi) ≥
∂Ci(xi(θˆi), θˆi)
∂xi(θˆi)
·
∂xi(θˆi)
∂θˆi
−
∂ti(θˆi)
∂θˆi
=
∂
∂θˆi
ki(θˆi, θˆi) = 0
Hence, ki(θˆi, θi) is increasing in θˆi as we assumed θˆi > θi. Equivalently, if we assume θˆi < θi, we
receive ∂
∂θˆi
ki(θˆi, θi) ≤ 0. Indicating that θi is a global minimum.
Proof. of proposition 2
According to proposition 1, a contract is globally incentive compatible iff for all agents j,
dxPij
dθj
≤ 0, ∀j, j 6= i, n
and
k j(θj, θj) = k j(θ j, θ j)−
∫ θ j
θj
∂Cj(xj(s, θ−j), s)
∂θj
ds. (5.4)
Note, that if equation (5.4) holds, then all individual rationality constraints will be satisfied iff
k j(θj, θj) ≤ kj. As a result, one can replace all individual rationality constraints with the one of
the highest type, which has to be binding, i.e.
k j(θ j, θ j) = kj.
From equation (5.4), we attain
tj(x) =
∫ θ j
θj
∂Cj(xj(s), s)
∂θj
ds− kj + Cj(xj, θj) + Dj(qj(x)), ∀j < i,
tj(x) = kj −
∫ θ j
θj
∂Cj(xj(s), s)
∂θj
ds− Cj(xj, θj)− Dj(qj(x)), ∀j > i
tn(x) = kn − Dn(qn(x)).
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Hence, substituting these transfers into the principals objective function implies
minx1,...,xnCi(xi, θi) + Di(qi(x)) +
i−1
∑
j=1,j 6=i
∫ θ j
θ j
[
∫ θ j
θj
∂Cj(xj(s), s)
∂θj
ds− kj + Cj(xj, θj) + Dj(qj(x))] f (θj)dθj
− kn + Dn(qn(x))
subject to
dxPij
dθj
≤ 0, ∀j 6= i.
Let us first ignore the monotonicity constraint and solve the resulting relaxed problem. Integrating
by parts yields
∫ θ j
θ j
∫ θ j
θj
∂Cj(xj(s), s)
∂θj
ds f (θj)dθj = [
∫ θ j
θj
∂Cj(xj(s), s)
∂θj
dsF(θj)]
θ j
θ j
+
∫ θ j
θ j
∂Cj(xj(s), θj)
∂θj
F(θj)dθj
=
∫ θ j
θ j
∂Cj(xj(θj), θj)
∂θj
F(θj)dθj.
Thus, the principals minimization problem can be restated to
minx1,...,xnCi(xi, θi) + Di(qi(x))−
n
∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj + Dn(qn(x))
+
n−1
∑
j=1,j 6=i
∫ θ j
θ j
[
∂Cj(xj, θj)
∂θj
F(θj)
f (θj)
+ Cj(xj, θj) + Dj(qj(x))] f (θj)dθj. (5.5)
It remains to be checked that the solution xPi1 , ..., x
Pi
n−1 to the above minimization problem is indeed
globally incentive compatible, i.e. whether xPij is decreasing in θj, ∀j. By using the implicit function
theorem, we attain
dxPij
dθj
= −
∂FOCj
∂θj
∂FOCj
∂xj
= −
∂2Cj(xj,θj)
∂xj∂θj
+
∂3Cj(xj,θj)
∂xj∂2θj
F(θj)
f (θj)
+
∂Cj(xj,θj)
∂θj
∂F(θj)
f (θj)
∂θj
SOCj
≤ 0,
with FOCj being the first and SOCj being the second order condition of the above minimization
problem (5.5), whereby SOCj ≥ 0 as xj is a minimum. Hence, the set of contracts is globally incentive
compatible.
Proof. of proposition 3
Let us first have a look at the upriver part of the contracting process, starting with agent i proposing
a contract to agent i− 1. With the transfer ti−1 given in (3.2) from agent i to agent i− 1, agent i− 1 is
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confronted with the following minimization problem
minx1,...,xi−1,ti−2(.)Ci−1(xi−1, θi−1) + Di−1(qi−1(x)) +
n−1
∑
j=i
Cj(x
FB
j )
+
n
∑
j=i
Dj(qj(x1, ..., xi−1, x
FB
i , ..., x
FB
n−1))−
n−1
∑
j=1
Cj(x
FB
j , θj)
−
n
∑
j=2
Dj(qj(x
FB)) +
i−1
∑
j=1
kj + ti−2(x),
so that the individual rationality constraint of agent i− 2 is binding, i.e.
Ci−2(xi−2, θi−2) + Di−2(qi−2(x))− ti−2(x) + ti−3(x) = ki−2,
implying
ti−2(x) =
i−2
∑
j=1
Cj(xj, θj) +
i−2
∑
j=1
Dj(qj(x))−
i−2
∑
j=1
kj.
The best agent i− 1 can do is to choose xi−1 = x
FB
i−1. To ensure that agent i− 2 incorporates the exter-
nalities fully and to maximize his cooperation gain, agent i− 1 proposes to agent i− 2 the following
transfer
ti−2(x) =
n−1
∑
i=1
Ci(x
FB
i , θi) +
n
∑
i=2
Di(qi(x
FB))−
i−2
∑
i=1
ki
−
n
∑
j=i−1
Dj(qj(x1, ..., xi−2, x
FB
i−1))− Cj(x
FB
j , θj).
Then again, given that agent i − 2 sets his upriver agent i − 3 indifferent between accepting the
contract or not, agent i− 2 chooses xi−2 = x
FB
i−2 and so on. Thus, in general, an agent j+ 1 < i offers
agent j a transfer of
tj(x) =
n−1
∑
i=1
Ci(x
FB
i , θi) +
n
∑
i=1
Di(qi(x
FB))−
n
∑
k=j+1
Dk(qk(x1, ..., xj, x
FB
j+1, ..., x
FB
n−1))
−
n−1
∑
k=j+1
Ck(x
FB
k , θk)−
j
∑
l=1
kl , (5.6)
which ensures that agent j is set indifferent and agent j+ 1’s cooperation gain is maximized. At the
last step of the upriver contracting, agent 1 receives a transfer of
t1(x) =
n−1
∑
i=1
Ci(x
FB
i , θi) +
n
∑
i=1
Di(qi(x
FB))− k1 −
n
∑
j=2
Dj(qj(x1, x
FB
2 , ..., x
FB
n−1))−
n−1
∑
j=3
Cj(x
FB
j , θj).
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He thus solves the following minimization problem
minx1C1(x1, θ1)−
n−1
∑
i=1
Ci(x
FB
i , θi)−
n
∑
i=1
Di(qi(x
FB)) + k1
+
n
∑
j=2
Dj(qj(x1, x
FB
2 , ..., x
FB
n−1)) +
n−1
∑
j=2
Cj(x
FB
j , θj),
implying x1 = x
FB
1 . Let us now use backwards induction to show that indeed no agent j < i has an
incentive to refuse the contract offered. At the last step of the upriver contracting, agent 1 receives
t1(.) as given in (5.6) and thus faces the following minimization problem
minx1C1(x1, θ1)−
n−1
∑
i=1
Ci(x
FB
i , θi)−
n
∑
i=1
Di(qi(x
FB)) +
n
∑
j=2
Dj(qj(x1, x
FB
2 , ..., x
FB
n−1))
+
n−1
∑
j=2
Cj(x
FB
j , θj) +
1
∑
j=1
kj.
Given that all other agents choose first best optimal abatement levels, the best agent 1 can do is to
select x1 = x
FB
1 , leaving him with k1 = 0. Similarly, moving downriver to an agent j < i, we have
xFBj ∈ argminxjCj(xj, θj) + Dj(qj(x
FB))− tj(x) + tj−1(x)
with tj(x), tj−1(x) given in (5.6), i.e.
xFBj ∈ argminxj
j−1
∑
k=1
Ck(x
FB
k , θk) +
j−1
∑
k=2
Dk(qk(x
FB)) + Cj(xj, θj) + Dj(qj(x
FB))−
n−1
∑
i=1
Ci(x
FB
i , θi) + kj
−
n
∑
i=2
Di(qi(x
FB)) +
n
∑
k=j+1
Dk(qk(x
FB
1 , ..., x
FB
j−1, xj, x
FB
j+1, ..., x
FB
n−1)) +
n−1
∑
k=j+1
Ck(x
FB
k , θk).
As a consequence, all agents j < i end up with their reservation costs kj.
Next, let us have a look at the downriver part of the contracting process with agent i proposing a
contract to agent i + 1. With the transfer ti given in (3.3), which agent i demands from agent i + 1,
agent i+ 1’s minimization problem is
minxi+1,...,xn−1,ti+1Ci+1(xi+1, θi+1) + Di+1(qi+1(x
FB
1 , ..., x
FB
i )) +
n
∑
j=i+1
kj
−
n−1
∑
j=i+1
Cj(x
FB
j , θj)−
n
∑
j=1
Dj(qj(x
FB))− ti+1(x)
with the binding individual rationality constraint of agent i+ 2, i.e. with
ti+1(x) =
n
∑
j=i+2
kj −
n−1
∑
j=i+2
Cj(xj, θj)−
n
∑
j=i+2
Dj(qj(x)).
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Thus, agent i+ 1 offers agent i+ 2 an abatement level of xFBi+1 and a transfer of
ti+1(x) =
n
∑
j=i+2
kj −
n−1
∑
j=i+2
Cj(x
FB
j , θj) +
n
∑
j=i+2
Dj(qj(x
FB)).
Hence, in general, an agent j > i will offer his direct downriver agent j+ 1 an abatement level of xFBj
and a transfer of
tj(x) =
n
∑
l=j+1
kl −
n−1
∑
k=j+1
Ck(x
FB
k , θk)−
n
∑
k=j+1
Dj(qk(x
FB)). (5.7)
At the last stage of the downriver contracting, agent n− 1 sets agent n indifferent, i.e.
tn−1 = kn − Dn(qn(x
FB)),
implying that agent n− 1 will face the following minimization problem
minxn−1
n−2
∑
j=1
Cj(x
FB
j , θj) + Cn−1(xn−1, θn−1) +
n−1
∑
j=1
Dj(qj(x
FB))
+ Dn(qn(x
FB
1 , ..., x
FB
n−2, xn−1))−
n−1
∑
j=1
Cj(x
FB
j , θj)−
n
∑
j=1
Dj(qj(x
FB)) + kn−1,
with the result that he will choose xFBn−1. To prove that indeed no agent has an incentive to decline
these contracts, we use backwards induction. In the last stage of the game, by accepting the contract
offered by agent n− 1, agent n incurs
kn(.) = Dn(qn(x
FB)) + kn − Dn(qn(x
FB)) = kn.
Hence, he is indifferent between accepting the contract or not and will thus accept. In the second last
step, agent n − 1 has to decide whether he accepts the offer by agent n − 2 and whether choosing
xFBn−1 and tn−1 is optimal. With tn−2 given in (5.7),
xFBn−1 ∈ argminxn−1Cn−1(xn−1, θn−1) + Dn−1(qn−1(x
FB))− kn + Dn(qn(x
FB
1 , ..., x
FB
n−2, xn−1))
+
n
∑
j=n−1
kj −
n−1
∑
j=n−1
Cj(x
FB
j , θj)−
n
∑
j=n−1
Dj(qj(x
FB
1 , ..., x
FB
n−1))
and agent n− 1 will end up with kn−1. Similarly, moving upriver, all agents j > i will end up with
their reservation costs kj as with tj, tj−1 given in (5.7), we have
xFBj ∈ argminxjCj(xj, θj) + Dj(qj(x
FB))− tj(x
FB) + tj−1(x
FB),
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i.e.
xFBj ∈ argminxjCj(xj, θj) + Dj(qj(x
FB))−
n
∑
l=j+1
kl +
n−1
∑
k=j+1
Ck(x
FB
k , θk) +
n
∑
l=j
kl −
n−1
∑
k=j
Ck(x
FB
k , θk)
+
n
∑
k=j+1
Dk(qk(x
FB
1 , ..., x
FB
j−1, xj, x
FB
j+1, ..., x
FB
n−1))−
n
∑
k=j
Dk(qk(x
FB)).
As a consequence, all agents j > i end up with their reservation costs kj.
In contrast, agent i, the principal, will end up with the entire cooperation gain, i.e.
ki(θi) = Ci(x
FB
i , θi) + Di(qi(x
FB))− ti(x
FB) + ti−1(x
FB)
=
n−1
∑
j=1
Cj(x
FB
j , θj) +
n
∑
j=2
Dj(qj(x
FB))−
n
∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj.
with ti(.) as given in (5.7) and ti−1 as given in (5.6).
The transfers (5.6) for all j < i and the transfers (5.7) for all j > i are the best ones the agents can
choose. First, the transfers lead to the implementation of the first best solution. This in turn results in
the largest cooperation gain which is in the interest of all agents. Second, each agent sets his down-
river respectively upriver contracting partner exactly indifferent between accepting or not and thus
extracts the maximum for himself. Or in other words, at the moment of contracting, agent j maxi-
mizes his cooperation gain by choosing tj−1 if j < i as given in (5.6) respectively tj(.) if j > i as given
in (5.7) .
Proof. of proposition 5
From the standard principal agent model, each agent j < i should at least get a transfer of
tj(x) = Cj(xj(θj), θj) +
∂Cj(xj(θj), θj)
∂θj
F(θj)
f (θj)
+ Dj(qj(x))− kj + tj−1(x).
Henceforth, under any incentive compatible scheme, agent j+ 1 has to offer agent j at least
tcj (x) = ∑
j
k=1 Ck(xk(θˆk), θˆk) + ∑
j
k=1
∂Ck(xk(θˆk),θˆk)
∂θˆk
F(θˆk)
f (θˆk)
+ ∑
j
k=1 Dk(qk(x))−∑
j
l=1 kl . (5.8)
Similarly, for agent j > i to report truthfully and to ensure his compliance, agent j has to offer agent
j+ 1 at least
tj(x) = kj+1 − Cj+1(xj+1, θj+1)−
∂Cj+1(xj+1, θˆj+1)
∂θˆj+1
F(θˆj+1)
f (θˆj+1)
− Dj+1(qj+1(x))− tj−1(x).
Iterating over the transfers yields
tcj (x) =
n
∑
l=j+1
kl −
n−1
∑
k=j+1
Ck(xk, θk)−
n−1
∑
k=j+1
∂Ck(xk, θˆk)
∂θˆk
F(θˆk)
f (θˆk)
−
n
∑
k=j+1
Dk(qk(x)). (5.9)
Similar to themodel with full information, agent imaximizes his cooperation gain under the assump-
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tion that he as to pay agent i− 1 at least tci−1(x) as given in (5.8) and can demand at most a transfer
of tci (.) as given in (5.9) from agent i + 1 for an abatement level of xi. Thus, he faces the following
minimization problem
minx1,...,xn−1Eθ−i [Ci(xi, θi) + Di(qi(x)) +
n−1
∑
j=1,j 6=i
Cj(xj(θˆj), θˆj) +
∂Cj(xj(θˆj), θˆj)
∂θˆj
F(θˆj)
f (θˆj)
+
n−1
∑
j=1,j 6=i
Dj(qj(x))−
n−1
∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj].
Agent i’s objective is thus equivalent to the one he faces in the centralized principal agent model.
However, in contrast to the centralized model, here agent i cannot choose all abatement levels him-
self. Agent i thus has to ensure that all intermediate agents j 6= i will choose abatement levels, which
are optimal from his point of view.
Let us first consider the upstream-oriented contracting part of the model. We claim that agent i
offers agent i− 1 a transfer of
ti−1(x) =ω(θˆi−1)−
n
∑
j=i
Dj(qj(x1, ..., xi, x
Pi
i+1, ..., x
Pi
n−1))−
n−1
∑
j=i
Cj(x
Pi
j , θˆj)
−
n−1
∑
j=i+1
∂Cj(x
Pi
j , θˆj)
∂θˆj
F(θˆj)
f (θˆj)
−
∂Ci−1(xi−1, θˆi−1)
∂θˆi−1
F(θˆi−1)
f (θˆi−1)
,
where ω(θˆi−1) is chosen in a way that agent i− 1 reports his type truthfully and accepts the contract.
Note that ω(θˆi−1) depends only on θˆi−1 and not on any abatement levels. Next, agent i − 1 has to
pay agent i− 2 at least tci−2(x) given in (5.8), implying the following minimization problem for agent
i− 1
minx1,...,xi−1Eθ1,...,θi−2 [Ci−1(xi−1, θi−1) + Di−1(qn−1(x)) +
n−1
∑
j=i
Cj(xj, θˆj) +
n
∑
j=i
Dj(qj(x))
+
n−1
∑
j=i+1
∂Cj(xj, θˆj)
∂θˆj
F(θˆj)
f (θˆj)
−ω(θˆi−1)−
i−2
∑
j=1
kj +
i−2
∑
i=1
Ci(xi, θˆi)
+
i−2
∑
j=1
Dj(qj(x)) +
i−1
∑
j=1
∂Cj(xj, θˆj)
∂θˆj
F(θˆj)
f (θˆj)
].
Consequently, agent i − 1 reports θˆi−1 and then chooses x
Pi
i−1(θˆ1, ..., θˆi−1, θi−1). In the next step, to
maximize his cooperation gain, agent i− 1 sets the following transfer
ti−2(x) =ω(θˆi−2)−
n
∑
j=i−1
Dj(qj(x1, ..., xi−2, x
Pi
i−1, ..., x
Pi
n−1))−
n−1
∑
j=i−1
Cj(x
Pi
j , θˆj)
−
n−1
∑
j=i−1
∂Cj(x
Pi
j , θˆj)
∂θˆj
F(θˆj)
f (θˆj)
−
∂Ci−2(xi−2, θˆi−2)
∂θˆi−2
F(θˆi−2)
f (θˆi−2)
.
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Agent i − 2 accepts by reporting θˆi−2 and will consequently choose x
Pi
i−2(θˆ1, ..., θˆi−1, θi−2). Moving
upstream, agent j receives a transfer of
tj(x) =ω(θˆj)−
n
∑
k=j+1
Dk(qk(x1, ..., xj, x
Pi
j+1, ..., x
Pi
n−1))−
n−1
∑
k=j+1
Ck(x
Pi
k , θˆk)
−
n−1
∑
k=j+1,k 6=i
∂Ck(x
Pi
k , θˆk)
∂θˆk
F(θˆk)
f (θˆk)
−
∂Cj(xj, θˆj)
∂θˆj
F(θˆj)
f (θˆj)
, (5.10)
with ω(θˆj) given in general by
ω(θˆj) =
n−1
∑
k=1
Ck(x
Pi
k , θk) +
n
∑
k=2
Dk(qk(x
Pi)) +
n−1
∑
k=j
∂Ck(x
Pi
k , θˆk)
∂θˆk
F(θˆk)
f (θˆk)
−
j
∑
l=1
kl
+
j
∑
k=1
∫ θk
θˆk
∂Ck(xk(θ−k, s, s, ), s)
∂θˆk
ds, ∀j, j < i
and reports θˆj with the result that he faces the same minimization problem as agent i, i.e.
minx1,...,xjEθ1,...,θj−1 [
j
∑
k=1
Ck(xk, θk) + Dk(qk(x)) +
j
∑
k=1
∂Ck(xk, θˆk)
∂θˆk
F(θˆk)
f (θˆk)
+
n−1
∑
k=j+1
Ck(x
Pi
k , θˆk)−ω(θˆj)
+
n
∑
k=j+1
Dk(qk(x1, ..., xj, x
Pi
j+1, ..., x
Pi
n−1)) +
n−1
∑
k=j+1,k 6=i
∂Ck(x
Pi
k , θˆk)
∂θˆk
F(θˆk)
f (θˆk)
−
j−1
∑
l=1
kl ]
:= minx1,...,xjMj(θj, θˆj), (5.11)
and therefore sets xPij (θˆ1, ..., θˆn−1, θj). In the last step of the upstream-contracting part of the game,
agent 1 receives the transfer t1(.) as given in (5.10) and solves the following minimization problem
minx1C1(x1, θ1) +
n
∑
j=2
Dj(qj(x1, x
Pi
2 , ..., x
Pi
n−1)) +
n−1
∑
j=2
Cj(x
Pi
j , θˆj)
+
∂C1(x1, θˆ1)
∂θˆ1
F(θˆ1)
f (θˆ1)
+
n−1
∑
j=2,j 6=i
∂Cj(x
Pi
j , θˆj)
∂θˆj
F(θˆj)
f (θˆj)
−ω(θˆ1)
:= minx1M1(θ1, θˆ1),
resulting in the choice of xPi1 (θˆ1, ..., θˆn−1, θ1).
Next, let us consider the downwards-oriented part of contracting. We claim that agent i offers agent
i+ 1 a contract consisting of xPii (.) and the following transfer
ti(x) =
i−1
∑
j=1
∂Cj(x
Pi
j , θˆj)
∂θˆj
F(θˆj)
f (θˆj)
+
∂Ci+1(xi+1, θˆi+1)
∂θˆi+1
F(θˆi+1)
f (θˆi+1)
− ϕ(θˆi+1),
with ϕ(θˆi+1) being chosen in a way so that agent i+ 1 is willing to accept the transfer and reports his
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type truthfully. Given this transfer, agent i+ 1’s minimization problem is
minxi+1,...,xn−1Eθi+2,...,θn−1 [Ci+1(xi+1, θi+1) + Di+1(qi+1(x
Pi
1 , ..., x
Pi
i )) +
∂Ci+1(xi+1, θˆi+1)
∂θˆi+1
F(θˆi+1)
f (θˆi+1)
− ϕ(θˆi+1) +
n−1
∑
j=i+2
Cj(xj, θj) +
n−1
∑
j=i+3
∂Cj(xj, θˆj)
∂θˆj
F(θˆj)
f (θˆj)
+
n
∑
j=i+3
Dj(qj(x))−
n
∑
j=i+3
kj]
:= minxi+1,...,xn−1Mi+1(θi+1, θˆi+1).
Agent i+ 1 then chooses xPii+1 and sets
ti+1(x) =
i+1
∑
j=1,j 6=i
∂Cj(x
Pi
j , θˆj)
∂θˆj
F(θˆj)
f (θˆj)
+
∂Ci+2(xi+2, θˆi+2)
∂θˆi+2
F(θˆi+2)
f (θˆi+2)
− ϕ(θˆi+2)
and so on. Thus, in general, an agent j > i, agent j solves
minxj,...,xn−1Eθj+1,...,θn−1 [Cj+1(xj+1, θj+1) + Dj+1(qj+1(x
Pi
1 , ..., x
Pi
j−1)) +
∂Cj(xj, θˆj)
∂θˆj
F(θˆj)
f (θˆj)
− ϕ(θˆj) +
n−1
∑
k=j+1
Ck(xk, θk) +
n−1
∑
k=j+2
∂Ck(xk, θˆk)
∂θˆk
F(θˆk)
f (θˆk)
+
n
∑
k=j+2
Dk(qk(x))−
n
∑
l=j+2
kl ]
:= minxj,...,xn−1Mj(θj, θˆj).
and proposes to agent j+ 1 an abatement level of xPij in exchange for the following transfer
tj(x) =
j
∑
k=1,k 6=i
∂Ck(x
Pi
k , θˆk)
∂θˆk
F(θˆk)
f (θˆk)
+
∂Cj+1(xj+1, θˆj+1)
∂θˆj+1
F(θˆj+1)
f (θˆj+1)
− ϕ(θˆj+1). (5.12)
with ϕ(θˆj+1) given in general by
ϕ(θˆj+1) =
n−1
∑
k=j+1
Ck(x
Pi
k , θk) +
n
∑
k=j+1
Dk(qk(x
Pi)) +
j+1
∑
k=1,k 6=i
∂Ck(x
Pi
k , θˆk)
∂θˆk
F(θˆk)
f (θˆk)
+
n−1
∑
k=j+1
∫ θk
θˆk
∂Ck(xk(θm, s, s), s)
∂θˆk
ds−
n
∑
l=j+1
kl .
Moving downriver, we reach agent n− 1 with the following minimization problem
minxn−1Cn−1(xn−1, θn−1) + Dn−1(qn−1(x
Pi
1 , ..., x
Pi
n−2, xn−1)) +
∂Cj(xn−1, θˆn−1)
∂θˆn−1
F(θˆn−1)
f (θˆn−1)
+ Dn(qn(x
Pi
1 , ..., x
Pi
n−2, xn−1))− ϕ(θˆn−1)− kn
:= minxn−1Mn−1(θn−1, θˆn−1)
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so that agent n− 1 will propose xPin−1 and the transfer tn−1 = kn − Dn(qn(x
Pi)) to agent n.
Next, let us prove that incentive compatibility holds for all agents j 6= i. To show incentive com-
patibility, we apply the following slightly altered lemmas from Mirrlees (1971) (Lemma 6.1, 6.3)
Lemma 1. Let x⋆i (θi) ∈ argminC(xi, θi)− t(xi). Then,
dki(xi(θi), θi)
dθi
=
∂Ci(xi(θi), θi)
∂θi
+
∂Ci(xi(θi), θi)
∂xi(θi)
·
∂xi(θi)
∂θi
−
∂ti(xi(θi))
∂xi(θi)
·
∂xi(θi)
∂θi
.
Applying the envelope theorem yields
dki(x
⋆
i (θi), θi)
dθi
=
∂Ci(x
⋆
i (θi), θi)
∂θi
.
Thus,
ki(x
⋆
i (θi), θi)− ki(x
⋆
i (0), 0) =
∫ θi
0
∂Ci(x
⋆
i (s), s)
∂θi
ds.
Lemma 2. Let ki(θi) = ki(x
⋆
i (θi), θi) and ki(θˆi) = ki(x
⋆
i (θˆi), θˆi). Furthermore, let
ki(θi)− ki(θˆi) =
∫ θi
θˆi
∂Ci(x
⋆
i (k), k)
∂θi
dk if θˆi < θi
ki(θi)− ki(θˆi) = −
∫ θˆi
θi
∂Ci(x
⋆
i (k), k)
∂θi
dk if θˆi > θi
It follows that if
∂Ci(x
⋆
i (θˆi),θi)
∂θi
is non-increasing in θˆi, i.e. x
⋆
i (θˆi) decreasing in θˆi, then xi(θi) minimizes
ki(xi, θi).
Proof. of lemma 2
Let θˆi < θi. Then
ki(x
⋆
i (θi), θi)− ki(x
⋆
i (θˆi), θˆi) =
∫ θi
θˆi
∂Ci(x
⋆
i (k), k)
∂θi
dk ≤
∫ θi
θˆi
∂Ci(x
⋆
i (θˆi), k)
∂θi
dk
= ki(x
⋆
i (θˆi), θi)− ki(x
⋆
i (θˆi), θˆi)
Thus, ki(x
⋆
i (θi), θi) ≤ ki(x
⋆
i (θˆi), θi), so that x
⋆
i (θi)must be minimizing ki(xi, θi).
Let θˆi > θi. Then
ki(x
⋆
i (θi), θi)− ki(x
⋆
i (θˆi), θˆi) = −
∫ θˆi
θi
∂Ci(x
⋆
i (k), k)
∂θi
dk ≤ −
∫ θˆi
θi
∂Ci(x
⋆
i (θˆi), k)
∂θi
dk
= ki(x
⋆
i (θˆi), θi)− ki(x
⋆
i (θˆi), θˆi)
Thus, ki(x
⋆
i (θi), θi) ≤ ki(x
⋆
i (θˆi), θi), so that x
⋆
i (θi)must be minimizing ki(xi, θi).
According to lemma 2, for agent j to report truthfully it suffices to show that
∂Mj(θj, θˆj)
∂θj
is weakly decreasing in θˆj. (5.13)
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Let xj(θˆ−j, θj, θˆj), j = 1, ..., n− 1, denote theminimizers of theminimization problemminx1,...,xj Jj(θj, θˆj)
given in (5.11). For condition (5.13) to hold, it suffices to show that
∂Mj(θj, θˆj)
∂θj
= Eθ1,...,θj−1 [
∂Cj(xj(θˆ−j, θj, θˆj), θj)
∂θj
] is decreasing in θˆj, for j < i respectively
∂Mj(θj, θˆj)
∂θj
= Eθj+1,...,θn−1 [
∂Cj(xj(θˆ−j, θj, θˆj), θj)
∂θj
] is decreasing in θˆj, for j > i
Clearly, this is the case as long as xj(θˆk, θj, θˆj) is decreasing in θˆj. This holds true as
dxj(θˆ−j, θj, θˆj)
dθˆj
= −
∂2Mj(θj,θˆj)
∂θj∂xj
∂2Mj(θj,θˆj)
∂2xj
= −
∂3Cj(xj(θˆ−j,θj,θˆj),θˆj)
∂2 θˆj∂xj(.)
F(θˆj)
f (θˆj)
+
∂2Cj(xj(θˆ−j,θj,θˆj),θˆj)
∂θˆj∂xj(.)
∂(F(θˆj)/ f (θˆj))
∂θˆj
∂2Mj(θj,θˆj)
∂2xj
≤ 0,
with
∂2Mj(θj,θˆj)
∂2xj
≥ 0 as xj(θˆk, θj, θˆj) is a minimum. The same argument holds for all agents j 6= i. It
remains to be shown, that the individual rationality constraints are fulfilled for all agents j 6= i. For
this to hold, it suffices that the individual rationality constraints are binding for the highest type, i.e.
Jj(θ j, θ j) = kj. Recall
ω(θˆj) =
n−1
∑
k=1
Ck(x
Pi
k , θk) +
n
∑
k=2
Dk(qk(x
Pi)) +
n−1
∑
k=j
∂Ck(x
Pi
k , θˆk)
∂θˆk
F(θˆk)
f (θˆk)
−
j
∑
l=1
kl
+
j
∑
k=1
∫ θk
θˆk
∂Ck(xk(θ−k, s, s, ), s)
∂θˆk
ds
and
ϕ(θˆj) =
n−1
∑
k=j
Ck(x
Pi
k , θk) +
n
∑
k=j
Dk(qk(x
Pi)) +
j
∑
k=1,k 6=i
∂Ck(x
Pi
k , θˆk)
∂θˆk
F(θˆk)
f (θˆk)
+
n−1
∑
k=j
∫ θk
θˆk
∂Ck(xk(θm, s, s), s)
∂θˆk
ds−
n
∑
l=j
kl .
As
∫ θ j
θˆj
∂Cj(xj(θ−j, s, s), s)
∂θˆj
ds = Cj(xj(θ−j, θ j, θ j), θ j)− Cj(xj(θ−j, θˆj, θˆj), θˆj)
is decreasing in θˆj, and Mj(θj, θj) is increasing in θj, all individual rationality constraints are binding
at the top. Given these transfers and according to the revenue equivalence theorem, i.e.
k j(θj)− k j(θ j) = −
∫ θ j
θj
∂Cj(xj(θ−j, s, s), s)
∂θj
ds
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all individual rationality constraints are fulfilled. Similar to the proof in the full information case, it
is evident from backwards induction, that given the transfers tj in (5.10) respectively (5.12), no agent
j can do better by choosing an abatement level other than xPij . Furthermore, as each agent j sets the
transfer in a way to maximize his cooperation gain, there is no other transfer that is preferable.
Proof. of proposition 6
The difference ∆i in expected costs for agent i between the delegated and centralized model Pi
amounts to
Eθ−i [∆i] = Eθ−i [
n−1
∑
j=1,j 6=i
∫ θ j
θ j
[
∫ θ j
θj
∂Cj(x
Pi
j (θ−j, s, s), s)
∂θj
ds−
∂Cj(x
Pi
j , θj)
∂θj
F(θj)
f (θj)
] f (θj)dθj].
Integration by parts yields
∫ θ j
θ j
[
∫ θ j
θj
∂Cj(x
Pi
j (θ−j, s, s), s)
∂θj
ds f (θj)dθj =
∫ θ j
θ j
∂Cj(x
Pi
j , θj)
∂θj
F(θj)dθj
and thus
Eθ−i [∆i] = Eθ−i [
n−1
∑
j=1,j 6=i
∫ θ j
θ j
[
∂Cj(x
Pi
j (.), θj)
∂θj
F(θj)
f (θj)
−
∂Cj(x
Pi
j (.), θj)
∂θj
F(θj)
f (θj)
] f (θj)dθj]
= 0.
Proof. of proposition 7
Let x = (x1, ..., xn−1) be the vector of abatement levels. The minimization problem of agent i in
case of asymmetric information, i.e. in the model Pi, differs from the minimization problem in case
of full information in the information rents that have to be paid. Thus, consider the parametrized
minimization problem of agent i
minx Ji(x, κ) = minx
n−1
∑
i=1
Ci(xi, θi) +
n
∑
i=1
Dn(qn(x)) + κ
n−1
∑
j=1,j 6=i
∂Cj(xj, θj)
∂θj
F(θj)
f (θj)
, (5.14)
with κ = 1 in Pi with asymmetric information and κ = 0 in case of full information. We need to
prove that the solution x to the minimization problem of agent i in (5.14) is decreasing in κ, implying
xPij ≥ x
FB
i , for all i.
Let κ′′ > κ′ and x′′ ∈ argminx Ji(x, κ
′′) and x′ ∈ argminx Ji(x, κ
′). Then, by revealed preferences
Ji(x
′, κ′) ≤ Ji(x
′′, κ′),
Ji(x
′′, κ′′) ≤ Ji(x
′, κ′′).
Adding up the above inequalities and rearranging implies
Ji(x
′, κ′′)− Ji(x
′, κ′′) ≥ Ji(x
′′, κ′′)− Ji(x
′′, κ′).
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Rewriting the above expression yields
∫ κ′′
κ′
∂Ji(x
′′, κ)
∂κ
dκ ≤
∫ κ′′
κ′
∂Ji(x
′, κ)
∂κ
dκ, (5.15)
Note that
∂Ji(x, κ)
∂κ
=
n−1
∑
j=1,j 6=i
∂Cj(xj, θj)
∂θj
F(θj)
f (θj)
.
Thus, inequality (5.15) can be rewritten as
∑
j=1,j 6=i
∫ κ′′
κ′
∫ x′j
x′′j
∂2 Ji(x, κ)
∂xj∂κ
dκdx =
∫ κ′′
κ′
∫ x′j
x′′j
n−1
∑
j=1,j 6=i
∂2Cj(xj, θj)
∂θj∂xj
F(θj)
f (θj)
≥ 0.
Due to the single crossing property, the above inequality is satisfied, whenever
(κ′′ − κ′)(x′j − x
′′
j ) ≥ 0, ∀j.
Thus, given that κ′′ > κ′, we need x′j > x
′′
j for the above inequality to hold. This requires that xj is
decreasing in κ. Hence,
xFBj ( if κ = 0) ≥ x
Pi
j ( if κ = 1), ∀i, j, j 6= i.
Proof. of proposition 8
Consider two potential principals i and k. Let
Eθ [ f (x)] = Eθ [
n−1
∑
i=1
Ci(xi, θi) +
n
∑
i=2
Di(qi(x)) +
n
∑
j=1,j 6=i,k
∂Cj(xj, θj)
∂θJ
F(θj)
f (θj)
].
From linear approximation
Eθ [ f (x
Pi)− f (xPk)] ≈ Eθ [
n
∑
i=1
f ′xi(x
Pk)(xPii − x
Pk
i )].
This implies
Eθ [ f (x
Pi)− f (xPk)] ≈Eθ [
n−1
∑
j=1
Cj(x
Pj
j , θj)
∂xj
(xPij − x
Pk
j ) +
n
∑
k=j+1
∂Dk(qk(x
Pk))
∂xj
(xPij − x
Pk
j )
+ ∑
j=1,j 6=i,k
∂2Cj(x
Pk
j , θj)
∂θj∂xj
F(θj)
f (θj)
(xPij − x
Pk
j )].
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This can be rewritten as
Eθ [ f (x
Pi)− f (xPk)] ≈Eθ [
n−1
∑
j=1
Cj(x
Pk
j , θj)
∂xj
(xPij − x
Pk
j ) +
n
∑
k=j+1
∂Dk(qk(x
Pk))
∂xj
(xPij − x
Pk
j )
+ ∑
j=1,j 6=i
∂2Cj(x
Pk
j , θj)
∂θj∂xj
F(θj)
f (θj)
(xPij − x
Pk
j )
+
∂2Ci(x
Pk
i , θj)
∂θi∂xi
F(θi)
f (θi)
(xPii − x
Pk
i )−
∂2Ci(x
Pk
i , θi)
∂θi∂xi
F(θi)
f (θi)
(xPii − x
Pk
i )]. (5.16)
Applying the envelope theorem to the right hand side of expression (5.16), we attain
Eθ [ f (x
Pi)− f (xPk)] ≈ Eθ [−
Ci(x
Pk
i , θi)
∂xi∂θi
F(θi)
f (θi)
(xPii − x
Pk
i )].
As a consequence,
Eθ [K
Pi(.)− KPk(.)] ≈ Eθ [
∂Ck(x
Pi
k , θk)
∂θk
F(θk)
f (θk)
−
∂Ci(x
Pk
i , θi)
∂θi
F(θi)
f (θi)
−
∂2Ci(x
Pn
i , θi)
∂θi∂xi
F(θi)
f (θi)
(xPii − x
Pk
i )].
Thus, Eθ [K
Pi(.)] ≤ Eθ [K
Pk(.)] as long as
Eθ [
∂Ck(x
Pi
k , θk)
∂θk
−
∂Ci(x
Pk
i , θi)
∂θi
] ≤ Eθ [
∂2Ci(x
Pk
i , θi)
∂θi∂xi
(xPii − x
Pk
i )].
Proof. of corollary 1
Let us first establish the following relationship for the abatement levels of an agent i.
Lemma 2. Agent i abates more in Pi than in Pn, i.e.
xPii ≥ x
Pn
i , i = 1, ..., n− 1
Proof. of lemma 2
Agent i’s minimization problem in Pi differs from the minimization problem of agent n in the addi-
tional information rent that agent n has to pay to agent i. Thus, consider the parametrized minimiza-
tion problem
Ji(x, κ) =
n−1
∑
i=1
Ci(xi, θi) +
n
∑
i=1
Di(qi(x)) +
n−1
∑
j=1,j 6=i
∂Cj(xj, θj)
∂θj
F(θj)
f (θj)
+ κ
∂Ci(xi, θi)
∂θi
F(θi)
f (θi)
with κ = 1 in Pn and κ = 0 in Pi. Showing that the cost minimizing xi is decreasing in κ, implies
xPii ≥ x
Pn
i .
Let κ′′ > κ′ and x′′i (x
′′
j ) ∈ argminxi Ji(xi, xj, κ
′′) and x′i(x
′
i) ∈ argminxi Ji(xi, xj, κ
′), where xj stands
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for all abatement levels except xi. Then, by revealed preferences
Ji(x
′
i(x
′
j), x
′
j, κ
′) ≤ Ji(x
′′
i (x
′′
j ), x
′′
j , κ
′),
Ji(x
′′
i (x
′′
j ), x
′′
j , κ
′′) ≤ Ji(x
′
i(x
′
j), x
′
j, κ
′′), ∀i, j, i 6= j.
Adding up the above inequalities and rearranging yields
Ji(x
′
i(x
′
j), x
′
j, κ
′′)− Ji(x
′
i(x
′
j), x
′
j, κ
′) ≥ Ji(x
′′
i (x
′′
j ), x
′′
j , κ
′′)− Ji(x
′′
i (x
′′
j ), x
′′
j , κ
′), ∀i, j, i 6= j.
Rewriting the above expression yields
∫ κ′′
κ′
∂Ji(x
′′
i (x
′′
j ), x
′′
j , κ)
∂κ
dκ ≤
∫ κ′′
κ′
∂Ji(x
′
i(x
′
j), x
′
j, κ)
∂κ
dκ, (5.17)
Note that
∂Ji(xi, xj, κ)
∂κ
=
∂Ci(xi, θi)
∂θi
F(θi)
f (θi)
,
Hence, inequality (5.17) can be rewritten as
∫ κ′′
κ′
∫ x′i(x′j)
x′′i (x
′′
j )
∂2 Ji(xi, xj, κ)
∂xi∂κ
≥ 0, ∀i, j, i 6= j.
Due to the single crossing property, the above inequality is satisfied, when
(κ′′ − κ′)(x′i(x
′
j)− x
′′
i (x
′′
j )) > 0.
Thus, given our assumption that κ′′ > κ′, we need x′i(x
′
j) > x
′′
i (x
′′
j ). Thus, xi(.)must be decreasing in
κ. Hence,
xPii ( if κ = 0) ≥ x
Pn
i ( if κ = 1).
According to proposition 8, agent i is better than agent n if
Eθ [K
Pi(.)− KPn(.)] ≈ Eθ [
∂Cn(x
Pi
n , θn)
∂θn
F(θn)
f (θn)
−
∂Ci(x
Pn
i , θi)
∂θi
F(θi)
f (θi)
−
∂2Ci(x
Pn
i , θi)
∂θi∂xi
F(θi)
f (θi)
(xPii − x
Pn
i )] ≤ 0.
(5.18)
Agent n does not abate, i.e. xPin = 0 and thus
∂Cn(x
Pi
n ,θn)
∂θn
F(θn)
f (θn)
= 0. In addition, according to lemma 2,
xPii ≥ x
Pn
i . Combined with
∂Ci(x
Pn
i ,θi)
∂θi
≥ 0, inequality (5.18) is fulfilled.
According to the minimization problem (3.1) of any principal i, the following first order conditions
must hold for all agents j 6= n
∂Cj(x
Pi
j , θj)
∂xj
+
∂2Cj(x
Pi
j , θj)
∂θj∂xj
F(θj)
f (θj)
+
n
∑
k=j+1
∂Dk(qk(x
Pi))
∂xj
= 0, ∀j.
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Subtracting the first order condition for agent j in Pn from the first order condition in Pi as given
above yields
∂Cj(x
Pi
j , θj)
∂xj
−
∂Cj(x
Pn
j , θj)
∂xj
+
∂2Cj(x
Pi
j , θj)
∂θj∂xj
F(θj)
f (θj)
−
∂2Cj(x
Pn
j , θj)
∂θj∂xj
F(θj)
f (θj)
+
n
∑
k=j+1
∂Dk(qk(x
Pi))
∂xj
−
n
∑
k=j+1
∂Dk(qk(x
Pn))
∂xj
= 0. (5.19)
As xPij ≤ x
Pn
j according to lemma 2 and
∂Cj(xj,θj)
∂xj
≥ 0 as well as
∂2Cj(xj,θj)
∂θj∂xj
≥ 0, the first two differences
in (5.19) are negative. Thus, for equality (5.19) to be satisfied,
n
∑
k=j+1
∂Dk(qk(x
Pi))
∂xj
−
n
∑
k=j+1
∂Dk(qk(x
Pn))
∂xj
≥ 0 (5.20)
has to hold. Due to
∂Dk(qk(x))
∂xj
< 0, the necessary condition for (5.20) to be satisfied is qk(x
Pi) ≤
qk(x
Pn), ∀k. It follows that ∑n−1j=1 x
Pi
j ≥ ∑
n−1
j=1 x
Pn
j .
Proof. of proposition 9
From the minimization problem (3.1), we attain the following abatement levels
xPii = x
FB
i = c
′−1
i
(
∑
n
j=i+1 β j
θi
)
and
xPij = c
′−1
j

∑nk=j+1 βk
θj +
F(θj)
f (θj)

 ≤ xFBj
with c′−1j (.) being the inverse function of c
′
j(.), j = 1, ..., n− 1. According to proposition 8,
Eθ [K
Pi(.)] ≤ Eθ [K
Pj(.)] ⇔
∫ Eθ [xPik ]
Eθ [x
Pk
i ]
∂2C(xi, E[θ])
∂E[θ]∂xi
dxi −
∂2C(Eθ [x
Pk
i ], E[θ])
∂E[θ]∂xi
(Eθ [x
Pi
i ]− Eθ [x
Pk
i ]) ≤ 0.
Due to ∂
2C(x,θ)
∂θ∂x > 0, the above inequality is satisfied if Eθ [x
Pi
k ] ≤ Eθ [x
Pk
i ] and Eθ [x
Pk
i ] ≤ Eθ [x
Pi
i ]. This
is the case for all agents i upriver of agent k due to ∑nj=i+1 β j > ∑
n
j=k+1 β j, k > i and c
′−1
j (.) being
an increasing function. The bigger Eθ [x
Pi
k ] relative to Eθ [x
Pk
i ] as well as Eθ [x
Pk
i ] to Eθ [x
Pi
i ], the bigger
the difference between expected total costs in Pi and Pk. Hence, with agent 1 as the principal, the
expected difference in total costs is the largest.
Proof. of lemma 1
The optimal abatement levels xPii are the solution to the following minimization problem
minx1,x2K
Pi(x1, x2, θ1, θ2, κ1, κ2) =minx1,x2 [D3(e1 + e2 − x1 − x2) + C1(x1, θ1) + κ1
∂C1(x1, θ1)
∂θ1
F(θ1)
f (θ1)
+ C2(x2, θ2) + κ2
∂C2(x2, θ2)
∂θ2
F(θ2)
f (θ2)
+ D2(e1 − x1)− D2(e1)]
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with κi = 0, κj = 1 for structure Pi, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i and κ1 = 1 and κj = 1 for structure P3. Set
F(θi)
f (θi)
= h(θi). Solving the above minimization problem implies
xPi1 =
(β2e1 + β3(e1 + e2))(β3 + κ2h(θ2) + θ2)− β
2
3(e1 + e2)
(β2 + β3 + κ1h(θ1) + θ1)(β3 + κ2h(θ2) + θ2)− β23
, ∀i
and
xPi2 =
β3(β2e2 + (e1 + e2)(θ1 + κ1h(θ1)))
(θ1 + κ1h(θ1))(κ2h(θ2) + θ2) + β2(β3 + κ2h(θ2) + θ2) + β3(κ1h(θ1) + κ2h(θ2) + θ1 + θ2)
, ∀i
Let e1 = αe2 and
f (α) := Eθ1,θ2 [K
P1(α)− KP2(α)].
Set h˜ = E[h(θ)], m = h˜+ E[θ] and b = h˜+ 2E[θ], then
f (α) = −
β2h˜(β2(β23(−e2 + e2α)(e2 + e2α) + e
2
2α
2E[θ]m+ β3e22α
2b) + β3(e2 + e2α)(2e2αE[θ]m+ β3(−e2 + e2α)b))
2(β3(β2 + h˜) + (β2 + 2β3 + h˜)E[θ] + E[θ]2)(E[θ]m+ β2(β3 +m) + β3b)
Clearly, as long as −e2 + e2α ≥ 0, i.e. α ≥ 1, we get f (α) ≤ 0. There exist α
idj , j = 1, 2 for which we
have Eθ1,θ2 [K
P1(.)] = Eθ1,θ2 [K
P2(.)], namly,
αid1 =
β23(β2 + b)
β3mE[θ] +
√
β23(β3(β2 + b)(β3b+ β2(β3 + b)) + (β2 + 2β3)m(β2 + b)E[θ] +m
2E[θ]2)
and
αid2 = −
β3mE[θ] +
√
β23(β3(β2 + b)(β3b+ β2(β3 + b)) + (β2 + 2β3)m(β2 + b)E[θ] +m
2t2)
(β3(β3b+ β2(β3 + b)) + (β2 + 2β3)mE[θ])
with αid1 > 0, αid2 < 0. Furthermore, f (α) has a maximum at αmax < 0, i.e. f ′(α) = 0⇔
αmax = −
(β3mE[θ])
(β3(β3b+ β2(β3 + b)) + (β2 + 2β3)mE[θ])
with f ′′(αmax) < 0 and f (αmax) > 0. Thus, as we only consider α > 0, for all α ∈ (0, αid1)with αid1 < 1
we get that choosing agent 2 as the principal is better than agent 1 and for all α > αid1 , choosing agent
1 is better.
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Figure 3: In the pink area, Eθ1,θ2 [K
P1(α)] > Eθ1,θ2 [K
P2(α)]. In the blue area,
Eθ1,θ2 [K
P1(α)] < Eθ1,θ2 [K
P2(α)].
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Chapter 3
A Second-Best Optimal Solution for Pollution Abatement in
Multi-Polluter Networks
Abstract
We propose a second-best optimal solution to the problem of pollution abatement in a multi-
polluter network with heterogeneously dispersed pollution. Instead of taking an exogenously
given and predetermined pollution cap in a cap-and-trade system, the pollution cap is endoge-
nized so that it is determined by the total cost-minimizing equilibrium of a cap-and-trade system.
We show that with quadratic abatement costs and linear damage costs, the first-best optimal pol-
lution cap implements the second-best cost-minimizing equilibrium of the cap-and-trade system
for any network. However, the second-best optimal abatement allocation differs from the first-best
optimal abatement allocation, implying higher second-best optimal total costs than first-best opti-
mal. In particular, second-best optimal total abatement costs fall short of first-best total abatement
costs, while second-best optimal total damage costs exceed first-best optimal damage costs. These
findings hold for two different cap-and-trade systems considered, the emission permit market and
the ambient pollution market.
1 Introduction
The regulation of uniformly distributed pollution with multiple sources and receptors of pollution
has been well studied (e.g. Baumol and Oates (1988), Tietenberg (1995)). The first-best solution may
be implemented by a Pigou tax or a cap-and-trade system. However, controlling heterogeneously
dispersed pollution in multi-polluter networks is more complex, because emissions released at the
sources and the damage-inducing ambient pollution levels accumulated at the receptors may not co-
incide. Because emissions from different sources induce different damage costs for the receptors, and
because the marginal damage costs may vary across receptors, the first-best optimal abatement allo-
cation can only be implemented by source-dependent taxes or prices of the tradable pollution rights
in cap-and-trade systems. It is, however, questionable whether such source-dependent regulating
instruments could be implemented.
In this chapter, we propose a second-best optimal solution to the problem of pollution abatement in a
multi-polluter network with heterogeneously dispersed pollution. Instead of taking an exogenously
given and predetermined pollution cap in a cap-and-trade system, we endogenize the pollution cap.
The endogenized pollution cap, termed the second-best pollution cap, is determined by the total cost-
minimizing equilibrium of the cap-and-trade system. We establish that, when facing linear damages
and quadratic abatement costs to reduce emissions, the first-best optimal pollution cap implements
the second-best cost-minimizing equilibrium of the cap-and-trade system for any network. How-
ever, the second-best optimal abatement allocation implied by the second-best pollution cap is not
equivalent to the first-best optimal abatement allocation, indicating higher second-best total costs for
the network than the first-best optimal. In particular, second-best total abatement costs in the cap-
and-trade system falls short of first-best total abatement costs, while second-best total damage costs
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exceed first-best optimal damage costs.
These findings hold for two different cap-and-trade systems, for the emission permit market and
ambient pollution market. The main distinction between these two markets is that an emission per-
mit gives a source a right to emit a unit of emission, whereas an ambient pollution permit is defined
as a permission to deposit a unit of emission at a specific receptor (Montgomery (1972)). Thus, am-
bient pollution markets incorporate the externality structure of the network, while emission markets
ignore it. Yet, counter-intuitively, we find that an ambient pollution market is not always the bet-
ter choice as an optimal second-best policy instrument. Furthermore, for other functional forms of
abatement and damage cost functions, first-best optimal pollution caps do not implement the cost-
minimizing equilibrium of the cap-and-trade system. Interestingly, second-best pollution caps may
either fall short of or exceed the first-best pollution caps. The resulting policy implication for the
regulation of heterogeneously distributed pollution in multi-polluter networks is to implement a
cap-and-trade system that fixes the cap at the first-best optimal pollution level whenever real-life
damages can be approximated to be linear and abatement cost functions to be quadratic. However,
in general, when facing other functional forms of damage and abatement costs, this policy guideline
should not be adopted.
It is well established that tradable pollution permits are a cost-efficient and cost-efficient policy in-
strument for uniformly distributed pollutants with multiple sources and receptors of pollution. They
provide incentives for the greatest reductions in pollution by those that can achieve these reductions
most cheaply and thus allowing any desired level of pollution to be realized at least costs to a net-
work (Baumol and Oates (1971)). However, the literature on the optimal regulation of spatially het-
erogeneous externalities where the emissions from one source affect receptors differently is rather
limited. Montgomery (1972) was the first who showed that a cost-effective, marketable permits sys-
tem must be spatially differentiated and proposed ambient pollution permits. He argued that as
long as the authorities can specify a vector of transfer coefficients for each emitter, linking emissions
at each location with concentrations at each of the predefined receptor locations, specific trades can
be defined which cost-effectively allocate the responsibility. Later, Krupnick et al. (1983) proposed
the approach of pollution offsets allowing trading among sources as long as it does not violate am-
bient air quality standards at any receptor point. New emitters must acquire permits from existing
sources to completely ’offset’ the effects of the new emissions on pollutant concentrations at recep-
tor points so that, in effect, exchange rates are endogenously given. This procedure provides for
ambient quality goals to be attained at least costs. More recently, Klaassen et al. (1994) proposed a
hybrid instrument that combines emission trading with a command-and-control policy, termed the
exchange-rate emission trading system. In this exchange-rate emission trading system, the environ-
mental authority first calculates and sets exchange rates ex-ante equal to the ratios of the sources’
marginal abatement costs in the first-best solution. Sources then trade with each other according to
these exogenous exchange rates. It was established that generally, this system will not achieve the
least cost solution and does not guarantee that environmental deposition constraints are upheld, al-
though total abatement costs are always reduced. Another market-oriented approach was proposed
by Hung and Shaw (2005). They designed a trading-ratio system of tradable discharge permits for
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water pollution control. They show that their cap-and-trade system is a cost-effective instrument that
meets predetermined environmental standards with the least aggregate abatement costs. These pro-
posed regulation instruments are cost effective, but provide second-best policy instruments because
none of them is cost-efficient. However, these instruments do not implement the second-best cost
minimum. To the best of our knowledge, no one has thus far studied second-best optimality for a
market-based policy instrument for a multi-polluter network with spatially distributed pollution.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the multi-polluter net-
work model and the first-best optimal solution to the problem of pollution abatement. In section
3, we discuss cap-and-trade systems as second-best solution concepts. In section 3, we present the
second-best optimal solution concept and address which cap-and-trade regime should be chosen
regarding second-best optimality. Section 5 concludes the chapter.
2 Multi-Polluter Network with non-uniformly distributed Pollution
Consider a multi-polluter network G consisting of n sources of pollution represented by a set of
agents N = 1, ..., n. The agents are arranged in the network G according to an exogenously given
geographical structure g. Each agent i produces gross emissions in exogenously given amount ei,
whereby ei ≥ 0 for all i and ej > 0 for at least one j. Gross emissions of agent i may pose negative
and spatially heterogeneous externalities on other agents j 6= i in the network. Each multi-polluter
network exhibits a specific externality structure Γ with elements γij ∈ [0, 1]. For any pair of agents
i, j, γij > 0 states that agent j is negatively affected by agent i’s emissions and the size of γij specifies
the percentage of the emissions released by agent i that reach agent j. In contrast, γij = 0 indicates
that the emissions of agent i do not affect agent j. Furthermore, we assume that γii = 0 for all agents,
so that pollution is an external effect. To clarify, externalities only go in one direction, so that γij 6= 0
does not necessarily imply γji 6= 0. Examples of such multi-polluter networks with spatially hetero-
geneously distributed pollution may encompass heterogeneously distributed global air pollutants,
noise pollution and river pollution.
All agents i may choose to abate pollution in the amount xi with 0 ≤ xi ≤ ei by incurring abate-
ment costs ci(xi). The abatement costs faced are strictly increasing, differentiable and strictly convex
functions ci(.), i.e. c
′
i(.) > 0, c
′′
i (.) > 0 and ci(0) = 0. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) be the vector of abatement
efforts. Net emissions ei − xi are released at each agent i, and are assumed to accumulate in the net-
work, so that the ambient pollution level qi at agent i of the network G is given by the sum of net
emissions by the agents j 6= i with γji > 0, i.e.
qi(x) =
n
∑
j=1
γji(ej − xj). (2.1)
Intuitively, γji measures by how much the ambient pollution level qi(x) at agent i increases, if net
emissions of agent j increase by one unit. The ambient pollution level qi(x) imposes costs on agent i
in form of damages, which are differentiable, convex and strictly increasing functions di(qi(x)) of the
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ambient pollution level qi(x) given in (2.1), i.e. d
′
i(.) > 0 and d
′′
i (.) ≥ 0. Without loss of generality,
di(0) = 0, no damages are incurred if there is no pollution.
Total costs of an agent i are denoted by ki(xi, qi(x)) and are the sum of his damage and abatement
costs, i.e.
ki(xi, qi(x)) = di(qi(x)) + ci(xi).
As the vector of abatement efforts x = (x1, ..., xn) together with the vector of exogenously given emis-
sions e = (e1, ..., en) fully characterize the vector of ambient pollution levels q(x) = (q1(x), ..., qn(n)),
total individual costs ki(xi, qi(x)) of an agent i are fully determined by the abatement allocation x.
To sum up, a multi-polluter network G with heterogeneously dispersed pollution is characterized
by (N, e, c, d, Γ), where N is the number of agents, and c = (c1, ..., cn) respectively d = (d1, ..., dn)
denote the vectors of abatement and damage cost functions. We assume perfect information in all
variables and functions (N, e, c, d, Γ).
There exists a unique and optimal abatement allocationminimizing overall costs in themulti-polluter
network, i.e. the sum of all individual abatement and damage costs.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique abatement vector x⋆ which is the solution to the following constrained
minimization problem
minx1,...,xn
n
∑
i=1
ci(xi) + di(qi),
subject to
qi(x) =
n
∑
j=1
γji(ej − xj)
and
0 ≤ xi ≤ ei.
Proof. of proposition 1
Existence and uniqueness follow directly from the strict convexity of the individual total cost func-
tions ki(xi, qi(x)).
As we restrict our attention to interior solutions, the necessary conditions for the total cost mini-
mum are
c′i(xi) =
n
∑
j=1
γijd
′
j(qj), ∀i, j, (2.2)
which follow directly from the corresponding Lagrangian
L =
n
∑
i=1
ci(xi) + di(qi) +
n
∑
j=1
λj[
n
∑
i=1
γij(ei − xi)− qj],
where λj is the Lagrange-multiplier of each pollution level qj, and the combination of the resulting
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first order conditions
∂L
∂xi
= c′i(xi)−
n
∑
j=1
λjγij = 0, ∀i = 1, ..., n; j = 1, ..., n
∂L
∂qi
= d′i(qi)− λi = 0, ∀i = 1, ..., n.
Due to pollution being an external effect and because abatement is costly, agents do not have any
incentive to abate.
Proposition 2. If the multi-polluter network G is considered to be a non-cooperative game among the agents,
each agent’s dominant strategy is not to abate, xi = 0, ∀i.
As a consequence of proposition 2, the first-best optimal abatement allocation will not be imple-
mented by the agents voluntarily. Thus, external regulation is deemed necessary. Such regulatory
instruments include, for example, command-and-control regulation and market-based approaches
such as cap-and-trade systems. However, in contrast to multi-polluter networks with either uni-
formly mixed pollutants or pollution impact measured at a single receptor, multi-polluter networks
with non-uniformly mixed pollutants and many affected receptors would require many different
permit trading markets or source specific emission taxes to implement the first-best solution. Yet,
in reality implementing many such markets or taxes may be difficult to be administered. Thus, in
this chapter we focus on establishing only one cap-and-trade system charging the same price for the
pollution rights for all emitters with the drawback that only second-best outcomes may be achieved
in the case of spatially distributed pollution.
In the next section, we introduce two different cap-and-trade systems, the emission permit mar-
ket and the ambient pollution permit market. We illustrate that these two markets indeed do not
implement the first-best solution in our setting in general, except for the conditions established.
3 A second-best Solution: Cap-and-Trade Systems
In cap-and-trade systems, an external authority chooses a pollution cap z for the whole network.
Pollution permits, representing the right to emit one unit of pollution, are then issued in this amount
and allocated to the agents at no costs so that each agent receives zi permits. Agents are allowed to
trade the permits they are equipped with at a price of p. Let zi be the net emissions of agent i. If zi
exceeds zi, an agent i may sell the excess (zi − zi) at the price p in exchange for money. Similarly, he
may buy zi − zi if the pollution released exceeds the number of permits held by the agent i. A buyer
of permits is thus paying a charge for polluting, while a seller is being rewarded for having reduced
his pollution. Thus, in theory, those who can reduce pollution most cheaply will do so, reaching the
pollution target at the lowest cost. Clearly, if the external authority sets the pollution cap too high,
the price of one permit is too low, reducing the incentives for the agents to cut back emissions and
damage costs will be high. On the other hand, setting the pollution cap too low might lead to a high
permit price, implying high abatement costs. The initial allocation of permits has no consequences
for overall costs in a permit market, as we have perfect information, perfect competition and no
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transaction costs (Montgomery 1972). In addition, we assume that agents are not budget restricted.
In the following, two different permit market regimes are introduced, the emission market, where
the externality structure of the network is ignored, and the ambient pollution market, where it is
incorporated.
Emission market
In an emission market, emission permits are traded. An emission permit gives an agent the right to
discharge one unit of pollution, regardless of how many and by how much other agents are affected
by this unit of pollution. Let zE be the pollution cap set by an external authority for the emission
market and z = (z1, ..., zn) be the vector of net emissions. Each agent i will choose the least-costly
way to comply with the pollution regulation, i.e.
minzici(ei − zi) + di(qi(z)) + p · (zi − zi)
subject to 0 ≤ zi ≤ ei and qi(z) =
n
∑
j=1
γjizj,
where p · (zi − zi) with a positive (negative) sign represents agent i
′s permit trading expenditure
(revenue). The associated first order conditions are
c′i(ei − zi) = p, ∀i = 1, ..., n, (3.1)
stating that an agent i adjusts his abatement level until the marginal abatement costs are equal to the
permit price. Let c−1i (.) denote the inverse function of ci(.). From the first oder conditions, we attain
the individual permit demand functions
zEi (p) = ei − c
′−1
i (p), ∀i. (3.2)
As ci(.) is increasing and convex, c
−1
i (.) is increasing and concave. Thus, the permit demand func-
tions zEi (p) are decreasing functions of the permit price p. Market clearing demands the sum of all
permit demands to be equal to the permit supply, i.e.
zE =
n
∑
i=1
zEi (p). (3.3)
From this the equilibrium price pE can be attained. Let zE = (zE1 (p
E), ..., zEn(p
E)) be the resulting
vector of permit demands for an emission market given zE. Total costs for an agent i add up to
kEi (p
E, zE) = ci(ei − z
E
i (p
E)) + di(qi(z
E)) + pE · (zEi (p
E)− zi)
whereby qi(z
E) = ∑nj=1 γjiz
E
j (p
E).
Summing up over all agents individual cost levels kEi (p
E, zE) yields a total cost level of TE, i.e.
TE =
n
∑
i=1
kEi (p
E, zE) =
n
∑
i=1
ci(ei − z
E
i ) + di(qi(z
E)),
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where individual revenues and expenditures on permits add up to zero.
Ambient Pollution Market
Next, we consider an ambient pollution market. An ambient pollution permit gives agent i the per-
mission to deposit a unit of emissions at a specific agent. Thus, in this market, the externality struc-
ture Γ is integrated in that each agent i has to hold permits in the amount of his induced ambient
pollution. Let zI be the ambient pollution target level set by the coordinator. Similar to the emission
market, the cost-minimizing behaviour of the agents i = 1, ..., n implies the following minimization
problem
minzici(ei − zi) + di(qi(z)) + p · (
n
∑
j=1
γijzi − zi)
subject to 0 ≤ zi ≤ ei and qi(z) =
n
∑
j=1
γjizj.
Solving the minimization problem yields the first order conditions
c′i(ei − zi) = p ·
n
∑
j=1
γij, ∀i = 1, ..., n. (3.4)
Analogously to the emission market, the costs to abate one more unit of pollution have to be equal to
the costs to emit one more unit of pollution. However, in contrast to the emission market, the costs to
emit one more unit of pollution are composed of the price of a permit times the sum of the increases
in the ambient pollution levels at the receptors caused by the additional unit of pollution. From (3.4),
the net emission function zIi (p) = ei − c
′−1
i (p · ∑
n
j=1 γij) of agent i can be attained. Individual permit
demand is then given by ∑nj=1 γijz
I
i (p), which is, analogously to the emission market, decreasing in
the permit price p. Market clearing demands
zI =
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
γijz
I
i (p
I), (3.5)
from which we obtain the equilibrium price pI and the vector of net emission functions
zIi = (z
I
1(p
I), ..., zIn(p
I)). The resulting individual total costs for an agent i are
kIi (p
I , zI) = ci(ei − z
I
i (p
I)) + di(qi(z
I)) + pI · (
n
∑
j=1
γijz
I
i (p
I)− zi)
with qi(z
I) = ∑nj=1 γjiz
I
j (p
I). Adding up all individual cost levels yields total costs in an ambient
pollution market of
T I =
n
∑
i=1
kIi (p
I , zI) =
n
∑
i=1
ci(ei − z
I
i ) + di(qi(z
I)),
whereby total expenditures and revenues of the permit trades add up to zero.
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Both permit market regimes generally fail to implement the least cost minimum given any pre-
determined pollution cap in networks with non-uniformly distributed pollution. In the following
proposition, we establish under which specific conditions permit markets are able to implement the
first-best solution.
Proposition 3. Emission markets are first-best optimal iff
n
∑
j=1
γijd
′
j(qj) =
n
∑
j=1
γkjd
′
j(qj), ∀k, i,
i.e. a unit-increase in net emissions of each agent i = 1, ..., n needs to have exactly the same total negative effect
on all other agents j 6= i.
Ambient pollution markets are first-best optimal iff
d′i(qi) = d
′
j(qj), ∀i, j,
i.e. marginal damages have to be equalized across all agents i.
The proof of proposition 3 may be found in the appendix.
Instead of setting an arbitrary pollution level, it is reasonable to assume that a coordinator will set
the pollution cap to be first-best optimal, i.e. to the first-best optimal total level of pollution in case
of an emission market or the first-best optimal total level of ambient pollution in case of an ambient
pollution market. The first-best pollution cap z⋆E for an emission market is determined by the sum of
all endogenously given gross emissions ei minus the first-best abatement levels x
⋆, i.e.
z⋆E =
n
∑
i=1
ei − x
⋆
i . (3.6)
Similarly, the first-best pollution cap z⋆I for the ambient pollution market is given by the sum of each
agent’s first-best optimal ambient pollution level q⋆i , i.e.
z⋆I =
n
∑
i=1
q⋆i (x) =
n
∑
i=1
(
n
∑
j=1
γji(ej − x
⋆
j )). (3.7)
In the next section, we propose a second-best optimal solution for the pollution abatement prob-
lem in networks with non-uniformly dispersed pollution.
4 A Second-best Optimal Solution
As established in the previous section, whenever we face heterogeneously distributed pollution in
multi-polluter networks, cap-and-trade systems fail to implement the first-best optimal solution
given any predetermined pollution cap. Cap-and-trade systems are cost-effective, in that a pre-
determined pollution cap is met at least costs, however, these least costs might not correspond to
the cost minimum of the cap-and-trade system. Thus, we propose the following second-best opti-
mal solution for the problem of emission abatement in multi-polluter networks: Instead of taking
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an exogenously given pollution cap, we endogenize the pollution cap. The endogenized pollution
cap, we call the second-best pollution cap, is determined by the total cost minimizing equilibrium of the
cap-and-trade system considered.
Formally, let zw be a given pollution cap for the two markets w = I, E, where I stands for an am-
bient pollution and E for an emission market. Total costs in a permit market in dependence of the
pollution cap zw, denoted by Tw(zw), are uniquely determined by zw and amount to
Tw(zw) =
n
∑
i=1
ki(p
w(zw), zw) =
n
∑
i=1
di(
n
∑
j=1
γjiz
w
i (p
w(zw))) +
n
∑
i=1
ci(ei − z
w
i (p
w(zw))),w = I, E. (4.1)
The individual permit demands zwi (p
w(zw)) follow from the cost minimization conditions (3.1) and
(3.4) for the emission and ambient pollution market respectively and pw(zw) is attained from the
market clearing conditions for the emission market (3.3) respectively ambient pollution market (3.5).
Proposition 4. For both permit markets w = I, E, there exists a pollution cap z⋆⋆w which implements the
total cost minimizing equilibrium of the permit market if c′′′i (ei − z
w
i (.)) ≤ 0.
The pollution cap z⋆⋆w solving ∂T
w(zw)
∂zw = 0 is a global minimum as long as T
w(zw) is convex in
zw, which is shown to be the case whenever c′′′i (ei − z
w
i (.)) ≤ 0. The proof of proposition 4 may be
found in the appendix. Examples for abatement functions with c′′′i (ei − z
w
i (.)) ≤ 0 are of the form
ci(xi) = x
n
i with n > 1 and ci(xi) = 1/k · exp(xi)− 1/k.
4.1 Second-best Pollution Caps
The second-best pollution cap z⋆⋆w minimizes total costs Tw(zw) in the corresponding permit market,
w = I, E. Thus, differentiating Tw(zw) given in (4.1) with respect to zw and setting equal to zero yields(
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
∂di(∑
n
j=1 γjiz
w
j (p
w(zw)))
∂zwj (p
w(zw))
·
∂zwj (p
w(zw))
∂pw(zw)
)
·
∂pw(zw)
∂zw
+
(
n
∑
j=1
∂cj(ej − z
w
j (p
w(zw)))
∂zwj (p
w(zw))
·
∂zwj (p
w(zw))
∂pw(zw)
)
·
∂pw(zw)
∂zw
= 0.
Applying the envelope theorem implies
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
∂di(∑
n
j=1 γjiz
w
j (p
w(zw)))
∂zwj (p
w(zw))
∂zwj (p
w(zw))
∂pw(zw)
|zw=z⋆⋆w
+
n
∑
j=1
∂cj(ej − z
w
j (p
w(zw)))
∂zwj (p
w(zw))
∂zwj (p
w(zw))
∂pw(zw)
|zw=z⋆⋆w = 0.
(4.2)
In proposition 4, we state that there always exits a z⋆⋆w for which (4.2) holds. Furthermore, z⋆⋆w con-
stitutes a global minimum, because total costs T(zw) are convex.
Do second-best pollution caps differ from first-best pollution caps and if yes, do they exceed or fall
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short of first-best pollution caps? Intuitively, second-best pollution caps should deceed first-best pol-
lution caps. Even though externalities are better incorporated in the second-best optimal concept
compared to traditional cap-and-trade systems, permit markets are primarily cost effective, leading
to least total abatement costs possible. Due to this, it is reasonable to assume that second-best optimal
caps should fall short of first-best caps. Surprisingly, we find that when facing linear damages and
quadratic abatement costs, the first-best pollution caps coincide with the second-best pollution caps.
Proposition 5. Suppose agent i faces quadratic abatement costs represented by
ci(xi) =
1
2
αi · x
2
i , with αi > 0, i = 1, ..., n,
and linear damage functions di(.) taking the following form
di(qi(x)) = βi · qi(x), with βi > 0, qi(x) =
n
∑
j=1
γji(ej − xj), i = 1, ..., n.
Then, the first-best optimal pollution cap z⋆w implements the second-best cost minimizing equilibrium of the
cap-and-trade system w = I, E for any network.
The appendix provides the proof of proposition 5. Proposition 5 states that if facing linear dam-
ages and quadratic abatement costs, establishing a cap-and-trade system and choosing a pollution
cap corresponding to the first-best optimal pollution level implements the second-best cost minimiz-
ing equilibrium of the cap-and-trade system for any network with non-uniformly distributed pollu-
tion and spatially distributed sources and receptors. However, we show that the second-best optimal
abatement allocation implied by the second-best pollution cap generally differs from the first-best
optimal abatement allocation for at least one agent expect for the conditions stated in proposition 3,
indicating higher second-best minimal total costs for the network than first-best optimal. In other
words, the dead weight loss, defined as the difference between the second-best cost minimum and
the first-best cost minimum, is weakly positive. Furthermore, we establish that in the second-best
cost minimizing equilibrium, total abatement costs fall short of the first-best total abatement costs,
whereas total damage costs exceed first-best total damage costs for both permit market regimes.
Proposition 6. If facing linear damage and quadratic abatement cost functions, for both market regimes it
holds that
∆Cw = Cw − C⋆ ≤ 0,w = I, E
and
∆Dw = Dw − D⋆ ≥ 0,w = I, E
with Cw and Dw being the second-best minimal total abatement costs respectively damage costs in the market
regime w and C⋆ and D⋆ being the total abatement and damage costs in the first-best solution respectively.
Moreover, the dead weight loss is positive
DWLw = ∆Cw + ∆Dw ≥ 0,w = I, E.
The proof of proposition 6may be found in the appendix. In conclusion, the cost minimizing equi-
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librium in a cap-and-trade system differs from the total cost minimum in the multi-polluter network.
Although total abatement effort is the same as in first-best solution, it is not optimally distributed
among the agents because the externalities are still not perfectly internalized in the second-best opti-
mal solution and the cost-effective property of the cap-and-trade systems seems to be predominant.
By facing other functional forms for the abatement and damage cost functions, the first-best optimal
pollution cap does not implement the second-best cost minimizing equilibrium of the cap-and-trade
system. Second-best pollution caps may either exceed or fall short of first-best pollution caps. This
finding is illustrated for quadratic damage costs and quadratic abatement costs for a specific network.
Example 1. Let us consider the problem of efficient emission abatement in an international river.
Agents are located along the river and pollute the water body by discharging waste water from
commercial and industrial waste in the amount of ei. Net emissions ei − xi accumulate while moving
downriver and we assume the river does not have any assimilative capacity. Furthermore, suppose
the agents i = 1, ..., n are linearly ordered along the river from up to down, so that j > i indicates that
agent j is located downriver of agent i. The externality structure Γ for the river sharing problem is
characterized by
γji =

 0, ∀j ≥ i1, ∀j < i
In words, an agent i’s net emissions affect all his downstream agents j > i equally and fully. Thus,
this specific network has a linear hierarchical structure with downstream oriented externalities.
Figure 4: River pollution network with n = 3, where the arrows represent the externalities between the
agents
Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3
Suppose, we have quadratic damage functions given by
di(qi(x)) = 1/2βiq
2
i (x), i = 1, ..., n
with βi > 0, so that the marginal damage costs d
′
i(qi) are positive and increasing in qi, i.e. d
′
i(qi) >
0, d′′i (qi) > 0, ∀i. As before, the functional form of the quadratic abatement functions is given by
ci(xi) = 1/2αix
2
i . The first order conditions (2.2) for the river network indicate that the marginal
abatement costs of an agent i have to be equal to the sum of the marginal damage costs of all his
followers j > i along the river. The main consequence of choosing non-linear damage functions
is that the first order conditions (2.2) of the minimization problem in proposition 1 constitute a n-
dimensional system of equations as the marginal damage costs are not constant. Thus, for simplicity,
we consider a river shared by only three agents.
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The first order conditions (2.2) translate into
c′1(x1) = d
′
2(q2(x)) + d
′
3(q3(x))
c′2(x2) = d
′
3(q3(x))
c′3(x3) = 0.
Given the functional forms of the abatement and damage cost functions, the system of equations can
be rewritten as
α1x1 = β2(e1 − x1) + β3(e1 + e2 − x1 − x2)
α2x2 = β3(e2 + e1 − x1 − x2)
α3x3 = 0.
Solving the system of equations, yields the following first-best abatement levels
x⋆1 =
e1(β2β3 + α2β2) + α2β3(e1 + e2)
α2(α1 + β2) + β3(α1 + α2 + β2)
x⋆2 =
β2β3e2 + α1β2(e1 + e2)
α2(α1 + β2) + β3(α1 + α2 + β2)
x⋆3 = 0.
As the emissions of agent 3 do not harm any other agents, it would be inefficient for agent 3 to abate.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that agent 3 is not required to hold any permits and no permits
are allocated to agent 3 initially. Hence, the first-best pollution cap for the emission market amounts
to
z⋆E =
2
∑
i=1
ei − x
⋆
i =
α2β2e2 + α1α2(e1 + e2)
α2(α1 + β2) + β3(α1 + α2 + β2)
and for the ambient pollution market
z⋆I =
2
∑
i=1
3
∑
j=1
γij(ei − x
⋆
i ) =
α1e1(2α2 + β3) + α2e2(α1 + β2 − β3)
α2(α1 + β2) + β3(α1 + α2 + β2)
with ∑3j=1 γ1j = 2 and ∑
3
j=1 γ2j = 1, indicating that agent 1’s emissions at the source of the river
impact the two downriver agents 2 and 3 whereas agent 2’s emissions only affect agent 3.
Next, we calculate the second-best pollution cap. In an emission market, agent i minimizes
minziki(zi, p) = minzi1/2αi(ei − zi)
2 + 1/2βiq
2
i (z) + p(zi − zi)
so that qi(z) =
2
∑
j=1
γjizj,
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implying zEi (p) = ei −
p
αi
, i = 1, 2. Market clearing demands
2
∑
i=1
zi = e1 −
p
α1
+ e2 −
p
α2
= zE,
from which we extract
pE(zE) =
e1 + e2 − z
E
1
α1
+ 1α2
.
Inserting pE(zE) into zE1 (p) and z
E
2 (p) yields the individual permit demands of
zEi (p
E(zE)) = ei −
1
αi
e1 + e2 − z
E
1
α1
+ 1α2
, i = 1, 2.
Total costs in the emission market in dependence of the pollution cap zE amount to
TE(zE) = c1(e1 − z
E
1 (p(z
E))) + c2(e2 − z
E
2 (p(z
E))) + d2(z
E
1 (p(z
E))) + d3(z
E)
= 1/2

 (e1 + e2 − zE)2
1
α1
+ 1α2
+ β2
(
e1 −
e1 + e2 − z
E
α1(
1
α1
+ 1α2 )
)2
+ β3(z
E)2

 .
Total costs TE(zE) reach their minimum at the second-best pollution cap z⋆⋆E, which can be expressed
as
z⋆⋆E =
α2(α1e1(α1 + α2 − β2) + e2(α
2
1 + α1α2 + α2β2))
α21(α2 + β3) + α
2
2(β2 + β3) + α1α2(α2 + 2β3)
.
Similarly, in an ambient pollution market, agent i minimizes
minziki(zi, p) = minzi1/2α1(ei − zi)
2 + 1/2βiq
2
i (z) + p(
3
∑
j=1
γijzi − zi)
so that qi(z) =
2
∑
j=1
γjizj,
with ∑3j=1 γ1j = 2 and ∑
3
j=1 γ2j = 1 for agent 1 and agent 2 respectively, implying net emission
functions of zI1(p) = e1 −
2p
α1
and zI2(p) = e2 −
p
α2
. Market clearing demands
2
∑
i=1
3
∑
j=1
γijz
I
i (p) = 2(e1 −
2p
α1
) + e2 −
p
α2
= zI
from which we extract
pI(zI) =
2e1 + e2 − z
I
4
α1
+ 1α2
.
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Plugging pI(zI) into zI1(p) and z2(p) yields the individual net emission functions of
zIi (p
I(zI)) = ei −
∑
3
j=1 γij
αi
(
2e1 + e2 − z
I
4
α1
+ 1α2
)
, i = 1, 2.
Total costs in a permit market in dependence of zI are the sum of the individual cost levels
T I(zI) = c1(e1 − z
I
1(p
I(zI))) + c2(e2 − z
I
2(p
I(zI))) + d2(z
I
1(p
I(zI))) + d3(z
I
1(p
I(zI)) + zI2(p
I(zI)))
= 1/2

α1
(
2
α1
2e1 + e2 − z
I
4
α1
+ 1α2
)2
+ α2
(
1
α2
2e1 + e2 − z
I
4
α1
+ 1α2
)2+ 1/2β2
(
e1 −
2
α1
2e1 + e2 − z
I
( 4α1 +
1
α2
)
)2
+ 1/2β3
(
e1 −
2
α1
2e1 + e2 − z
I
( 4α1 +
1
α2
)
+ e2 −
1
α2
2e1 + e2 − z
I
( 4α1 +
1
α2
)
)2
.
Minimizing T I(zI) with respect to zI yields the following second-best pollution cap
z⋆⋆I =
α1e1(α1(2α2 + β3) + α2(8α2 − 2β2 + 2β3)) + α2e2(α
2
1 + 4α1α2 + 4α2β2 − 2α1β3 − 4α2β3)
(α2 + β3)(α21 + 4α1α2) + 4α
2
2(β2 + β3)
.
For the case of linear damages, we established that first and second-best pollution caps coincide. By
assuming specific abatement and damage cost parameters, it can be easily demonstrated that this
equivalence does not hold in the case of quadratic damages. In particular, the divergence may go in
both directions in that second-best pollution caps may exceed or deceed first-best pollution caps. For
simplicity, let us consider the case of full symmetry, i.e. αi = α, βi = β and ei = e. In this case, the
first-best pollution caps for the two permit market regimes simplify to
z⋆E =
αe(2α + β)
α2 + 3αβ + β2
and
z⋆I =
α2e+ αe(2α + β)
α2 + 3αβ + β2
.
The second-best pollution caps reduce to
z⋆⋆E =
4αe
2α + 5β
and
z⋆⋆I =
(15α− β)e
5α + 13β
.
Thus, given full symmetry, first-best exceed second-best pollution caps as
z⋆⋆E − z⋆E = −
αβ2e
(2α + 5β)(α2 + 3αβ + β2)
< 0
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and
z⋆⋆I − z⋆I = −
β2e(α + β)
(5α + 13β)(α2 + 3αβ + β2)
< 0.
Yet, by deviating slightly from full symmetry, for example by setting β2 = 1/3β3 in an emission
market and β2 = 2β3 in an ambient pollution market, first-best pollution caps fall short of second-
best pollution caps.
Example 1 illustrates that the first-best pollution cap does not implement the cost minimizing
equilibrium in the two permit markets considered if damage costs are non-linear. In order to attain
the second-best least costs in cap-and-trade systems, the second-best pollution cap has to be derived
formally for each specific network.
4.2 Second-best Optimal Choice of Permit Market Regime
Should the external authority choose an ambient pollutionmarket or an emissionmarket? Intuitively,
ambient pollution markets seem to be the better choice as they incorporate the externality structure
and therefore look at ambient pollution levels not just emission levels. However, against intuition,
this is not always the case. To see this, assume without loss of generality, that we face linear damage
costs and quadratic abatement costs and let us compare the dead weight losses created by the two
market regimes.
Let mi = ∑
n
j=1 γijβ j. Intuitively, mi measures the total marginal effect of an increase in agent i’s
net emissions ei − xi on the damages of all agents j, with γij > 0. Applying lemma 3 and using
slightly rewritten expressions for ∆CE and ∆DI derived in (5.11) and (5.15) respectively in the proof
of proposition 6, implies
DWLE = 1/2

 n∑
i=1
m2i
αi
−
(
∑
n
i=1
mi
αi
)2
∑
n
i=1
1
αi

 (4.3)
and
DWLI = 1/2

 n∑
i=1
m2i
αi
−
(
∑
n
i=1 ∑
n
j=1 γij
mi
αi
)2
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
(∑nj=1 γij)
2

 . (4.4)
By taking the difference
DWLE − DWLI = 1/2


(
∑
n
i=1 ∑
n
j=1 γij
mi
αi
)2
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
(∑nj=1 γij)
2
−
(
∑
n
i=1
mi
αi
)2
∑
n
i=1
1
αi


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we observe that as (
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
γij
mi
αi
)2
≥
(
n
∑
i=1
mi
αi
)2
as well as
n
∑
i=1
1
αi
(
n
∑
j=1
γij)
2 ≥
n
∑
i=1
1
αi
,
we cannot draw the conclusion, that the ambient pollutionmarket incorporating the externality struc-
ture, should always be chosen as a second-best optimal policy instrument. On the contrary, as illus-
trated in the following example, the second-best cost minimizing equilibrium of an emission market
may beat the one from an ambient pollution market.
Example 2. Recall the river pollution network introduced in example 1. To illustrate that the second-
best total cost minimum of an ambient pollution market may exceed the second-best least costs of an
emission market, we consider a river with 3 agents and compare the dead weight losses created by
establishing a second-best optimal permit market.
Recall the formulas of the dead weight losses for an emission respectively ambient pollution market
derived in (4.3) respectively (4.4). For the river network, mi = ∑
n
j=i+1 β j. Thus, the dead weight loss
for a second-best optimal emission market amounts to
DWLE =
1/2β22
α1 + α2
and similarly, for an ambient pollution market we attain
DWLI =
1/2(β2 − β3)2
α1 + 4α2
.
Let αi = α and βi vary across agents i = 1, 2, 3. Then,
DWLI =
(β2 − β3)2
10α
> DWLE =
β22
4α
⇔ (β2 − β3)
2
> 5/2β22.
Clearly, there exist values for β2, β3 for which this inequality is satisfied, for example for β3 = 3β2.
5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose a second-best optimal solution to the problem of pollution abatement in a
setting where the multiple sources and receptors of pollution are spatially distributed and pollution
is non-uniformly dispersed. Instead of taking an exogenously given and pre-set pollution cap in a
cap-and-trade system, the pollution cap is endogenized in such a way that it results from the total
cost minimizing equilibrium of the cap-and-trade system. We show that setting the pollution cap at
the first-best optimal pollution level implements the second-best cost minimizing equilibrium for any
network if damage costs are linear and abatement costs are quadratic. However, the second-best cost
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minimum exceeds the first-best total cost minimum, with total second-best optimal abatement costs
falling short of first-best total abatement costs and total second-best optimal damage costs exceed-
ing total first-best damage costs, indicating that the second-best abatement allocation differs from
the first-best abatement allocation for at least one agent. Thus, we provide the following policy im-
plication for the environmental regulation of pollution in networks with heterogeneously dispersed
pollution: whenever real life damages are approximately linear and abatement costs quadratic, and
a cap-and-trade system was established to regulate the pollution, then the pollution cap should be
set at the first-best optimal level to attain least total costs possible. Yet, for other functional forms of
damage and abatement cost functions, no such policy implication can be made. In these cases, first-
best pollution caps are not second-best optimal and second-best pollution caps have to be calculated
for each specific network structure.
One drawback of the second-best optimal solution concept proposed in this chapter and cap-and-
trade systems in general is that they require perfect information of the abatement and damage cost
functions as well as the exogenously given pollution levels. Abatement costs may be especially dif-
ficult to monitor and agents may have an incentive to overstate their true abatement costs. Further-
more, if sources and receptors are assumed to be nations, no international government exists that
can impose a cap-and-trade system. Hence, establishing a cap-and-trade system would require co-
operation among the sovereign nations. Yet, they can only be expected to cooperate if it makes them
better or at least not worse off. Thus, the initial distribution of second-best optimal amount of per-
mits should be used as an instrument for compensating the potential losers of an international policy
instrument. As a final point, clearly there exists an isomorphism between a second-best pollution cap
and a second-best Pigou tax. By endogenizing the Pigou tax so that it is determined by the second-
best cost minimum of the multi-polluter network given a tax regime, the resulting second-best tax
implies a total pollution level equivalent to the first-best optimal pollution level.
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Appendix
Proof. of proposition 3
Let us first consider emission markets. In an emission market equilibrium, marginal abatement costs
have to be equalized over all agents as all agents face the same price pE, i.e.
c′i(ei − zi) = c
′
j(ej − zj), ∀i, j. (5.1)
In order for the emission market to be first-best optimal, the cost minimizing conditions (2.2) have to
hold. Combined with (5.1), this implies that
n
∑
j=1
γijd
′
j(qj) =
n
∑
j=1
γkjd
′
j(qj), ∀k, i, j = 1, ..., n.
Similarly, for an ambient pollution market, the necessary cost minimizing conditions (3.4) combined
with pI having to be equal for all agents leads to
c′i(ei − zi)
∑
n
m=1 γim
=
c′j(ej − zj)
∑
n
m=1 γjm
, ∀i, j.
Together with the first order conditions for the first-best solution (2.2), an ambient pollution market
is first-best optimal whenever
∑
n
j=1 γijd
′
j(qj)
∑
n
m=1 γim
=
∑
n
j=1 γkjd
′
j(qj)
∑
n
m=1 γkm
, ∀i, k.
Rearranging implies
n
∑
m=1
γkm
n
∑
j=1
γijd
′
j(qj) =
n
∑
m=1
γim
n
∑
j=1
γkjd
′
j(qj), ∀i, k,⇔
(γi1 + ...+ γin)(γk1d
′
1(q1) + ...+ γknd
′
n(qn)) = (γk1 + ...+ γkn)(γi1d
′
1(q1) + ...+ γind
′
n(qn)) ⇔
n
∑
j=1
n
∑
m 6=j
γijγkm(d
′
m(qm)− d
′
j(qj)) = 0⇔
d′j(qj) = d
′
m(qm), ∀j,m.
Proof. of proposition 4
We have to prove that there exists a z⋆⋆w that is the solution to ∂T
w(zw)
∂zw = 0 and that this local ex-
tremum is a global minimum. For this, Tw(zw) needs to be convex in zw, which is the case whenever
c′′′i (ei − z
w
i (.)) ≤ 0.
Lemma 1. Total costs Tw(zw) are convex in zw if c′′′i (ei − z
w
i (.)) ≤ 0.
Proof. of lemma 1
To show that total costs are convex, a few properties of the price and permit demand functions need
to hold, as established in the subsequent lemma.
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Lemma 2. For both permitmarketsw = I, E, the price pw(zw) is decreasing in zw and convexwhenever
c′′′i (ei − z
w
i (.)) ≥ 0 and concave whenever c
′′′
i (ei − z
w
i (.)) ≤ 0. The permit demands z
w
i (p(z
w)) are
decreasing in pw(zw) and increasing in zw. Furthermore, the permit demands are concave functions
of zw whenever c′′′i (ei − z
w
i (.)) ≥ 0 and convex whenever c
′′′
i (ei − z
w
i (.)) ≤ 0.
Proof. of lemma 2
Let us first show that the demand for permits decreases with an increase in the permit price. Follow-
ing from the necessary conditions of the emission (3.2) and ambient pollution market (3.4), zi(.) =
ei − c
′−1
i (.). Thus,
∂zwi (p
w(zw))
∂pw(zw)
= −
1
c′′i (ei − z
w
i (p
w(zw)))
< 0,w = I, E,
as c′′i (ei − z
w
i (p
w(zw)) > 0. Next, let us establish that ∂p
w(zw)
∂zw < 0 and
∂2pw(zw)
∂2zw
≥ 0, w = I, E. The
proofs for the emission and ambient pollution market differ, but only slightly. For completeness,
both proofs will be presented. From the market clearing condition for an emission market, we obtain
zE =
n
∑
i=1
ei − c
′−1
i (p).
Thus,
n
∑
i=1
c′−1i (p
E(zE))−
n
∑
i=1
ei + z
E = 0.
Applying the implicit function theorem yields
n
∑
i=1
∂c′−1i (p
E(zE))
∂pE(zE)
∂pE(zE)
∂zE
+ 1 = 0.
Solving for
∂pE(ze)
∂zE
gives
∂pE(zE)
∂zE
= −
1
∑
n
i=1 c
′−1
i (p
E(zE))′
= −
1
∑
n
i=1
1
c′′i (ei−zi)
< 0
as c′′i (ei − zi(.)) > 0, indicating a decrease in the permit price if the pollution cap increases. Analo-
gously, for the ambient pollution market,
zI =
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
γij(ei − c
′−1
i (p
n
∑
j=1
γij))
and by the implicit function theorem,
∂ ∑ni=1 ∑
n
j=1 γijc
′−1
i (p
I(zI)∑nj=1 γij)
∂zI
∂pI(zI)
∂zI
− 1 = 0.
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From this we obtain
∂pI(zI)
∂zI
= −
1
∂ ∑ni=1 ∑
n
j=1 γijc
′−1
i (p
I(zI)∑nj=1 γij)
∂zI
= −
1
∑
n
i=1
∑
n
j=1 γij
c′′i (ei−z
I
i (p
I(zI)))
< 0.
Taking the second order derivative of pw(zw) with respect to zw yields
∂2pw(zw)
∂2zw
= −
1
∑
n
i=1
gi
−(c′′i (ei−z
w
i (p
w(zw))))2
· c′′′i (ei − z
w
i (p
w(zw))) ·
∂zwi (p
w(zw))
∂pw(zw)
∂pw(zw)
∂zw
,
with gi = 1 for the emission market and gi = ∑
n
j=1 γij for the ambient pollution market. Thus,
∂2pw(zw)
∂2zw

> 0 if c
′′′
i (ei − z
w
i (p
w(zw))) > 0
< 0 if c′′′i (ei − z
w
i (p
w(zw))) < 0.
Additionally, let us analyse the curvature of zwi (p
w(zw)), i.e.
∂2zwi (p
w(z)w)
∂2pw(zw)
=
1
(c′′i (ei − z
w
i (p
w(zw))))2
· c′′′i (ei − z
w
i (p
w(zw))) ·
∂zwi (p
w(zw))
∂pw(zw)
so that
∂2zwi (p
w(zw))
∂2pw(zw)

< 0 if c
′′′
i (ei − z
w
i (p
w(zw))) > 0
> 0 if c′′′i (ei − z
w
i (p
w(zw))) < 0.
For both permit markets
∂zwi (p
w(zw))
∂zw
=
∂zwi (p
w(zw))
∂pw(zw)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
·
∂pw(zw)
∂zw︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0.
Finally, with
∂2zwi (p
w(zw))
∂2zw
=
∂2zwi (p
w(zw))
∂2pw(zw)
(
∂pw(zw)
∂zw
)2
+
∂zwi (p
w(zw))
∂pw(zw)
∂2pw(zw)
∂2zw
and given the properties of pw(zw) and zwi (p
w(zw)), we attain
∂2zwi (p
w(zw))
∂2zw

< 0 if c
′′′
i (ei − z
w
i (.)) > 0
> 0 if c′′′i (ei − z
w
i (.)) < 0.
Thus, zwi (p
w(zw)) is a convex function of zw whenever c′′′i (ei − z
w
i (.)) < 0.
Let D(zw) = ∑ni=1 di(∑
n
j=1 γjiz
w
j (p(z
w))) and C(zw) = ∑ni=1 ci(ei − z
w
i (p(z
w))), with T(zw) =
D(zw) + C(zw). From convex function calculus, we know that when f is convex and g is convex and
monotonically increasing, then g ◦ f is convex. Given that c′′′i (ei− z
w
i (.)) ≤ 0, z
w
i (p
w(zw)) is convex in
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zw. As di(.) as well as ci(.) are convex and monotonically increasing, we have that D(z
w) and C(zw)
are convex functions in zw. Hence, Tw(zw) = D(zw) + C(zw) being the sum of two convex functions
must be convex as well. Because Tw(zw) is a convex function of zw in the case of c′′′i (ei − z
w
i (.)) < 0,
Tw(zw) has a global minimum at z⋆⋆w, which however must not be unique as we do not have strictly
convex functions.
Proof. of proposition 5
Let us first characterize the first-best optimal abatement levels x⋆. According to proposition 1, the
first-best optimal abatement allocation has to satisfy the following first order conditions
c′i(xi) =
n
∑
j=1
γijd
′
j(qj).
To simplify our analysis, let mi = ∑
n
j=1 γijd
′
j(qj). Intuitively, mi measures the total marginal effect
of an increase in agent i’s net emissions ei − xi on the damages of all agents j, with γij > 0. As
the marginal damages d′j(qj) are constants for all agents j, the first-best abatement levels take the
following form
x⋆i = c
′−1
i (mi), i = 1, ..., n.
Given the functional form of ci(.), the first-best solutions can be expressed as
x⋆i =
mi
αi
, i = 1, ..., n, (5.2)
indicating that x⋆i is inversely proportional to αi. As per (3.6), the first-best pollution cap for an
emission market amounts to
z⋆E =
n
∑
j=1
(ej − x
⋆
j ) =
n
∑
j=1
ej −
mj
αj
(5.3)
and similarly, in compliance with (3.7), the first-best pollution cap for an ambient pollution market is
z⋆I =
n
∑
j=1
n
∑
i=1
γji(ej − x
⋆
j ) = ∑
j
∑
i
γji(ej −
mj
αj
). (5.4)
Next, we determine the second-best pollution caps, first for an emission market and then for an
ambient pollution market. Given the functional form of ci(.) and the individual cost minimizing
conditions for the permit demands (3.2), we attain
zEi (p
E(zE)) = ei −
pE(zE)
αi
(5.5)
implying
∂zEi (p
E(zE))
∂pE(zE)
= −
1
αi
. (5.6)
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Furthermore, c′i(ei − zi) = αi(zi − ei). The second-best pollution cap z
⋆⋆E has to fulfill equation (4.2).
Inserting the expressions derived in (5.5) and (5.6) into equation (4.2) yields
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
mj ·
(
−1
αj
)
−
n
∑
j=1
αj(ej − z
E
j (p
E(z⋆⋆E))) ·
(
−1
αj
)
= 0.
Rearranging implies
n
∑
j=1
zEj (p(z
⋆⋆E)) =
n
∑
j=1
ej −
mj
αj
. (5.7)
By definition,
n
∑
j=1
zEj (p(z
⋆⋆E)) = z⋆⋆E.
Thus, according to (5.7), we get
z⋆⋆E =
n
∑
j=1
ej −
mj
αj
.
Given the first-best pollution cap (5.3), we conclude
z⋆⋆E = z⋆E.
Analogously, for the ambient pollution market, given the functional form of ci(.) and the individual
cost minimizing conditions for the permit demands (3.4), we attain
zIj (p
I(zI)) = ej −
pI(zI)∑nk=1 γjk
αj
and thus
∂zIj (p
I(zI))
∂pI(zI)
= −
∑
n
k=1 γjk
αj
.
The second-best pollution cap z⋆⋆I has to fulfill (4.2). Inserting the expressions derived above into
(4.2) implies
n
∑
j=1
mj ·
(
−∑nk=1 γjk
αj
)
−
n
∑
j=1
αj(ej − zj(p(z
⋆⋆I))) ·
(
−
∑
n
k=1 γjk
αj
)
= 0
Rearranging yields
n
∑
j=1
n
∑
k=1
γjkz
I
j (p
I(zI⋆⋆)) =
n
∑
j=1
n
∑
k=1
γjkej −
n
∑
j=1
n
∑
k=1
γjk
mj
αj
.
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By definition
z⋆⋆I =
n
∑
j=1
n
∑
k=1
γjkz
I
j (p
I(zI⋆⋆)),
which according to (5.4) implies
z⋆⋆I = z⋆I .
Proof. of proposition 6
The first-best allocation derived in (5.2) determines first-best total abatement costs, i.e.
C⋆ =
n
∑
i=1
ci(x
⋆
i ) = 1/2 ·
(
n
∑
i=1
m2i
αi
)
(5.8)
and first-best total damage costs, i.e.
D⋆ =
n
∑
i=1
di(qi(x
⋆)) =
n
∑
i=1
mi(ei −
mi
αi
). (5.9)
To attain Cw and Dw, the second-best optimal permit demands have to be acquired. With the func-
tional forms of the damage and abatement functions and the cost minimizing conditions of the emis-
sion market (3.1), we obtain zEi (p) = ei −
p
αi
. In the second-best cost minimum, market clearing
demands
n
∑
i=1
zEi (p(z
⋆⋆E)) =
n
∑
i=1
ei −
p(z⋆⋆E)
αi
= z⋆⋆E.
Solving for p(z⋆⋆E) yields
pE(z⋆⋆E) =
∑
n
i=1 ei − z
⋆⋆E
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
.
Inserting pE(z⋆⋆E) into zEi (p) = ei −
p
αi
, yields permit demands
zEi (p(z
⋆⋆E)) = ei −
∑
n
i=1 ei − z
⋆⋆E
αi ∑
n
i=1
1
αi
. (5.10)
According to proposition 5, second-best and first-best permit pollution caps coincide. Thus, inserting
z⋆E derived in (5.3) into the above expression (5.10) leads to the second-best optimal permit demands,
i.e.
zEi (p(z
⋆⋆E)) = ei −
∑i
mi
αi
αi ∑i
1
αi
.
Thus, total abatement costs in the second-best cost minimum amount to
CE =
n
∑
i=1
ci(ei − z
E
i (p
E(z⋆⋆E))) = 1/2
(
(∑ni=1
mi
αi
)2
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
)
(5.11)
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and total damage costs to
DE = ∑
i=1
di(
n
∑
j=1
γjiz
E
j (p
E(z⋆⋆E))) =
n
∑
i=1
βi
n
∑
j=1
γji
(
ej −
1
αj
∑
n
i=1
mi
αi
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
)
. (5.12)
Given the expressions of C⋆ in (5.8) and CE in (5.11), we attain
∆CE = CE − C⋆ = 1/2
(
(∑ni=1
mi
αi
)2
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
−
n
∑
i=1
m2i
αi
)
. (5.13)
And analogously, with D⋆ derived in (5.9) and DE given in (5.12), we attain
∆DE = DE − D⋆ =
n
∑
i=1
βi
n
∑
j=1
γji
(
ej −
1
αj
∑
n
i=1
mi
αi
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
)
−
n
∑
i=1
mi(ei −
mi
αi
)
=
n
∑
j=1
mj
αj
(
mj −
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
mi
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
)
.
Equivalently, for an ambient pollution market, the net emission functions resulting from the individ-
ual cost minimizing conditions (3.4) amount to zIi (p) = ei−
p∑nj=1 γij
αi
. Combined with market clearing,
we receive
pI(z⋆⋆I) =
∑
n
i=1 ∑
n
j=1 γijei − z
⋆⋆I
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
(
∑
n
j=1 γij
)2
so that
zIi (p
I(z⋆⋆I)) = ei −
1
αi
·
n
∑
j=1
γij

∑ni=1 ∑nj=1 γijei − z⋆⋆I
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
(
∑
n
j=1 γij
)2

 .
Inserting the first-best pollution cap derived in (5.4) into the above expression, yields second-best net
emission functions of
zIi (p(z
⋆⋆I)) = ei −
1
αi
·
n
∑
j=1
γij

 ∑nj=1
mj
αj
∑
n
k=1 γjk
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
(
∑
n
j=1 γij
)2

 .
Thus, the total abatement cost in the second-best total cost minimum amount to
CI =
n
∑
i=1
ci(ei − z
I
i (p(z
⋆⋆I))) = 1/2 ·

 (∑nj=1
mj
αj
∑
n
k=1 γjk)
2
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
(
∑
n
j=1 γij
)2

 (5.14)
and similarly, total damage costs to
DI = ∑
i=1
di(
n
∑
j=1
γjiz
I
j (p(z
⋆⋆I))) =
n
∑
i=1
βi
n
∑
k=1
γki

ek − 1αk
n
∑
j=1
γkj
∑
n
i=1 ∑
n
j=1
γji
αj
∑
n
k=1 γjkβk
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
(∑nj=1 γij)
2

 . (5.15)
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Given the expressions of C⋆ in (5.8) and CI in (5.14), we conclude that
∆CI = CI − C⋆ = 1/2 ·

 (∑nj=1
mj
αj
∑
n
k=1 γjk)
2
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
(
∑
n
j=1 γij
)2 − n∑
i=1
(mi)
2
αi

 . (5.16)
Similarly, according to D⋆ derived in (5.9) and DI given (5.15), the difference in total damage costs
amounts to
∆DI = DI − D⋆
=
n
∑
i=1
βi
n
∑
k=1
γki

ek − 1αk
n
∑
j=1
γkj
∑
n
i=1 ∑
n
j=1
γji
αj
∑
n
k=1 γjkβk
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
(∑nj=1 γij)
2

− n∑
i=1
mi(ei −
mi
αi
)
=
n
∑
k=1
m2k
αk
−
n
∑
k=1
mk
αk

 n∑
j=1
γkj
∑
n
i=1 ∑
n
j=1
mjγji
αj
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
(∑nj=1 γij)
2

 .
Lemma 3. The following relationship between ∆Cw and ∆Dw holds
∆Dw = −2 · ∆Cw,w = I, E.
Proof. of lemma 3
Given the definitions of ∆CE and ∆CI in (5.13) respectively (5.16), we have
−2∆CE = −2 ·
(
1/2
(
(∑ni=1
mi
αi
)2
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
−
n
∑
i=1
m2i
αi
))
=
n
∑
i=1
m2i
αi
−
(∑ni=1
mi
αi
)2
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
=
n
∑
i=1
mi
αi
(
mi −
∑
n
i=1
mi
αi
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
)
.
= ∆DE.
Similarly,
−2∆CI = −2

1/2 ·

 (∑nj=1
mj
αj
∑
n
k=1 γjk)
2
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
(
∑
n
j=1 γij
)2 − n∑
i=1
(mi)
2
αi




=
n
∑
i=1
m2i
αi
−
(∑nj=1 ∑
n
k=1
γjkmj
αj
)2
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
(∑nj=1 γij)
2
=
n
∑
i=1
m2i
αi
−
(∑nj=1 ∑
n
k=1
γjkmj
αj
)
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
(∑nj=1 γij)
2
· (
n
∑
j=1
n
∑
k=1
γjkmj
αj
)
= ∆DI .
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Let us now prove that ∆Cw ≤ 0 and ∆Dw ≥ 0. By contradiction, let ∆CE > 0. Then,
∆CE > 0 ⇔ 1/2
(
(∑ni=1
mi
αi
)2
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
−
n
∑
i=1
1
αi
(mi)
2
)
> 0
⇔
n
∑
i=1
1
αi
m2i
n
∑
i=1
1
αi
−
(
n
∑
i=1
1
αi
mi
)2
< 0
⇔
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1,j 6=i
1
αiαj
(mi −mj)
2
< 0.
The last inequality does not hold due to (mi −mj)
2 always being positive. Thus, ∆CE > 0 cannot be
satisifed. Given ∆CE ≤ 0 and applying lemma 3, implies ∆DE ≥ 0.
Equivalently, for the ambient pollution market, assume by contradiction that ∆DI < 0. Then,
∆DI < 0 ⇔
n
∑
k=1
(mk)
2
αk
−
n
∑
k=1
mk
αk

 n∑
j=1
γkj
∑
n
i=1 ∑
n
j=1
γji
αj
mj
∑
n
i=1
1
αi
(∑nj=1 γij)
2

 < 0
⇔ (
n
∑
i=1
1
αi
(
n
∑
j=1
γij)
2)(
n
∑
i=1
m2i
αi
)−
(
n
∑
i=1
mi
αi
n
∑
j=1
γij
)2
< 0
⇔ 1/2
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
(
mi ∑
n
k=1 γik −mj ∑
n
k=1 γjk
)2
αiαj
< 0.
The last inequality does not hold true due to
(
mi ∑
n
k=1 γik −mj ∑
n
k=1 γjk
)2
always being positive.
Hence, ∆DI ≥ and it follows from lemma 3, that ∆IC ≤ 0.
Finally, we show that DWLw ≥ 0. By definition of DWLw and as a consequence of lemma 3, we
obtain
DWLw = ∆Dw + ∆Cw = −2∆Cw + ∆Cw = −∆Cw,w = I, E.
Given ∆Cw ≤ 0, we conclude DWLw ≥ 0.
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